First Labor Rights Claim Under the Revised NAFTA Filed by Migrant Worker Women in the U.S. -- What Does It Mean in Terms of the New Labor Rulebook in the Region?

By Daniel Rangel

The revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) hints at key terms that a pro-worker, pro-environment trade agreement should include, thanks to the crucial engagement of congressional Democrats. In 2019, they forced Trump to renegotiate his initial 2018 NAFTA revision to meet Democrats’ demands. The final pact won unprecedented Democratic congressional support in no small part because of enhanced labor obligations enshrined in the agreement and its novel enforcement mechanisms that many hoped could improve the living conditions of working people throughout North America.

One critique made by some progressives was that the deal targeted labor conditions in Mexico, while offering little that could improve working conditions for people north of the Rio Grande — including labor protections for Mexican migrant workers employed in the Northern neighbors.

Well, it turns out that the first demand for enforcement action for failing to comply with the new labor terms is against the United States. The petition submitted on March 23 was filed by Mexican migrant workers, Maritza Perez and Adareli Ponce, and a binational coalition of organizations led by the binational organization Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc. (CDM). Other signers include the American Federation of Teachers, the Association of Flight Attendants-CWA and the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union.

From the outset, it is important to point out that this submission is not under the labor Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) that is viewed as one of the most interesting new provisions in the revised NAFTA. RRM allows challenges against specific companies and punishes them directly for violations. RRM enforcement only applies to claims about violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights, which are not the focus of this complaint. So, the first test run of the RRM provisions is still pending.

Rather, this submission to the Mexican Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare is effectively a request that the Mexican government initiate what is called a state-state enforcement claim that the United States has breached the revised NAFTA labor rules by allowing gender-based discrimination in its H-2 non-immigrant worker visa program.

The 133-page complaint basically has four lines of argument.

First, migrant women are largely excluded from the U.S. H-2 visa programs. Through systemic, discriminatory recruitment and hiring practices, women are overwhelmingly left out of both the H-2A and H-2B programs. For instance, in 2018, only 3% of all H-2A visas (for non-U.S. citizens to temporarily work in agricultural essential activities) were issued to women, while women make up 25% of the U.S. agricultural workforce.

Second, the limited number of women who get admitted to the H-2 visa program are routinely funneled into H-2B visas, which are generally less desirable because of lower wages and fewer benefits, such as free employer-provided housing. The petitioners point out that the United States issues approximately three times as many H-2B visas to women as compared to H-2A visas.

Third, even within the less desirable H-2B program, employers generally assign women to less favorable and lower-paid positions than their male counterparts.

And fourth, women that participate in H-2 visa programs experience pervasive sexual harassment and sexual violence and limits to their ability to seek legal counsel.

According to the petitioners, the United States is in violation of its obligations under the revised NAFTA by failing to enforce both the new terms of the deal and its own laws that ban these kind of practices, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the case claims violations of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) Article 23.3(1)(d), labor rights; Art. 23.5(1) and (2), enforcement of labor laws; Art. 23.7, violence against workers; Art. 23.8, migrant workers; Art. 23.9, discrimination in the workplace; and Art. 23.10, public awareness and procedural guarantees.

Notably, the petitioners rely on provisions of the revised NAFTA and on U.S. domestic law to back their arguments. This speaks to the critiques about the new deal not protecting Mexican migrant workers. Unlike the original NAFTA’s labor side deal, the revised NAFTA’s Labor Chapter is part of the pact’s core text and contains “hard” obligations that are subject to the agreement’s dispute settlement provisions. This includes obligations on the elimination of employment discrimination (Art. 23.3(1)(d)) and on the protection of migrant workers (Art. 23.8). The original NAFTA’s labor-side agreement only mentioned these subjects as “guiding principles” that the parties were committed to promote without setting common minimum standards.

While the substantive standards give tools to organizations in North America to promote the enhancement of working conditions in the United States and Canada, including for migrant workers, there are no procedural guarantees a formal state-state enforcement action will proceed. Article 23.11 of the revised NAFTA obliges the parties to designate a contact point and to provide a timely response to written submissions related to labor matters. However, whether the enforcement process is launched is solely within the discretion of the government that has been petitioned. Thus, while the strong case made in the petition has advocacy value on its own merits, we must wait for the decision of the Mexican government on whether this will become a formal USMCA case and test if substantive protections for Mexican workers employed in the United States and Canada can be enforced.

Acknowledging the existence of migrant workers protections does not mean that the labor terms in the deal treat each country the same. This imbalance is particularly visible in the procedural requirements to activate RRM, alluded to above. A complaint can be initiated against Mexico based on violations of the right to organize and union democracy rights, under legislation that complies with conditions set out in an annex of the agreement. For all relevant purposes, this refers to violations of Mexico’s 2019 reformed Federal Labor Law. However, cases against the United States and Canada are limited to violations occurring after the National Labor Relations Board or Industrial Relations Board, respectively, has already issued an order, meaning that the issue already has been subject to domestic enforcement action. In practice, what this means is that there is an exhaustion of local remedies requirement to start a RRM case against the United States or Canada and there is no such requirement if the complaint is against Mexico. Furthermore, there is not RRM enforcement between the United States and Canada. 

So, what’s next on this petition? According to the revised NAFTA rules, the Mexican government has to consider and provide a timely response to the petitioners behind this brief, but it still has significant discretion about whether to proceed with state-state dispute settlement. If it chooses to do so, the first step is to start consultations with the United States to try to reach a mutually agreeable solution. If consultations fail, Mexico could initiate a formal dispute settlement proceeding and, eventually, impose trade sanctions against the United States if a panel rules that the violations indeed exist and that the U.S. government has not done anything to redress them.

Whether the Mexican government is likely to pursue this case at all or go all the way through a formal state-state enforcement case remains to be seen. Notably, earlier this year President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) aired a proposal to create a Bracero style immigrant labor program to allow Mexican and Central American immigrants to temporarily work in the United States to fill labor shortages. Given that this complaint spotlights bad conditions for workers under existing U.S. visa programs for foreign workers, AMLO could try to leverage the case to promote his plan. However, civil society organizations, among them the lead organization behind the complaint, have sounded alarms about a potential Bracero 2.0 program, due to the exploitative working conditions under the original program during World War II.

In any event, the complaint represents many organizations’ intentions to test if the revised NAFTA’s labor terms could be an effective tool to improve workers’ conditions in the United States, in contrast to the current model that has primarily benefited transnational capital. Now, it is for the governments of North America to treat this case, and those that follow, seriously in order to make the revised deal a floor of decency for worker protection across the region.

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Trump Trade Deficit 6.5% Higher than Obama’s Last Year, Not Eliminated as Then-Candidate Trump Promised

Trump Trade Deficit Increases Even as Trade Flows Show COVID-19 Effect, Dropping 15% in First Six Months of 2020 Compared to Same Period in 2019

The U.S. trade deficit in the first half of President Donald Trump’s fourth year in office remains 6.5% higher than in the same period in President Barack Obama’s last year, despite a 15% overall fall-off in trade flows related to the global pandemic, new trade data released by the U.S. Census Bureau shows.

“Worldwide COVID-19 has reduced trade flows, so the fact that Trump’s trade deficit is larger than  the same period in the last year of the Obama administration shines a big fat spotlight on Trump’s failure to ‘eliminate’ the trade deficit, which he promised endlessly as a candidate in 2016,” said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch.

Even as trade flows overall dropped 15%, the U.S. trade deficit in the first six months of 2020 was only down 9% relative to the same period in 2019. This is in part because imports from Mexico have begun to rise significantly. 

The new U.S. Census Bureau trade data showed that:

  • The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on commerce in general and trade in specific are evident in the six-month 2020 data: Comparing the trade flows in the first 6 months of 2019 to the same period in 2020, U.S. trade has decreased 15%.
    • Total U.S. goods and services exports in the first half of 2020 were $1,066 billion relative to $1,266 billion  in 2019. Imports in the first half of 2020 were $1,341 billion versus $1,563 billion  in 2019.
  • The six-month 2020 trade deficit is 6.5% higher than the deficit for 2016, the year before Trump took office, even as the COVID-19 effect reduced the deficit 9% compared to the first six months of 2019. Comparing the first half of Obama’s last year in office (January to June 2016), the overall trade deficit increased 6.5% rising from $257 billion to $274 billion in inflation-adjusted terms. (The unadjusted figures provided in the government data base show a rise from $238 billion to $274 billion.)
    • The overall U.S. goods and service trade deficit with the world dropped 9% in first half of 2020 relative to the same period in 2019 from $301 billion to $274 billion in inflation-adjusted terms (The unadjusted figures provided in the government data base show a drop from $297 billion to $274 billion.)
    • The U.S. trade deficit in goods decreased 7.5% in inflation-adjusted terms from $446 billion in the first six months of 2019 to $412 billion in the same period of 2020. However, the trade deficit in goods during these months is still 3% higher than the one experienced in the same period of 2016, rising from $399 billion to $412 billion (inflation-adjusted dollars).
  • The China deficit is down relative to Obama’s last year, but there is “trade diversion” effect of imports increasing from other countries. 
    • The trade deficit with China decreased 22% in inflation-adjusted terms going from $169 billion in the first half of 2019 to $132 billion in the first half of 2020. It is also smaller compared to 2016, when in inflation-adjusted dollars, it was $173 billion for January to June.
    • In inflation-adjusted dollars, the goods trade deficit with the rest of the world (excluding China) increased from $277 billion to $280 billion in the first half of 2020 relative to the same period in 2019.
  • The deficit with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners is 11% higher in the first half of 2020 relative to the same period in Obama’s last year in office but down relative to 2019 even as Mexican exports to the U.S. began to expand significantly in June.
    • The NAFTA deficit in the first six months of 2020 was $97 billion, 11% higher than the same period in 2016 when it was equivalent to $88 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars. (In nominal terms the goods trade deficit with NAFTA parties increased by 18%, or $15 billion.)
    • The goods trade deficit with NAFTA parties decreased by $19 billion in inflation adjusted terms compared to the same period in 2019, largely because of measures taken to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
    • Even as the COVID-19 pandemic narrowed the trade deficit with NAFTA parties during the first half of 2020 compared to 2019, the reduction was not as large as expected given the jump of Mexican exports in June. According to the data released by Mexico’s statistics authority Mexico’s statistics authority (the National Institute of Statistics and Geography), Mexican exports, of which more than 80% are destined to U.S. markets, grew 75.5% in June relative to May. This resulted in Mexico posting a six-month January to June surplus of $2.6 billion even as Mexican exports decreased overall 12.8% compared to June 2019, Mexican imports dropped almost 10% more in the same period (22.2%).
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Mexican Labor Activist Susana Prieto, on Eve of Possible Reimprisonment, and U.S. Rep. Chuy Garcia (D-Ill.) Call on Mexican President AMLO and President Trump to Remedy Ongoing Worker Abuses and Low Wages

Celebration of New NAFTA Premature: It Won’t Help Workers Absent Action to Translate the Labor Rights in the Text into Change on the Ground

 

WHAT:     On Weds., July 8th at 11 a.m. EDT/10 a.m. CDT, Mexican labor activist Susana Prieto will be joined by U.S. Rep. Jesús “Chuy” García (D-Ill.) to demand an end to ongoing labor abuses that undercut the U.S. and Mexican presidents’ celebration tomorrow of the new North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Prieto, a prominent labor lawyer representing exploited workers in Mexico-Texas border maquiladora factories, was released on July 1 after being held without bail for three weeks on trumped-up charges of “mutiny, threats and coercion” after trying to register an independent union to replace a corrupt “protection” union. Her case reflects myriad labor abuses throughout Mexico, where workers fighting for independent unions, better wages and COVID-19-safe workplaces face ongoing abuse and resistance. The conditions for Prieto’s release, including a 30-month internal exile, are designed to end her representation of Matamoros workers seeking independent unions and intimidate workers nationwide seeking to exercise their labor rights. She must end her Matamoros labor organizing, not leave Mexico, and relocate to the state of Chihuahua, where a prosecutor issued new warrants for her arrest. Prieto helped workers win higher wages last year while fighting for independent labor representation that the new NAFTA is supposed to promote. Recently she helped workers demand COVID-19 safety protections after many died from workplace coronavirus exposures. After decades of worker intimidation, Mexican manufacturing wages are now 40% lower than those in China. More background on Prieto is available, here.

WHEN:    11 a.m. EDT/10 a.m. CDT/9 a.m. Juarez time, Weds., July 8

 

WHO:       Susana Prieto Terrazas, Mexican labor lawyer

U.S. Rep. Jesús “Chuy” García (D-Ill.)

Lori Wallach, director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch (moderator)

 

WHERE:  To register for the press conference: https://cutt.ly/koN4s49

                  (You must register in advance to get the zoom link for the event)

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Launch of New NAFTA Marred by Detainment of Mexican Labor Activist, Hundreds of Court Challenges Against New Labor Law

Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

Note: The revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) goes into effect today, July 1. The U.S. Senate passed the new NAFTA in January 2020 by a margin of 89 to 10 after the U.S. House of Representatives voted by a margin of 385 to 41 in December 2019.

On paper the new NAFTA –with improved labor terms added and extreme Big Pharma monopolies and ISDS investor rights removed – is better than the original, but it won’t benefit people unless it’s effectively enforced.

It’s a terrible start that on Day One of a deal Trump said would transform trade, a leading Mexican labor lawyer has spent weeks in jail on trumped up charges for helping workers use USMCA’s labor rights and Mexico’s new USMCA-compliant labor law is bogged down by hundreds of lawsuits aimed at derailing it.

Maybe Trump hoped to distract from myriad failures by spotlighting the new NAFTA on July 1, but it’s also the date that 100 of the 600 legal challenges against the pact’s labor rights rise to Mexico’s Supreme Court and Susana Prieto, a famous Mexican labor lawyer detained for weeks for helping workers organize a union, has a high visibility hearing.

Meanwhile, Trump’s claims that the new NAFTA will restore hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs have proved baseless as U.S. auto firms announced plans to increase production in Mexico from Ford’s Mustang electric SUV to GM closing U.S. plants and moving popular vehicle lines to Mexico. But the U.S. Department of Labor has certified more than 175,000 Americans as losing jobs to trade during the Trump administration’s first years while the NAFTA trade deficit jumped 88% under Trump.

The new NAFTA’s greatest impact may be that it began a long overdue rethink of the U.S. trade-pact model. The unusually large, bipartisan congressional votes on the new NAFTA showed that to be viable today, U.S. trade pacts no longer can include extreme corporate investor privileges or broad monopolies for Big Pharma and must have enforceable labor and environmental standards. The 2016 Trans-Pacific Partnership, which failed these tests, never got close to majority congressional support.

Renegotiating the existing NAFTA to try to reduce its ongoing damage is not the same as crafting a good trade deal that creates jobs, raises wages and protects the environment and public health. The new NAFTA is not a template, but rather sets the floor from which we will fight for trade policies that put working people and the planet first. Any new trade deals must include climate standards, stronger rules to stop race-to-the-bottom outsourcing of jobs and pollution, and enforceable rules against currency misvaluation and not limit protections needed to ensure our food and products are safe, our privacy is protected and big banks do not crash the economy.

BACKGROUND INFO

Susana Prieto Terrazas, a well-known Mexican labor lawyer, has been locked up since June 8 for trying to use the core labor right guaranteed by the revised NAFTA and Mexico’s new labor law; a July 1 hearing is scheduled after several punitive bail denials. Prieto, a key advocate for exploited workers in border maquiladora factories in Matamoros and Juárez, has been held without bail for three weeks on trumped-up charges of “mutiny, threats and coercion” after trying to register an independent union to replace a corrupt “protection” union in Matamoros. Prieto became well-known in Mexico for helping maquiladora workers win higher wages in factories along the Texas border last year. Recently, she supported workers demanding COVID-19 safety measures after dozens of maquiladora workers died from workplace coronavirus exposure. Wildcat strikes and mass protests have grown throughout the border region as U.S. companies and officials push for plants to reopen without safety measures. Dozens of members of the U.S. House of Representatives sent a letter yesterday demanding Prieto’s release. At June 17 hearings, members of Congress raised concerns about Prieto’s arrest with the U.S. Trade Representative, who confirmed he was closely following her case and found it a “bad indicator” of compliance with NAFTA’s revised labor standards. Prieto livestreamed her arrest as she tried to register the Independent Union of Industrial and Service Workers “Movimiento 20/32,” chosen by workers to replace a “protection” union. Last week, Prieto’s daughter delivered a letter from U.S. unions and civil society groups to the Mexican National Human Rights Commission seeking help on Prieto’s release. U.S. fair trade activists will deliver the letter to Mexican consulates nationwide on July 1. After decades of worker intimidation, Mexican manufacturing wages are now 40% lower than those in China. The Department of Labor has certified more than one million U.S. jobs (1,015,948) as lost to NAFTA just under one narrow retraining program called Trade Adjustment Assistance, which represents a significant undercount of total jobs lost.*

The first 100 of 600 challenges to Mexico’s new labor law will hit Mexico’s Supreme Court on its July 1 reopening. The new NAFTA requires that “protection” contracts signed by unions not elected by workers all be reviewed and that contracts be approved directly by workers within four years after the revised NAFTA goes into effect. This requirement is at the heart of the reforms to Mexico’s labor laws enacted on May 1, 2019. Under the new labor law, workers in Mexico could finally have legal protections to fight to raise abysmally low wages. This would also reduce incentives to outsource U.S. jobs to Mexico, benefiting U.S. workers. Within weeks of the new law’s enactment, hundreds of corrupt local “protection” unions and other interests opposed to reform began to file what are now more than 600 lawsuits, which both try to block the law’s application to specific union contracts and workplaces and to gut the law altogether on grounds that it is  unconstitutional. Mexico’s judiciary has been out of session since mid-March for COVID-19 precautions. On July 1, the court system goes back into operation, with the first 100 challenges hitting Mexico’s Supreme Court. If the court rules against the challenged terms, Mexico will be in violation of NAFTA labor obligations that are essential if the new deal is to slow U.S. job outsourcing. This memo has the latest updates on the cases

The Department of Labor has certified 176,982 trade-related job losses during Trump’s presidency, and the manufacturing sector is hurting. Under the narrow Trade Adjustment Assistance worker training program alone, 176,982 workers have been certified as losing jobs to trade since the 2017 start of the Trump administration. The data mainly covers 2017-2018, as there is typically a 12-18 month gap between layoff dates and certification. Whether the new NAFTA can slow ongoing job outsourcing or the 88% increase in the overall NAFTA trade deficit during the Trump administration remains to be seen over time. What is clear now is that the U.S. manufacturing sector has been severely harmed by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, with 1.1 million manufacturing jobs lost in May 2020 compared with the same month last year.

*Data Note: The trade data is sourced from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. Census Bureau. We present deficit figures adjusted for inflation to the base month of May 2020. The overall percentage change in the U.S.-NAFTA trade deficit under Donald Trump represent the change in total goods and services trade deficit since 2016, Barack Obama’s last year, and 2019, the last full year of data available during the Trump administration. Manufacturing job data is sourced from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The government-certified job loss data is sourced from Public Citizen’s Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Database. The U.S. Department of Labor certified trade-impacted workplaces under its TAA program. This program provides a list of trade-related job losses and job retraining and extended unemployment benefits to workers who lose jobs to trade. TAA is a narrow program, covering only a subset of workers who lose jobs to trade. It does not provide a comprehensive list of facilities or jobs that have been offshored or lost to import competition. Although the TAA data represent a significant undercount of trade-related job losses, TAA is the only government program that provides information about job losses officially certified by the U.S. government to be trade-related. Public Citizen provides an easily searchable version of the TAA database. Please review our guide on how to interpret the data here and the technical documentation here.

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Rethinking Trade - Season 1 Episode 6: As U.S. Pressures Mexico to Re-open NAFTA Factories, Workers Protest

COVID-19 deaths are still on the rise across Mexico. Despite government orders to close all non-essential firms, some U.S. factories have continued operating–with little consequence. Now the U.S. ambassador and hundreds of multinationals are demanding the country prioritize corporate interests over the safety of Mexican workers – by reopening factories now.

With the new NAFTA going into effect on July 1, how will the COVID-19 crisis impact the deal’s new worker-protection requirements and Mexico’s related labor reforms?

Transcribed by Lauren Martin

RYAN HARVEY: Welcome back to Rethinking Trade where we don’t just talk about trade policy, we fight to change it. I’m Ryan and I’m joined by our in house trade expert, Lori Wallach. Lori, we’ve all been seeing and consuming tons of news about the coronavirus, but one thing we’re not hearing too much about is Mexico. A lot of the products we use everyday are made in Mexico. What’s been going on in Mexico?

LORI WALLACH: Well, there is considerable spread of coronavirus there and COVID illness. It started a little bit later than the U.S. but there was widespread community spread by the beginning of March, on March 30th the progressive president of Mexico, AMLO, called for a basically shelter at home order and shut down all non-essential businesses. The sort of really gruesome story is that a lot of U.S. corporations that are producing in Mexico, many brand name companies that left the U.S. under NAFTA, have stayed open and particularly in the northern part of Mexico what’s often known as the maquiladora. So, in the border cities across from Texas and California and Arizona there have been considerable horrible outbreaks in factories where social distancing wasn’t respected, where personal protective equipment wasn’t given to workers, and where clearly the work was not essential. So, one of the stories that has gotten into the U.S. press (because most of it hasn’t) is the Lear company, they’re making car seats- obviously not essential- over a dozen workers there died after workers started showing up at the infirmary at the plant saying they had symptoms and they were sent back to work, etc. Unfortunately that is not unique, there have been in Honeywell plants, in [can’t tell what company she’s referencing 2:30] Motors plants, there have been a variety of episodes like that and there’s been a lot of activism which is, you know, powerful, inspired, where really workers saw the situation basically corporate greed, NAFTA corporate greed, versus their health and life. And a lot of workers-against really hard odds in Mexico because you can get beaten up at least, if not worse, for exercising your labor rights- workers protested. An inspiring story but unfortunately not the norm is workers at a factory called TPI Composite, they make the wind blades for electric generating windmills, five hundred workers went out on strike as someone in the plant had died and people were sick, and they got the company to basically furlough them all at full pay. And that is not typical- most of the places that are closing, it’s a struggle to get paid. And also, companies keep popping back up, they’re ignoring the order or they have sort of complicity with local officials. And if that weren’t enough, the U.S. and U.S. corporations have launched this really, really, intense pressure campaign for the Mexican government and those plants, the Mexican workers, to basically put these corporations interests ahead of the life and health of these Mexican workers. And the National Association of Manufacturers sent a letter, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico has just played a really evil role, he has been pressuring the  government with threats that the U.S. companies will just take off and produce elsewhere if they don’t reopen those companies regardless of the health complications. And maybe one of the most outrageous things he said was in a tweet: “There are risks everywhere,” said Chris Landau, “but we all don’t stay at home for fear we’re going to get in a car accident. The destruction of the economy is also a health threat.” As if somehow going to make non-essential goods, so a U.S. company can profit, at a time when the outbreak in Mexico is growing, growing, growing, is equivalent to the threat of a car accident. Versus industrial suicide by being forced into a dangerous situation. That is the situation of the Mexican government, it’s been uneven in it’s response in some respects it’s stood up to this pressure and in some instances it’s suggested that it will basically be reopening soon.

HARVEY: Speaking of labor laws in Mexico and labor standards in Mexico, one of the reasons we’re talking about this in our podcast about trade is because the new NAFTA is going into effect on July 1st, and in the new NAFTA there are new and somewhat significant labor standards that have also coalesced with a labor law reform in Mexico. Maybe you can talk about what those standards look like and what this current situation might mean for the new NAFTA’s implementation.

WALLACH: So the new NAFTA is slated to go into effect on July 1st in all three countries, and there could not be a less auspicious time. Because the improved labor standards and the really landmark enforcement system on paper in the agreement that the Congressional House Democrats forced the administration to add, so folks will remember in 2018 the NAFTA 2.0 text came out and the Democrats said “no!” The labor and environmental standards aren’t sufficient, nor their enforcement to stop outsourcing, it will just get worse, plus, there are outrageous new giveaways for pharma. The House Democrats basically drew a line in the sand and there was almost a year long stare down and ultimately the administration backed down and renegotiated the renegotiated NAFTA. So, the deal that’s going to go into effect on July 1 now has some useful improvements. But, like everything in life, there’s what’s on paper and then there’s what actually happens. So, there are at least 3 factors. And when I say it’s really inauspicious this is happening during COVID it’s because some of it’s going to be disrupted by the priority necessarily on the COVID response. So, number one, there are a bunch of court challenges against a new Mexican labor law that was passed to basically bring Mexican labor law into conformity with the obligations in the agreement. So, under the current Mexican labor law, there is what’s called a tripartite system where there is a lot of power in the state level in each Mexican state so that, for instance, if there are conservative governments that support the business perspective the tripartite system is one sort of, the decision is about whether contracts are legit, etc, it’s one union person, one business person, and one government person. So already, you’ve got a prospect of the business people and the government people on the wrong side of the workers. But then, under Mexican labor law, there really has not been under the old law, a way to ensure Mexican workers are actually voting to elect their own unions. So there’s this plague of what are called protection contracts, which are contracts typically signed for the first worker enters into the plant, between the boss and these sort of racket unions that are paid to do a contract, to satisfy the requirements of Mexican law, but the workers don’t get to vote on it, the function is to protect the boss and to have low wages. So there are 700,000 of those protection contracts and one of the things that’s in the Mexican new reformed labor law is revoting those and the NAFTA requires they are all reaffirmed over the period of four years. So that the fake contracts get dumped and people get real unions. And then how is it going to be decided if the contract has really been revoted and there’s no real union contract there, it’s more of the same fake stuff, there’s a bunch of new institutions that have to be set up. So the new Mexican labor law sets up the institutions, sets up those new rights, and it’s been challenged over four hundred lawsuits, some have been dismissed but a bunch are still going forward and they're not getting decided. Because, just like in the U.S., the courts are basically shut down for anything but urgent criminal matters. So the labor law itself is still a little bit up in the air and that is necessary for the reforms to go into effect. But then the second thing is, a whole bunch of new institutions need to get set up. And that involves the U.S. coming through with the funding it promised to help do that, and some additional staffing support, but also the Mexican government which promised to increase funding and promised to establish a bunch of new really national labor relations board type institutions which replace these state level tripartite bodies. And so the national system is still plugging ahead but obviously in the way of every country plugging ahead with resources diverted to COVID, with priorities of everyone, I mean obviously with all the worker safety issues the labor department is just focused on emergency labor worker safety issues and COVID as they can be on trying to set up these new institutions. And then the third piece of it has to do with, really, the kind of oversight and political and press really, if you will, spotlighting of what’s going on and pretty much everything is COVID, COVID, COVID. So even some of the high profile labor disaster situations like at Goodyear where a lot of workers were locked out to try to have an independent union and members of Congress who wanted to investigate got locked out, that’s not been resolved. Some of the outrageous conduct in call centers has not been resolved vis a vis contracts at least there’s been now a criminal case filed against a call center in Mexico City that was staying open even as workers were getting sick. But there’s just not the level of focus or attention by civil society, by parliamentarians here or in Mexico, by the press. So all of those things leave a slightly, you know, less auspicious likelihood of the kind of improvements we were hoping for and we’re all going to have to stay on it. 

HARVEY: It’s interesting because we’re actually watching in real time a labor law reform through a trade agreement happening and it’s pretty compelling so why is this something, do you think, that people should be paying close attention to, and what does it mean for the future of North American work?

WALLACH: So, we keep hearing in the context of COVID “we’re all in this together.” And that is an entirely true slogan with respect to workers wages, conditions, futures, in North America. Because we are so integrated after 25 years of NAFTA, for U.S. workers and the recovery that’s going to have to happen economically, given the wreckage being caused by the COVID disaster, as we think about both how jobs are going to be restored, what wage levels will be available, but also, we think about how we rebuild our resilience, our ability to make the basic things we desperately need to be safe, both the medical goods that we found ourselves unable to make or get, but also thinking forward to the next potential disaster be it, you know, infrastructure related or weather related, we are, thanks to the system of hyperglobalization, really, really not resilient in the face of any crisis. Part of the answer to that is a North American answer, to move some of that production out of China, obviously a bunch of it needs to come domestically to the U.S., but also with respect to what’s going to happen with workers here, and wages here, this NAFTA rewrite experiment with improved labor standards and enforcement has got to be made to work. Because, unless wages rise in Mexico, the prospect for U.S. workers having decent wages and, or manufacturing being situated in the U.S. for that, two thirds of the workforce that does not have a college degree, that many of whom had previously a middle class union manufacturing job, it is not an either or, it is not the jobs are in Mexico or the jobs are here. As we’ve seen with this crisi, we don’t have any redundancy. Everything’s been moved to one plant far away, if that plant goes down or we need a bigger supply we’re just stuffed. So this is a moment to think about how we rebuild our manufacturing sector in the U.S., but in North America as well, with redundancy and resilience and distribution of jobs in more countries. And so making sure that those hard-fought labor standards in NAFTA and their enforcement actually make a difference, is every damn person’s business in the United States, not just in Mexico. 

HARVEY: That’s all for today, thanks for listening. Rethinking Trade is produced by Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. I would encourage you to visit rethinktrade.org as well as tradewatch.org to educate yourself and to find out how you can get involved in the work we’re doing to fight for fairer and more equitable trade policies.

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No Good Option on Implementation of New NAFTA

Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

Note: Today, the Trump administration sent Congress a statutorily required notification that Mexico and Canada “have taken measures necessary to comply with” the terms of the new North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that are to “take effect on the date on which the agreement enters into force.” The administration also sent Mexico and Canada the required notification that the United States “has completed the internal procedures required” for entry into force of the revised NAFTA. These actions mean the new NAFTA will enter into force and replace the old NAFTA on July 1, 2020.

The current situation is not consistent with the hard-fought labor standards improvements in the new NAFTA given Mexican workers being pressured to continue laboring in NAFTA-supply-chain factories despite serious health risks, continuing uncertainty about legal challenges against Mexico’s labor reforms and Mexico’s president announcing COVID-related 50% government budget cuts that could slow the establishment of required new labor rights capacity.

But postponing the agreement’s start will not do anything to improve Mexican workers’ situation, and in fact would delay phase-ins of key improvements in the new NAFTA, such as whacking Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), strengthening rules of origin and replacing fake “protection” union contracts in Mexico.

Because the old NAFTA remains in place, delaying implementation of the new NAFTA does not create leverage for change. The interests calling for a delay in implementation are those who were happy with the old NAFTA and dislike requirements to include more North American content in cars and the threat of goods that do not meet labor standards being stopped at the border.

The U.S. president should acknowledge that Mexico is not now in compliance with its labor rights obligations under the new NAFTA, because absent major changes, the American public will witness more race-to-the-bottom job outsourcing to Mexico that will expose Trump’s absurd claims about having entirely replaced NAFTA with the “best and most important deal ever.”

Public Citizen will be closely monitoring implementation of the new NAFTA and measuring the actual outcomes against the gains Trump has promised for American workers.

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Trump to Visit Michigan, Iowa: His Zeal to Tout His Trade Agenda Complicated by Agricultural Export Declines, Ongoing Auto Sector Job Outsourcing and New Federal Contracts to Serial Job-Outsourcing Firms

President Donald Trump is very keen to talk trade to distract from his impeachment trial. Central to his victory in key Midwest swing states were his pledges to stop job outsourcing, rebuild American manufacturing and end the job-killing trade deficit. He’s off to Michigan and Iowa after yesterday’s signing ceremony for the new North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and last week’s preliminary China trade deal. But his impeachment-distraction trade mission is complicated by some inconvenient facts:  

  • Tens of thousands more U.S. jobs have been government-certified as lost to outsourcing during the Trump era. This includes outsourcing by General Motors, Boeing, Honeywell, Siemens, IBM, Hewlett Packard, United Technologies, Caterpillar, Electrolux, General Electric, Harley-Davidson, Honeywell, Kohler and Intel Thompson Reuters, AT&T, Dun & Bradstreet, Verizon and Ministry Health. Verizon, Ford and Nabisco also have outsourced under Trump, but have not yet been processed on the certified list.
  • Manufacturing sector job growth hit a wall in 2019, as the sector slid into recession. Manufacturing job creation nearly stopped after a job growth boom that started two years before Trump was elected, while an important indicator of manufacturing sector health – the Purchasing Managers Index – registered its lowest reading since the June 2009 financial crisis days. The U.S. manufacturing sector has been in a technical recession for the past two quarters.
  • The overall U.S. trade deficit increased 14% in Trump’s first two years. Despite expectations that the 2019 deficit will be smaller, the manufacturing sector deficit will be up again, while the overall decline reflects a jump in U.S. exports of oil and gas and lower oil imports. During the Trump administration, the NAFTA trade deficit has grown 30% relative to the year before Trump took office.
  • The new NAFTA will not bring back hundreds of thousands of jobs, as Trump nonsensically claims. Nothing makes this clearer than recent developments in the U.S. auto sector. Post-NAFTA renegotiation, U.S. auto companies have announced plans to expand production in Mexico. GM is closing numerous U.S. plants while making popular models in Mexico. Ford is even making its new Mustang electric SUV in Mexico – the first Mustang not to be made here. Over time, the labor standards and enhanced enforcement terms Democrats forced into the new NAFTA may help raise wages in Mexico, and this also may reduce U.S. corporations’ incentives to outsource more U.S. jobs to Mexico to pay workers less.
  • Contrary to his campaign promises, Trump has rewarded firms that have outsourced jobs with lucrative government contracts. Sadly there are many instances, but consider a state on today’s trip: In December 2018, the Siemens plant in Burlington, Iowa, closed after 148 years of operation. The plant closure eliminated 107 jobs, as part of a nationwide loss to outsourcing of 1,800 jobs by Siemens. During 2019, contracts for $877,354,618 were granted to Siemens.

Firms That Have Caused TAA-Certified Job Losses in Iowa

Value of Federal Contracts Received in Last 12 Months

Siemens

$877,354,618

Verizon Communications

$754,077,723

United Parcel Service (UPS)

$637,292,359

Hewlett Packard

$265,824,579

Cummins

$255,917,252

Cargill

$184,535,591

Delta Air Lines

$141,014,806

John Deere

$18,517,349

Bayer Pharmaceuticals

$6,578,386

 

  • Trump’s tax bill promotes more outsourcing. If a firm shuts production in the United States and moves to Mexico, their U.S. federal tax rate is cut in half. (A firm in the U.S. would pay a 21% corporate tax rate, while offshore income is taxed at a 10.5% rate.)
  • On the China front, it remains to be seen if what the White House is selling as a “phase 1” China trade agreement will translate into changes in trade flows or China policies, and the promise of one-time increased Chinese purchases of U.S. goods, including agricultural exports, that the administration is touting may provide elusive.
    • Chinese purchasing agency commodity orders in early January did not reflect a shift to U.S. purchases, while Chinese officials have said they will not increase agricultural import quotas.
    • The China agreement does not cover the mass subsidies or other “China 2025” policies that the White House has spotlighted as a threat to U.S. manufacturing and geopolitical interests. Indeed, policy changes China has made that are reflected in the agreement, including more access for foreign investors and protections for their intellectual property, may promote more outsourcing of U.S. investment and jobs.
  • The government has certified tens of thousands of Michigan workers as trade job-loss victims under just one narrow program called Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). This government program represents a significant undercount: Workers must know to apply and meet the TAA’s narrow criteria, which exclude many types of jobs lost to trade. The top five firms that the TAA certified for China job loss in Michigan are Yale Lift-Technologies, Lear Corporation, Chrysler, Ameriwood Industries, and A123 Systems LLC. The top five firms certified for NAFTA job loss in Michigan are Tyco Electronics, Lear Corporation, Copper Range Co., Collins and Aikman and Kraft Foods. As well, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors all have extensive Michigan TAA certifications for production relocation that do not specify to what country the work has been relocated.
  • The government has certified tens of thousands of Iowa workers as trade job-loss victims under TAA. The top five firms that the TAA certified for China job loss in Iowa are Maytag, Ocwen Loan Servicing, TMK-IPSCO, Lands’ End, and IMI Cornelius. The top five firms certified for NAFTA job loss in Iowa are Eaton Corporation, John Deere, GFSI, Intier Automotive Seating of America and International Automotive Components.

Data Notes: Deficit figures are adjusted for inflation to the base month of December 2019. Thus, the figures represent changes in trade balances expressed in constant dollars. So, for months prior to December 2019, the numbers are different than the data unadjusted for inflation that is provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. The U.S. Department of Labor certifies trade-impacted workplaces under its TAA program. This program provides a list of trade-related job losses and job retraining and extended unemployment benefits to workers who lose jobs to trade. The TAA is a narrow program, covering only a subset of workers who lose jobs to trade. It does not provide a comprehensive list of facilities or jobs that have been offshored or lost to import competition. Although the TAA data represent a significant undercount of trade-related job losses, the TAA is the only government program that provides information about job losses officially certified by the U.S. government to be trade-related. Public Citizen provides an easily searchable version of the TAA database. Please review our guide on how to interpret the data here and the technical documentation here. The federal contract data is sourced from usaspending.gov.

For more information visit State-by-State Outcomes of NAFTA.

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New NAFTA Signed Into Law Only After Democrats Force Trump to Rewrite His 2018 NAFTA 2.0 Deal to Remove Big Pharma Giveaways, Add Better Labor and Environmental Terms

Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

Note: Today, President Donald Trump signed the implementing legislation for the revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This follows passage in the U.S. Senate by a margin of 89-10 and in the U.S. House of Representatives by a margin of 385-41 with 193 Democrats and 192 Republicans supporting. The White House did not invite any congressional Democrats to the 400-person signing event. By gaslighting the Democrats central role in creating a new NAFTA, Trump has generated new attention to the reality that the revised NAFTA deal he signed in 2018 was DoA in Congress and Democrats forced Trump to reopen that deal and rewrite it so that it might actually counteract some of NAFTA’s ongoing damage.

Donald Trump has a new NAFTA to sign into law today only because congressional Democrats forced him to reopen the NAFTA 2.0 deal he signed in 2018 to remove Big Pharma giveaways that would have locked in high medicine prices and to strengthen labor and environmental terms so a new NAFTA might counter outsourcing.

The corporate-rigged NAFTA 2.0 deal that Trump signed in 2018 betrayed his campaign promise to fix NAFTA and was “dead on arrival” in Congress. It included new Big Pharma giveaways that would have locked in high drug prices, making it worse than the original, and labor and environmental terms too weak to counteract NAFTA’s outsourcing of jobs and pollution.

Trump is desperate to pretend that this is his victory, but Public Citizen’s new Timeline of #ReplaceNAFTA Advocacy shows that the new NAFTA exists only thanks to relentless work by House Democrats, unions, consumer and faith groups, and activists nationwide who forced improvements to the 2018 deal Trump signed.

The unusually large, bipartisan congressional votes for the “revised revised” NAFTA show that to be politically viable, U.S. trade pacts no longer can include broad monopoly protections for Big Pharma or extreme corporate investor privileges and must have enforceable labor and environmental standards.

After congressional Democrats, unions and consumer groups forced Trump to remove Big Pharma giveaways and improve labor and environmental terms, the final revised deal is better than the original and might reduce some of NAFTA’s ongoing damage to workers and the environment.

But this new NAFTA won’t bring back hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs, as Trump nonsensically claims, despite U.S. auto manufacturers’ recent announcements that they plan to increase production in Mexico. This includes Ford’s decision to make its new Mustang electric SUV in Mexico. while GM has closed U.S. auto plants even as it has shifted production of its most popular vehicles to Mexico.

One important win for consumers, workers and the environment is the gutting of NAFTA’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) regime. ISDS empowers multinational corporations to go before panels of three corporate lawyers to demand unlimited compensation from taxpayers over claims that domestic policies or actions violate special investor privileges. The lawyers can award the corporations unlimited sums to be paid by taxpayers, including for the loss of expected future profits. To date, corporations have extracted almost $400 million from North American taxpayers after attacks on energy, water, timber and toxics policies. Largely eliminating ISDS will foreclose numerous corporate attacks on environmental, health and other safeguards and bolster countries worldwide seeking to exit the illegitimate ISDS regime. 

The new NAFTA is not a template for future agreements; rather, it sets the floor from which we will fight for good trade policies that put working people and the planet first. Trying to fix an existing bad deal like NAFTA to reduce its ongoing damage is very different from creating a truly good trade deal that generates jobs, raises wages and protects the environment and public health.

Any new trade deals, including with the European Union and United Kingdom, must additionally include binding climate standards, even stronger rules to stop race-to-the-bottom outsourcing of jobs and pollution, and enforceable rules against currency cheating. And any new deals must not limit the protections needed to ensure our food and products are safe, our privacy is protected and monopolistic online firms are held accountable, and big banks do not crash the economy again.

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Broad Bipartisan Congressional Votes on Revised NAFTA Cement New Floor for Trade Pacts: Pharma Giveaways, Extreme Investor Rights in Past Pacts Are Out, Better Labor and Environmental Terms In After Democrats Forced Trump to Redo His 2018 NAFTA 2.0 Deal

Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

Note: The U.S. Senate today passed the revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by a margin of 89 to 10. This follows passage in the U.S. House of Representatives by a margin of 385 to 41 in December 2019.

The unusually large, bipartisan votes in the Senate and House on the revised NAFTA set a new standard that to be politically viable, U.S. trade pacts no longer can include extreme corporate investor privileges or broad monopoly protections for Big Pharma and must have enforceable labor and environmental standards, in contrast to the 2016 Trans-Pacific Partnership, which never got close to congressional majority support.

Renegotiating the existing NAFTA to try to reduce its ongoing damage is not the same as creating a good trade agreement that creates jobs, raises wages and protects the environment and public health. That would additionally require climate provisions, stronger labor and environmental terms, and truly enforceable currency disciplines, and not limit consumer protections for food and product safety and labeling, the service sector, online platforms and more.

The NAFTA 2.0 deal that President Donald Trump initially signed in 2018 betrayed his campaign promise to fix NAFTA: It included new Big Pharma giveaways that lock in high drug prices, making it worse than the original, and its labor and environmental terms were too weak to counteract NAFTA’s outsourcing of jobs and pollution.

However, after congressional Democrats, unions and consumer groups forced Trump to remove Big Pharma giveaways and improve labor and environmental terms, the final revised deal is better than the original and might reduce some of NAFTA’s ongoing damage to workers and the environment. Although the new deal still includes problematic terms, the alternative is status quo NAFTA, not a more improved deal.

But this new NAFTA won’t bring back hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs, as Trump nonsensically claims. Nothing makes that clearer than U.S. auto manufacturers’ recent announcements that they plan to increase production in Mexico – from Ford’s decision to make its new Mustang electric SUV in Mexico to GM closing U.S. auto plants while expanding production in Mexico.

One clear and important win for consumers, workers and the environment is the gutting of NAFTA’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) regime. ISDS empowers multinational corporations to go before panels of three corporate lawyers to demand unlimited compensation from taxpayers over claims that domestic laws, regulations and court rulings violate special investor privileges. The lawyers can award the corporations unlimited sums to be paid by taxpayers, including for the loss of expected future profits. To date, corporations have extracted almost $400 million from North American taxpayers after attacks on energy, water, timber and toxics policies. Largely eliminating ISDS will foreclose numerous corporate attacks on environmental, health and other public interest policies and send a signal worldwide to the many countries also eager to exit the illegitimate ISDS regime. 

The new NAFTA is not a template for future agreements; rather, it sets the floor from which we will fight for good trade policies that put working people and the planet first.

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NAFTA Vote Reveals New Reality for Trade Deals: Passage Possible Only After Democrats Forced Trump to Cut Pharma Giveaways and Extreme Investor Rights Plus Strengthen Labor and Environmental Terms

Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

Note: The U.S. House of Representatives today passed the revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The unusually large, bipartisan vote on the revised NAFTA shows that to be politically viable, U.S. trade pacts no longer can include extreme corporate investor privileges or broad monopoly protections for Big Pharma and must have enforceable labor and environmental standards, in contrast to the 2016 Trans-Pacific Partnership, which never got close to majority House support.

Renegotiating the existing NAFTA to try to reduce its ongoing damage is not the same as creating a good trade agreement that creates jobs, raises wages and protects the environment and public health. That would additionally require climate provisions, stronger labor and environmental terms, and truly enforceable currency disciplines, and not limit consumer protections for food and product safety and labeling, the service sector, online platforms and more.

The NAFTA 2.0 deal that President Donald Trump initially signed in 2018 betrayed his campaign promise to fix NAFTA: It included new Big Pharma giveaways that lock in high drug prices, making it worse than the original, and its labor and environmental terms were too weak to counteract NAFTA’s outsourcing of jobs and pollution.

However, after congressional Democrats, unions and consumer groups forced Trump to remove Big Pharma giveaways and improve labor and environmental terms, the final revised deal is better than the original and might reduce some of NAFTA’s ongoing damage. Although the new deal still includes problematic terms, the alternative is status quo NAFTA, not a more improved deal.

But this new NAFTA won’t bring back hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs, as Trump nonsensically claims. Nothing makes that clearer than U.S. auto manufacturers’ recent announcements that they plan to expand production in Mexico – from Ford’s decision to make its new Mustang electric SUV in Mexico to GM closing U.S. auto plants while expanding production in Mexico.

One clear and important win for consumers, workers and the environment is the gutting of NAFTA’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) regime. ISDS empowers multinational corporations to go before panels of three corporate lawyers to demand unlimited compensation from taxpayers over claims that domestic laws, regulations and court rulings violate special investor privileges. The lawyers can award the corporations unlimited sums to be paid by taxpayers, including for the loss of expected future profits. To date, corporations have extracted almost $400 million from North American taxpayers after attacks on energy, water, timber and toxics policies, largely eliminating ISDS will foreclose numerous corporate attacks on environmental, health and other public interest policies and send a signal worldwide to the many countries also eager to exit the illegitimate ISDS regime.

The new NAFTA is not a template for future agreements; rather, it sets the floor from which we will fight for good trade policies that put working people and the planet first.

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Lori Wallach Slams Trump Fake Out on Drug Prices

In response to the Trump Administration’s announcement today about allowing some prescription drug imports from Canada, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch Director Lori Wallach released the following statement:

“Trump is talking out of both sides of his mouth on this. Access to cheaper drugs from Canada won't help many Americans when Trump is also pushing Big Pharma giveaways that would push up the price of life saving drugs in Canada and lock in high prices here — including skyrocketing the prices of treatments for diabetes, osteoporosis, and heart failure. Ultimately — Trump cares far more about corporate profits than people."

Fast Facts on the revised NAFTA agreement Trump signed last year, but that is up for revision currently in Congress:

  • Requires signatory governments to guarantee pharmaceutical corporations monopoly powers to block generic competition.
  • Requires governments to guarantee 10 years of marketing exclusivity for biologic drugs and provide patent evergreening opportunities for all drugs, blocking competition to bring down prices. 
  • Locks the United States into policies that keep medicines, including critical cancer treatments, outrageously expensive. 
  • Exports our failed prescription drug pricing system to Mexico and Canada.
  • Provides longer monopoly benefits for medicines such as: diabetes treatments Victoza, Saxenda, Glucagon and Ozempic; osteoporosis treatment Forteo; heart failure treatment Natrecor; and short bowel syndrome treatment Gattex.

Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch has joined Congressional Democrats to demand these terms are eliminated before any vote is scheduled on the new deal.

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Key Findings of the ITC Report on the Revised NAFTA: Modest Projections Do Not Alter Pact’s Prospects in Congress

The April 18, 2019 release of the International Trade Commission (ITC) report on the revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) does nothing to alter the reality that the fate of NAFTA 2.0 relies largely on whether the administration engages with congressional Democrats and then with Canada and Mexico to improve the text signed last year. That Democrats, unions and others who have opposed past pacts seek improvements – rather than the deal’s demise – reveals that a path exists to build broad support. But absent removal of new monopoly protections for pharmaceutical firms that lock in high drug prices and strengthened labor and environmental standards and enforcement, the deal is not likely to garner a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives. Indeed, all four of the trade deals Congress enacted in the past decade required changes to their texts after the pacts were signed in order to pass the House.

  • The official government projections of very small gains spotlight how Donald Trump has oversold the revised NAFTA, which he promised would “support many hundreds of thousands of American jobs,” “send cash and jobs pouring into the United States” and eliminate the large U.S. trade deficit with NAFTA countries. The modest findings reinforce congressional Democrats’ views that absent more improvements, the revised deal won’t stop NAFTA’s ongoing damage.
  • The ITC projects that after six years, the pact would add 175,800 jobs about the number created by the economy in a slow month and increase wages by 27/100 of one percent or an average of $2.58 per week. Almost 80 percent of projected job growth is for workers in the service sector without a college education, meaning many of these jobs are likely to be low-paid. Almost one million mainly U.S. manufacturing jobs have been lost to the original NAFTA according to Trade Adjustment Assistant certifications, which undercount trade-related job loss.
  • Only $1.8 billion in trade deficit reduction with NAFTA countries is projected over time, relative to a U.S. 2018 NAFTA goods deficit of $215 billion. Yet, based on past performance of ITC projections on trade pact deficits, the more likely outcome is a larger NAFTA deficit. Consider the ITC’s original assessment of NAFTA: Within 10 years, the goods trade deficit with Mexico had grown to almost 20 times the level the ITC had projected in its dimmest forecast.
  • Overall, the ITC projected minuscule gains from NAFTA 2.0: one-time gains of 35/100 of one percent in real GDP, 12/100 of one percent in employment and 27/100 of one percent in wages. In contrast to past reports, the agency somewhat obfuscated the time period of the projected GDP gain of $68.2 billion. It assumes a six-year implementation period, so if gains are realized steadily over that period, it means annual growth gains of only 6/100 of one percent for six years. That is smaller than a rounding error on the $19 trillion U.S. economy. The sum total effect of NAFTA 2.0 would be a GDP on January 1, 2025 that would be attained on March 6, 2025 without the deal.
    • Most of these economic gains are derived from a highly dubious new research methodology, which assigns an invented positive economic value to terms that reduce “policy uncertainty” by freezing in place environmental, consumer protection, financial and other safeguards. If the ITC had not done this, the report would have projected a negative outcome. All $68.2 billion of the deal’s supposed economic gains arise from simulating the impact of removing trade barriers that do not exist. In other words, the gains are generated not through the removal of trade barriers directly, but through the elimination of the possibility of new future regulatory policies, which are deemed to be potential trade barriers. Absent this fabrication, the revised NAFTA would have been projected to lower the United States’ GDP by $22.6 billion and reduce the number of jobs by 53,900. The very notion that “reducing policy uncertainty” generates economic benefits is questionable. But in this study, these imagined gains also are not balanced against foreseeable downsides, such as financial instability, lower worker productivity from injury or illness, and the like. Perversely, given the focus on “uncertainty” the ITC choose to simply not analyze the impact of one prominent new feature of the deal - its review and sunset provision - that industry attacks as creating new uncertainties to North American trade.
    • Absent methodological monkey business, how could a NAFTA revision that involves no major trade barrier elimination be projected to create almost 90 percent of the GDP gains as it predicted for the original NAFTA even though the first deal substantially cut tariffs? The study also projects almost 50 percent more economic gains than the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), even though the revised NAFTA covers only two other countries with which the United States has had almost no tariffs and has been integrated with for 25 years under NAFTA, while the TPP included 11 nations and involved significant tariffs cuts with Japan, Malaysia and others.

 

ITC’s Projected Real GDP Gains (in 2017 dollars)

NAFTA

$77.9 billion

TPP

$42.7 billion

USMCA

$68.2 billion

 

  • The report then feeds these fabricated gains from the reduction of “policy uncertainty” into the same old computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that for decades has produced rosy ITC projections that have been systematically contradicted by trade pacts’ actual outcomes. The CGE model simply assumes away the very results that have often occurred under past pacts: long-term job loss, trade deficit increases and currency devaluations. By design, the CGE model assumes that the overall U.S. economy remains at full employment, that income inequality and the U.S. global trade balance does not change, and currency values are locked. These assumptions have systematically resulted in ITC trade-pact projections being entirely unrelated to actual outcomes.
    • IMF economists recently calculated negligible U.S. economic growth gains from the revised NAFTA relying on the same economic model as the ITC, but without the additional assumptions of gains from regulatory freeze. They found the United States would experience a welfare loss of $794 million, while Canada enjoys a small gain of $734 million and Mexico a gain of $597 million. The IMF study also found a zero percent change in real (inflation-adjusted) GDP for the United States, a 0.02 percent change for Canada and a -0.01 percent change for Mexico.
    • The ITC’s past trade-pact projections have been so entirely wrong – in direction, not just in scale – that findings of minuscule gains from the revised NAFTA would not have obtained as much attention had Donald Trump not set such a high bar by overselling this as a new species of trade deal that would miraculously reverse NAFTA’s decades of damage.

 

NAFTA: U.S.-Mexico Trade

1993 - Baseline

ITC Projection

Actual

$1.6 billion goods surplus

$2.3 billion goods deficit

$83.7 billion goods deficit

China-WTO: U.S.-China Trade

1998 - Baseline

ITC Projection

Actual

$57 billion goods deficit

$60 billion goods deficit

$281 billion goods deficit

U.S.-Korea FTA: Trade

2011 - Baseline

ITC Projection

Actual

$19 billion goods deficit

$16 billion goods deficit

$22 billion goods deficit

 

  • The ITC report projects that longer periods for patents and other intellectual property monopolies will deliver economic gains by reducing what the ITC describes as “trade costs,” while dismissing any economic losses (reduction in welfare) accruing from high medicine prices. The report explicitly admits that “originator [first-to-market] firms” will gain “from stronger IPR protections” while “follow-on or generic firms” will suffer “losses.” Not only do high medicine prices hit Americans directly, but extracting licensing payments from foreign consumers by imposing these rules on NAFTA partners can crowd out purchases of U.S. exports, entailing U.S. job loss.
  • Interestingly, for the first time the ITC considered the impact of investor protections and the related roll back of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), concluding: “The Commission’s quantitative analysis also shows that the reduction in the scope of ISDS would have a small positive effect on the U.S. economy. In particular, U.S. domestic manufacturing and mining output is estimated to increase due to greater amount of capital available in the United States for investing in such industries because of reduced investment in Mexico.”
  • The ITC just assumes labor terms will be enforced, even though lack of enforceability is a core critique: “The USMCA labor provisions are expected to promote higher wages and improved labor conditions in member markets if these provisions are enforced.” (emphasis added) After noting that significant variable, which is not ensured in the current text, the report proceeds to project a 17.2 percent increase in Mexican union wages and then to feed that finding into the broader model to project U.S. employment and other gains. There is no alternative simulation based on non-enforcement despite the upside scenario relying on a course of action that is desirable, but far from certain: Mexico passes and implements labor law reform to comply with the agreement and the pact’s labor provisions remain enforced, which leads to more independent unions, which leads to successful collective bargaining, which leads to the replacement of thousands of low-wage “protection” contracts, which ultimately leads to higher wages. Second, if that happens, the projected gain is from $1.50-$3 an hour Mexican manufacturing wages to $1.76-$3.51 an hour wages, an increase that is too small to either improve Mexican workers’ lives or counter the low-wage pull factor to outsource U.S. jobs.
  • The ITC projects very small job gains in the auto sector from the deal’s tighter rules of origin and other auto-sector-specific terms, while the U.S. Trade Representative’s office projects more jobs in the auto parts supply chain based on data from car producers that remains confidential.
  • The ITC ignores the environmental chapter of the agreement, even as the administration claims it is the strongest such chapter of any trade agreement.
  • The ITC concludes the revised pact will have little benefit for the energy sector, contradicting industry claims. “Given the already very low most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs for the parties, as well as the effects of recent reforms in Mexico’s energy sector, USMCA’s energy-related provisions are likely to have little impact on U.S. trade and production of energy-related products.”
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Modest Projections in Today’s ITC Assessment of the Revised NAFTA Do Not Alter Its Prospects in Congress

Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

Note: The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) today released a study on the potential economic impact of the revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that projects minuscule economic gains in real GDP of $68.2 billion, or 35/100 of one percent. The highest projected gains in wages, employment and output are all less than one-half of one percent – with most figures much lower. Undergirding a large share of those tiny gains is an assumption that locking in lengthy intellectual property monopolies and freezing environmental and consumer safeguards leads to economic gains and no downsides. The report projects that over time, the agreement would add 175,800 jobs, which is less than one-fifth of what the U.S. government has certified as lost to the original NAFTA.  Public Citizen will soon release a detailed summary of findings. [UPDATE: findings available here]

 “The minuscule projected gains in this long-awaited official government assessment contradict Donald Trump’s grandiose claims that it will lead to ‘cash and jobs pouring into the U.S.’ and reinforces congressional Democrats’ views that absent more improvements, the revised deal won’t stop NAFTA’s ongoing damage.

The ITC’s past trade-pact projections have been so entirely wrong — in direction, not just in scale — that today’s findings of minuscule gains would have limited effect on the debate had Trump not set such a high bar by overselling this as a new species of trade deal that would miraculously reverse NAFTA’s decades of damage.

This report does nothing to alter the reality that the prospects for a NAFTA 2.0 vote rely largely on whether the administration engages with congressional Democrats and then with Canada and Mexico to improve the text signed last year. That congressional Democrats, unions and others who have outright opposed past pacts seek improvements rather than the deal’s demise reveals there is a path to build broad support. But absent removal of new monopoly protections for pharmaceutical firms that lock in high drug prices and strengthened labor and environmental standards and enforcement, the deal is not likely to garner a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives. Indeed, all four of the trade deals Congress enacted in the past decade required changes to their texts after the pacts were signed in order to pass the House.”

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Major USMCA Milestone Next Week: What Will International Trade Commission Report Show and Does It Matter?

It’s not just trade economists who are eager for the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (ITC) long-awaited analysis of the revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Publication of the statutorily required report usually signals that the congressional debate on a trade deal is nigh. But this ITC trade-pact report is not usual.

First, as political silly season looms this fall, whether there is a vote on NAFTA 2.0 anytime soon relies largely on whether the administration will engage with congressional Democrats and then with Canada and Mexico to resolve problems Democrats have identified with the text signed last year. That congressional Democrats, unions and others who have outright opposed past pacts seek improvements rather than the deal’s demise reveals there is a path to build broad support for it. But absent removal of new monopoly protections for pharmaceutical firms that lock in high drug prices and the addition of strengthened labor and environmental standards and enforcement, the deal is not likely to garner a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives. All of the trade deals Congress has enacted in the past decade required changes to their texts after the pacts were signed to get through the House.

Second, because the ITC has used a research methodology for decades that produces rosy projections that have been systematically contradicted by trade pacts’ actual outcomes, few people are willing to rely on the agency’s topline predictions. But the underlying assumptions in the study will be revealing, as they will reflect the agency’s sense of what is – and is not – different from the original NAFTA. 

We’ll post our initial analysis shortly after the ITC report is released.

Some Key Things We Will Look for in the ITC’s Assessment on the Revised NAFTA

  • Are any projected economic gains meaningful? For example, the ITC projection of a 0.23 percent gain in national income from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) over 15 years meant that the United States would be as wealthy on Jan. 1, 2032, with TPP as it would be six weeks later (Feb. 15, 2032) without it. Or, the ITC projected TPP gains to gross domestic product (GDP) of $47.2 billion over 15 years. But this large figure actually was equivalent to an additional 0.01 percentage point of annual growth. And relative to the U.S. economy’s size, it is tiny.
  • What about the trade balance? Though the magnitude of projected change likely will be small, does it affirm or contradict the administration’s talking points about United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) bringing about “more balanced, reciprocal trade” and/or Donald Trump’s campaign promises to bring down the NAFTA trade deficit?
  • What does the ITC think is a real change that merits inclusion in its modeling:
    • Were the new labor and environmental provisions considered “economically important” enough to model? If so, are a range of impact estimates provided based on the degree of compliance?
    • Will the ITC model the impact of the major rollback of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), inclusion of a new Labor Annex and the Labor Value Content wage rule, stronger rules of origin and other elements of the deal that have led opponents of past pacts to work to remove non-starter terms and improve others rather than launch a campaign to kill the revised deal?
    • Will the ITC continue to exclude from its core model chapters like those on intellectual property, even though the impact on consumers of locking in high medicine prices through longer patent monopolies should be weighed against other consumer welfare calculations?
  • With tariffs largely eliminated by the original NAFTA, how much of the economic gains from the revised NAFTA arise from cutting “non-tariff barriers”? In such models, health and environmental standards are labeled as non-tariff barriers and removal of them is falsely assigned an assumed positive value, while economic and social costs of eliminating such domestic policies are ignored.
  • Has the ITC inappropriately conflated projected effects of the removal of Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs with the implementation of the NAFTA 2.0 agreement?

As Public Citizen and other organizations described last year in official ITC submissions for this report, the agency has historically overestimated the gains from previous free trade agreements (FTAs). Past ITC studies have systematically projected positive outcomes that were contradicted by the actual results, and the agency is unlikely to have overhauled its entire approach for this agreement.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) economists, using the same underlying model as the ITC, recently projected the USMCA would result in a larger U.S. trade deficit with NAFTA countries, a loss in overall welfare for the United States (alongside gains in overall economic welfare for Mexico and Canada) and zero U.S. real economic growth gains. The IMF study relied on the same economic model that the ITC uses, a so-called computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with the same underlying “GTAP” database. That model assumes away the negative outcomes that often have occurred under past FTAs – job loss, trade deficit increases and currency devaluations – and explicitly fails to model portions of the text that have negative impacts. The divergence between past ITC projections and actual outcomes means the factors not included in the model must be larger than the factors that are incorporated into the analysis.

Despite these questionable assumptions, the IMF projections based on the same methodology was that the United States would experience a welfare loss of $794 million, while Canada enjoys a small gain of $734 million and Mexico a gain of $597 million. The IMF study found a zero percent change in real (inflation-adjusted) GDP for the United States, a 0.02 percent change for Canada and a -0.01 percent change for Mexico.

As was detailed in Public Citizen’s ITC submission, the agency’s record in evaluating the economic impact of trade pacts has been abysmal. Gains to trade agreements have been consistently overestimated. After the original NAFTA was implemented, for example, the goods trade deficit with Mexico grew to almost 20 times the projected level within 10 years than even the dimmest forecast provided by the ITC (see graph).

Graph-for-itc

The use of the CGE model is even less reliable in the context of there being no significant tariff cuts in the USMCA. The CGE model originally was meant to focus on the impact of cutting tariffs. But NAFTA 2.0 cannot cut tariffs that already are zero.

So what could possibly be the basis for any findings of gains?

Will CGE modeling be used to find gains from the removal of so-called “non-tariff barriers,” otherwise known as food and product safety standards, service-sector regulations for financial stability and other public interest goals and more? Trying to guesstimate values for such changes introduce substantial uncertainty into the model, according to academic economists.

Will the ITC’s modeling take into consideration possible lack of compliance, given a proven record of just that with respect to past pacts’ ostensibly enforceable labor and environmental terms? The CGE model considers only an endpoint – a final outcome assuming full implementation – not whether other nations may not fully implement or enforce a pact’s terms. And, by design, the model assumes the trade balance does not change as a share of GDP and that overall employment levels remain constant – that workers who lose jobs simply obtain new jobs in other sectors where wages are presumed to increase.

Finally, if past practice holds, the ITC will not consider the effect of intellectual property rules that lock in high medicine prices. The most controversial component of the revised NAFTA’s intellectual property provisions are monopoly protections for drugs called biologics that comprise 70 percent of the skyrocketing growth in drug spending. Not only do these provisions hit American pocketbooks directly, but extracting licensing payments from foreign consumers by imposing these rules on NAFTA partners can crowd out purchases of U.S. exports, entailing U.S. job loss.

How the ITC handles these issues will be interesting to trade wonks. But the report is not likely to reveal much about either the pact’s probable effects or its prospect for congressional passage.

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2018 Annual Trade Data to Be Released Wednesday Likely to Show Highest-Ever U.S. Deficit with China, Highest NAFTA Deficit in a Decade

Grim Trade Balance Data Spotlights Imperative for Trump to Not Cave on China Trade Talks and to Work with House Democrats to Improve NAFTA Deal 

The 2018 annual trade data to be released by the U.S. Census Bureau on Wednesday will likely show record-setting U.S. goods trade deficits, capping two years of steadily rising trade deficits for the Trump administration that contrast with candidate Donald Trump’s promises to quickly reduce them.  The rate of growth in the trade deficit has increased during the Trump era, with the increase from 2017 to 2018 greater than the change from 2016 to 2017.

“More important than Trump failing on the trade-deficit-reduction benchmark for success he set on trade is that he focus on addressing the root causes by securing a China trade deal that’s not about short-term soy and gas sales but addresses structural issues fueling the deficit and by working with congressional Democrats to improve the NAFTA so it has a chance to pass,” said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch. “The growth of the trade deficit is accelerating in part because of early enactment of government policies like Trump’s tax package that incentivized production and job outsourcing while the major trade reforms are just now coming to a head.”

Based on 11-month 2018 data trends, the annual 2018 trade data is likely to show the highest-ever recorded U.S. trade deficit with China. The U.S. deficit with China has grown during both years of the Trump administration, spotlighting why many China trade and foreign policy experts are urging the president not to cave in and accept a quick and meaningless China trade deal that fails to secure fundamental reforms necessary to reduce the deficit.

The data also will likely show additional imports from Mexico during the Trump administration, especially in the auto sector, driving up the trade deficit with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners to its highest level since 2008. The data will bolster congressional Democrats’ calls for the revised NAFTA deal that Trump signed to be improved, including by ensuring swift and certain enforcement of strong labor and environmental standards to reduce the incentive to outsource jobs to Mexico.

When Wednesday’s data is released, Public Citizen will post updated annual data, which also will be available on our Trump trade deficit tracker. Annual trends for 2018 will likely be in line with the following major trends observed through the first 11 months of the year:

What to Look for When Census Releases the Annual 2018 Trade Data on Wednesday

Deficit chart
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. All figures adjusted for inflation. NAFTA trade balance does not include re-exports of imported goods.

  • The U.S. trade deficit with China is on pace to set another all-time record. The goods trade deficit with China was the highest first 11 months ever recorded – a 15 percent increase over 2016 – the last year of the Obama administration. The China goods trade deficit during the first 11 months of 2018 was $382 billion, a 9 percent increase over a $352 billion deficit in 2017, which came after a 6 percent increase over $332 billion in 2016, President Barack Obama’s last year in office.

  • The U.S. goods trade deficit with NAFTA partners is on pace to be the highest in the decade since the financial crisis – a 20 percent increase over 2016 – with auto leading the growth. The U.S. trade deficit with NAFTA partners during the first 11 months of 2018 increased 10 percent to $198 billion from $179 billion in 2017, which was an increase of 9 percent from $164 billion in 2016. The previous record 11-month NAFTA trade deficit came in 2008 before the effect of the 2008-09 financial crisis when it reached a record $220 billion before falling to $130 billion in 2009. Three-fifths of the $40 billion growth in Mexican imports to the United States since 2016 is accounted for by the automotive (HS 87) and miscellaneous machinery sectors (HS 84). This comes before GM’s closures of four plants and opening of a new Mexico plant.

  • The overall U.S. goods trade deficit with the world is set to be the highest since the financial crisis – up 14 percent over 2016. The U.S. trade deficit with the world over the first 11 months of 2018 increased 8 percent to $806 billion in 2018 from $749 billion in 2017, which was up 6 percent from $707 billion in 2016. The previous record 11-month deficit was prior to the 2008-09 financial crisis when it reached $949 billion in 2006 before falling to $531 billion in 2009.

The U.S. Trade Deficit is Worse Than It Looks

U.S. energy exports are masking deepening manufacturing deficits. In 2008, oil and gas made up a greater share of the U.S. trade deficit than all other products combined. Since then, the deficit in oil products has plummeted and now makes up only 7 percent of the deficit with the United States projected to be a net energy exporter next year. Meanwhile, the deficit in manufactured goods has expanded and the surplus in agricultural products has declined. But for the boom in domestic energy production and exports, the overall trade deficit would have been much worse.

The growth of the trade deficit is accelerating under Trump. The trade deficit is not just growing larger, but quickening its pace of growth under Trump. For the world deficit over the 11-month period, after a 6 percent bump between 2016 and 2017, the deficit increased 8 percent from 2017 to 2018. And, as the trade deficit is growing twice as fast as GDP, now almost reaching record pre-financial crisis levels as a share of GDP, it’s not simply the strong U.S. economy that is driving the trade deficit, contrary to what some experts claim. Rather, there are structural trade problems.

Breathless coverage this past year of the impact of Chinese tariffs on U.S. soybeans, the second-largest export to China (after aerospace equipment) betrays the depletion of the U.S. export base. Not only do we now import $4 worth of goods for every $1 we sell to China, but low-value-added commodities like soybeans, cotton, oil, gas, metal scrap, wood pulp and paper waste make up most of the top 15 U.S. export products to China. In fact, 43 percent of our exports to China are low-value-added products, while only 6 percent of imports from China are in low-value-added categories. If more high-value-added products are produced offshore, our structural trade deficit will persist.

NOTE: We provide comparison data for cumulative deficits over 11 months for 2018 relative to past years because this offers a clearer picture of trade trends than changes in month-to-month numbers. Monthly trade figures are volatile, and Census’ “seasonal adjustment” of it cannot control for unpredictable factors, such as exporters shifting shipment dates to avoid imposition of various countervailing tariffs. We focus on goods trade balances because services data by country lags the goods data and won’t be available until April 2019. The value of goods trade is also more than triple that of services trade, so has more impact on overall trends. All figures are adjusted for inflation, representing changes in trade balances expressed in constant dollars.

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Trump SOTU Trade Message: An Advance Fact-Check

Donald Trump is likely to misrepresent the facts and inflate his record on trade as he hits the midpoint of his presidential term and delivers his second State of the Union address. We offer this handy guide to help sort fiction from fact. While the administration’s trade reform effort includes some key steps in the right direction, it remains a work in progress with uncertain outcomes.

 

Past Trump Mischaracterization

Reality

 

UNFAIR TRADE: President Trump says he has “turned the page on decades of unfair trade deals.”

(a claim made in last year’s address)

 

Transformation of U.S. trade policy remains a work in progress, with uncertain outcomes. The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 2.0 text on November 30 was the first step in a long process, and further improvements are necessary for a final package to pass Congress much less for revisions to stop NAFTA’s ongoing damage to workers and the environment. Only very limited revisions were made to the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. There is still a danger that the ongoing trade battle with China could end in one-time purchases of U.S. exports that would do nothing to address China’s underlying unfair trade practices and deliver the necessary structural changes to alter long-term trends. Contrary to his promises to do something about trade imbalances, the trade deficit is up 13 percent under Trump. By the time Trump announced he would formally shelve the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, it was a moldering corpse that could never muster a majority in Congress, meaning his role was in the pact’s burial, not in authoring its demise.

 

 

TRADE DEFICIT: Trump says that U.S. trade relationships are more “balanced” and “reciprocal,” but he has yet to fulfill his campaign promise to bring down the trade deficit: “We have a massive trade deficit with China, a deficit we have to find a way quickly, and I mean quickly, to balance.”

 

On the one clear measure that Trump set for himself as a benchmark for success – bringing down the U.S. trade deficit – he is failing – with the largest China deficit ever recorded and a 13 percent increase in the U.S. trade deficit with the world during the Trump administration. As our Trump trade deficit tracker shows, the U.S. trade deficit has grown significantly under Trump. The latest quarterly government data (released in November – the 2018 annual data is a shutdown victim and a new release date has not been announced) reveals the highest U.S. goods trade deficit in a decade for the first three-quarters of 2018, up 13 percent since the start of the Trump administration. During Trump’s presidency, the U.S. trade deficit with China has risen (also 13 percent) to the highest ever recorded, while the deficits with the world and with NAFTA nations specifically have steadily grown.

 

 

USMCA V. NAFTA: Despite an effort to rebrand NAFTA with a new name, Trump’s renegotiation has not fixed the problems of original NAFTA.  

 

Trump’s claim to have created a totally different kind of agreement is a deceitful sales pitch, similar to those used for decades by US presidents to hawk previous trade deals. After a year of renegotiations, the NAFTA 2.0 text signed on November 30 revealed improvements for which progressives have long campaigned, the addition of damaging terms that we oppose, and critical unfinished business. Unless the administration works with congressional Democrats on critical changes to the signed agreement, the pact is unlikely to be passed. One way in which NAFTA 2.0 is dramatically worse than the original is the addition of a slew of new monopoly rights for pharmaceutical companies that would help them avoid competition from generic products and keep medicine prices high. While the NAFTA 2.0 labor provisions are an improvement over previous U.S. trade agreements, unless strong labor and environmental standards are subject to swift and certain enforcement—which is not the case with the NAFTA 2.0 text—U.S. firms will continue to outsource jobs, pay Mexican workers poverty wages, and dump toxins in Mexico.

 

 

JOB OUTSOURCING: Trump says he has slowed outsourcing and is succeeding on “Buy America, Hire American,” but the data do not support this claim. 

 

Outsourcing of American jobs has continued and not only the high-profile GM and Carrier mass job losses while Trump’s corporate tax policies create incentives for more outsourcing and his promised Buy American reforms lag. GM’s factory closures at the end of 2018 spotlights the ongoing loss of American manufacturing jobs. One of the first companies that Trump met with once taking office, GM closed five plants affecting thousands of workers after expanding production in Mexico. Because of the outsourcing incentives in trade agreements like NAFTA as well as the pro-outsourcing tax bill signed by President Trump, firms will continue to outsource jobs. Even tax dollars that could be used to boost U.S. production continue to be offshored. A government-wide assessment on procurement spending President Trump requested never saw the light of day. Various new “Buy American” executive orders include recommendations but not requirements to expand the policy, making Trump’s “Buy American, Hire American” promises mainly rhetoric without policy action. Case in point: the NAFTA 2.0 text maintains the old NAFTA rules that require the waiver of Buy American procurement preferences with respect to Mexico.

 

 

CHINA TRADE: Trump may tout his actions to try to address China’s unfair trade practices, but whether he stays on track, adds the missing elements of a China trade plan and delivers remains to be seen.

 

 

Six months after the first set of U.S. tariffs on China, bilateral discussions have yielded little concrete progress. Meanwhile, Trump has failed to take action against trade advantages gained through misaligned currency values nor limit investment by Chinese-government-related entities in the United States. Though one of Trump’s campaign promises was to declare China a currency manipulator on Day One, four semi-annual reports by Trump’s Treasury Department have failed to name any country a currency manipulator. Trump has chosen to rely on criteria created by the previous administration that ensure no action is taken.

 

 

USMCA PAYS FOR BORDER WALL - NOT: Though Trump may claim the opposite, NAFTA 2.0 will NOT pay for the border wall between the United States and Mexico.

 

There are no provisions in NAFTA 2.0 that would directly or indirectly fund the border by putting money into the U.S. Treasury from the Mexican government. When trade generates money for a government’s treasury, it is via payment of border taxes, called tariffs. But even if NAFTA 2.0 raised tariffs, which it does not, that money would not go into a Trump-wall-fund. So, the same issue that caused the showdown would remain: Congress must allocate general revenue to the wall. But there is no such tariff revenue to be had. U.S.-Mexico trade has been duty-free under NAFTA for more than a decade. When NAFTA went into effect in 1994, Mexico agreed to duty-free treatment of everything with a 15-year phase-in. The revised deal does not add new tariffs. Moreover, perhaps the strongest evidence that nothing in NAFTA 2.0 forces Mexico to pay for Trump’s border wall is that Mexico, which has made clear it will not pay, signed the deal.

 

 

NAFTA 2.0 FATE IN CONGRESS: Trump says that NAFTA 2.0 can pass easily, but that is not what the vote count suggests.

 

Thanks to the midterm elections, only a revised NAFTA deal that can win significant Democratic support will get through Congress. Democrats in Congress are insisting that NAFTA 2.0’s  giveaways to Big Pharma are eliminated. And also that tougher labor and environmental standards are added, because the deal Trump signed  won’t stop corporations from outsourcing American jobs. Trump’s deal is not the transformational replacement of corporate-rigged NAFTA that Americans need. But if the administration works with congressional Democrats on needed improvements, there is a path to passing the revised NAFTA with a broad bipartisan vote.

 

NAFTA WITHDRAWAL: Trump says he could just withdraw from NAFTA if Congress doesn’t act on the renegotiated deal.

 

 

While Trump has the authority to withdraw, neither withdrawing from NAFTA nor maintaining NAFTA 1.0 will raise wages in Mexico (where average annual Mexican wages are down 2 percent with Mexican manufacturing wages now 40 percent lower than in China) that will stop the offshoring that transforms middle-class jobs into sweatshop jobs, or reverse NAFTA’s destruction of nearly a million American middle class jobs.

 

 

MEXICO V. U.S. IN NAFTA: Trump says the United States was a victim of the original NAFTA.

 

Trump’s notion of NAFTA as a plot by Mexico to hurt U.S. workers is absurd. NAFTA was the brainchild of U.S. presidents, was negotiated with input from hundreds of U.S. corporate trade advisors, and has been devastating to working people in both Mexico and the United States alike. Since NAFTA was signed, U.S. real wages are flat and real wages have actually declined in Mexico.

 

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More Than 70 U.S. Health, Consumer and Other Groups Demand Elimination of NAFTA 2.0 Terms That Would Lock in High U.S. Medicine Prices

Letter to Congress: Giveaways to Big Pharma Must Be Removed From Revised NAFTA

WASHINGTON, D.C. – After overwhelming public demand to reduce medicine prices helped propel Democrats to a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives, today more than 70 U.S. organizations launched an effort to remove new monopoly protections for pharmaceutical firms added to the revised North American Free Trade Agreement.

In a letter to Congress, the groups – representing tens of millions of Americans – demand that the pact’s giveaways to Big Pharma that would keep medicines unaffordable be removed before the pact is sent to Congress

The diverse group of patient advocacy, faith, consumer, labor and other public interest organizations that signed the letter took aim at NAFTA 2.0 terms that would “lock in place existing U.S. policies that have led to high medicine prices, undermining the authority of this and future Congresses to implement important reforms to expand generic and biosimilar competition, lower medicine prices and expand access.”

Among other dangerous requirements is that each NAFTA country guarantee a minimum of 10 years of marketing exclusivity – that is, longer monopoly protections – for cutting-edge biologics, which includes many new cancer treatments and even vaccines. This would lock the United States into its current system that keeps prices for biologics sky-high and export it to Mexico, which does not mandate a special exclusivity period for biologics, and to Canada, which now has an eight-year period.

Some of the signatory organizations have identified ways in which the NAFTA 2.0 text improves on the original NAFTA and are calling for strengthened enforcement of the revised pact’s new labor and environmental terms. But one way in which NAFTA 2.0 is dramatically worse than the original is the addition of a slew of new monopoly rights for pharmaceutical corporations that would help them avoid competition from generic and biosimilar products and keep medicines unaffordable.

The letter notes that a decade ago, congressional Democrats and then-President George W. Bush agreed on a standard for trade-pact intellectual property terms that strove to promote innovation and access to affordable medicines. That standard is not met in the NAFTA 2.0 text.

With one in five people in the United States failing to fill prescriptions due to their cost, the letter signers urge the new Congress to demand “that the administration eliminate the provisions in the NAFTA 2.0 text that undermine affordable access to medicines.” Focus on widespread public anger over health care costs helped propel the Democrats to victory in the midterm elections.

The full letter and list of signing organizations are available here.

Please see below for quotes from representatives of Consumer Reports, Doctors Without Borders, NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice, Social Security Works, the AFL-CIO and Public Citizen.

  • “Prescription drugs are priced out of reach for too many Americans. But, there are provisions in the NAFTA 2.0 proposal that would lock in prolonged monopoly pricing for prescription drugs. These provisions do not belong in any trade agreement that is supposed to benefit American consumers and workers. We urge Congress to insist on taking these provisions out. We should all be working to make prescription drugs more affordable, and this proposal would just further tighten the monopoly grip of drug makers.” – Dena Mendelsohn, senior policy counsel at Consumer Reports

  • “It’s absolutely reckless and counterproductive for the U.S. government to support this deal despite evidence that it keeps drug prices high and further reduces access to lifesaving medicines. This agreement is not only a threat to patients in the United States, Mexico and Canada, it also sets a dangerous precedent for future trade deals involving countries all over the world, including many in which Médecins Sans Frontières works.” – Leonardo Palumbo, advocacy adviser at the Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Border) Access Campaign

  • “Pope Francis says that to be faithful, the economy must serve people first, not wealthy corporations. NAFTA 2.0 does not meet the mandate because it preferences giveaways for powerful drug companies that will harm patients. This new trade deal bars Congress from reducing drug prices, putting American lives at risk. Nearly one in four Americans report they or a family member have not filled a recent prescription because of costs, and prices continue to skyrocket. This needs to change. There is new bipartisan interest in Congress to begin tackling the issue of drug pricing. We cannot allow “big pharma lobbyists” to undermine the needs of our people. The profits of big pharma should not be prioritized over the health of people. Trade deals should not endanger the health of Americans. The Trump administration must eliminate these immoral provisions of NAFTA 2.0.” – Sister Simone Campbell, executive director of the NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice

  • “It is unacceptable that provisions in the NAFTA 2.0 (USMCA) prioritize profits and protect special interests over high-quality health care and affordable medicines. America’s working families deserve better. We will continue to fight for fair trade rules that protect their wages, their rights on the job and their access to affordable medicines.” – Cathy Feingold, director of the International Department at the AFL-CIO

  • “NAFTA 2.0 contains massive handouts to big pharma that will raise our drug prices. We need to smash pharmaceutical monopolies in the United States, not allow these corporations to use trade deals to make it impossible for us to lower our prices. Many members of Congress in both parties claim they want to take on big pharma and bring down prescription drug prices. But they will all be liars if they don’t also demand changes to NAFTA 2.0 to eliminate the handouts to drug corporations.”  – Alex Lawson, executive director of Social Security Works

  • “With consumer anger mounting, Big Pharma aims to use NAFTA 2.0 to lock in the government-granted monopolies that give drug corporations their power to price gouge consumers in the United States and around the world. The idea was to sneak a provision into the trade deal that would prevent the United States, Canada or Mexico from reducing monopoly terms in their domestic law for cancer and other important medicines. But here’s the bad news for Big Pharma: Congress is aware of the pharmaceutical corporations’ sneaky effort to lock in high drug prices using NAFTA 2.0, and if those terms are not eliminated, it’s hard to imagine how a deal gets through Congress. – Robert Weissman, president of Public Citizen
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The Revised NAFTA Deal Will NOT Fund Trump’s Border Wall, Directly or Indirectly

Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

Note: In his Oval Office address, Donald Trump again falsely claimed that somehow his revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA 2.0) will fund his border wall.

Donald Trump keeps repeating the ludicrous claim that somehow the revised NAFTA will fund his wall even though it remains unclear if the deal will be enacted and if it is, the text does not include border wall funding directly nor would it generate new government revenue indirectly given it cuts the very few remaining tariffs, not raises them.

A back of the envelope calculation reveals a new 20 percent tariff would have to be imposed on all imports from Mexico to put the money  to construct the wall into the U.S. Treasury and that money would come from importers, not the Mexican government. All imports into the United States from Mexico have been duty free for more than a decade, meaning that NAFTA trade does not generate money from Mexican importers for U.S. government coffers and nothing in the NAFTA 2.0 changes that.

So much for Trump’s great negotiating skills, given its obvious that trying to connect NAFTA to funding for his wall decreases the likelihood Congress passes the revised NAFTA, even if Trump’s NAFTA-wall-funding claims are entirely without merit.

Perhaps the strongest evidence that nothing in NAFTA 2.0 forces Mexico to pay for Trump’s border wall is that Mexico, which has made clear it will not pay, signed the deal.

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As Battle Over NAFTA 2.0 Heats Up, New Report Documents 25 Years of NAFTA's Disproportionate Damage to U.S. Latino and Mexican Working People

With the signing of the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on Nov. 30 as the migrant crisis at the border escalates, the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA) and Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch released a timely analysis of the North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) disproportionate damage to U.S. Latinos and Mexican workers, and whether the NAFTA 2.0 deal would stop it.

“While President Trump’s manipulation of grievances over trade and immigration brought him to power, absent from his worldview is the reality that NAFTA was developed by and for multinational corporations seeking to pay workers less and has hurt both U.S. and Mexican workers,” said Hector Sanchez, executive director of LCLAA at a Press Club event today. “Indeed, NAFTA’s destruction of millions of Mexican small farmers’ livelihoods and the pact’s race-to-the-bottom wage incentives have pushed many in Mexico to search for work outside their home country.”

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Titled “Fracaso: NAFTA’s Disproportionate Damage to U.S. Latino and Mexican Working People,” the report’s findings upend President Donald Trump’s xenophobic NAFTA narrative that blames Mexican workers for harming U.S. workers. The report’s analysis of the NAFTA 2.0 text in the context of the ongoing NAFTA-related damage to Mexican and U.S. workers alike spotlights why further improvements are necessary before a final NAFTA 2.0 deal can achieve broad support in Congress next year. The report was produced through a partnership that united LCLAA’s decades of advocacy for Latinos and Public Citizen’s decades of analysis of trade pacts and their impacts.

“NAFTA not only didn’t deliver on its proponents’ rosy promises of more jobs and higher wages, but its ongoing damage ended decades of bipartisan congressional consensus in favor of trade pacts,” said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. “For a final NAFTA 2.0 package to get through Congress next year, the signed deal will need more work so its labor standards are subject to swift and certain enforcement and the other improvements are made to stop NAFTA’s ongoing job outsourcing, downward pressure on wages and environmental damage.”

The data on NAFTA’s disproportionately negative effect on both Mexican and U.S. working people undermine Trump’s nationalist critique while also spotlighting why more-of-the-same neoliberal NAFTA policies are equally unacceptable. Among the report’s findings:

  • Government-certified NAFTA job loss has been greatest in regions where the U.S. Latino population is concentrated. The 15 states where 85 percent of Latinos reside account for nearly half (46 percent) of total NAFTA job loss certified under just the narrow Trade Adjustment Assistance program.
  • Latino workers were disproportionately represented in the light manufacturing industries hit hardest by the outsourcing NAFTA incentivized. Latinos lost 138,000 jobs in the apparel and textile sector and 123,000 jobs in the U.S. electronics industry during the NAFTA era.
  • As NAFTA eliminated U.S. manufacturing jobs, the related wage stagnation for workers without college educations across all industries hit Latinos asymmetrically. Rather than the Latino-white pay gap closing, it increased during the NAFTA years.
  • For Mexican workers, increased investment and trade with the United States failed to translate into per capita income growth or rising wages in Mexico. Annual per capita income grew less than 2 percent in the first seven years of NAFTA and less than 1 percent thereafter.
  • Real average annual wages have declined in Mexico under NAFTA. According to analysis by Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, manufacturing wages in Mexico are now 40 percent lower than in China. Prior to NAFTA, Mexican auto wages were five times lower than in the United States. Today, even as U.S. wages have stagnated, Mexican auto wages are nine times lower
  • NAFTA devastated Mexico’s rural sector. Amid a NAFTA-spurred influx of subsidized U.S. corn, about 2 million Mexicans engaged in farming and related work lost their livelihoods.
  • With millions of Mexicans displaced from rural communities competing for the hundreds of thousands of new manufacturing jobs outsourced from the United States, and a lack of independent unions in Mexico to bargain for better wages, employers could keep wages reprehensibly low. Overall, in real terms average annual Mexican wages are down 2 percent and the minimum wage down 14 percent from pre-NAFTA levels.
  • As NAFTA destroyed Mexican livelihoods and displaced millions in rural Mexico, it became a powerful push factor for migration. From 1993, the year before NAFTA, to 2000, annual immigration from Mexico increased from 370,000 to 770,000. With annual immigration on the rise, the total number of undocumented immigrants from Mexico living in the United States increased from about 2.9 million in 1995 to 4.5 million in 2000 to 6.9 million by 2007 when the financial crisis limited job opportunities and slowed migration rates.
  • Nearly 28,000 small- and medium-sized Mexican businesses were destroyed in NAFTA’s first four years alone, spurring the El Barzon movement of formerly middle-class Mexican entrepreneurs protesting NAFTA. Losses included many retail, food processing and light manufacturing firms that were displaced by NAFTA’s new opening for U.S. big-box retailers that sold goods imported from Asia.

This report makes clear that neither status-quo neoliberalism nor Trump’s anti-Mexico nationalism is in the interest of working people in the United States or Mexico.

“Tens of millions of Mexican and U.S. Latino workers have been hurt by NAFTA – from the factory worker in El Paso, Texas, who lost her livelihood making blue jeans after the apparel industry moved to Mexico to take advantage of low wages, to the Mexican farmer in Chiapas who can barely make ends meet as the prices paid for his corn plummeted after subsidized U.S. corn flowed into Mexican markets after NAFTA,” said Yanira Merina, national president of LCLAA. “It is the future of these workers, their families and their communities that will be determined by whether there is a new NAFTA deal that can raise wages and replace NAFTA’s race to the bottom with fair trade.”

“NAFTA 2.0 labor enforcement must be greatly strengthened,” said Guillermo Perez, labor educator at the United Steelworkers and president of the Pittsburgh LCLAA. “It is in the interest of workers in all three countries to ensure that Mexico adopts strong workers’ rights provisions and monitors and enforces their implementation. Workers in Mexico must be able to form labor organizations and collectively bargain for better wages and working conditions to stop downward pressure on wages in Canada and the United States.”

“Trade agreements like NAFTA, which are not fair and leave workers in the U.S., Canada and Mexico out in the cold, have caused immense pain and disruption in the lives of everyday working people in all three countries. The NAFTA 2.0 that was signed will not stop the wage suppression in Mexico and the related outsourcing from the U.S. and Canada. Our future, the future of manufacturing and the future of workers’ lives depends on getting trade policy right,” said Dora Cervantes, general secretary-treasurer at the International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers.

The full report is available here.

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Signing of NAFTA 2.0 Does Not End Fight for Progressive Improvements to the Agreement

Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

The NAFTA 2.0 text that is being signed contains some improvements that progressives have long demanded, some damaging terms we have long opposed and some important unfinished business.
 
If I had to grade the agreement now, I’d give it an incomplete because more work is needed to ensure swift and certain enforcement of the pact’s labor and environmental standards among other essential improvements necessary to stop NAFTA’s ongoing damage to workers and the environment.  
 
President Donald Trump and commentators who don’t know better are likely to place undue significance on this ceremonial event, but the signing is simply the next step in an ongoing process that must produce a final deal that can win majority support in Congress. 
 
As is, the agreement falls short of the changes needed to stop NAFTA’s ongoing job outsourcing, downward pressure on our wages and attacks on environmental safeguards, but there is a path to improving it so a final NAFTA package could win wide support.
 
A new NAFTA can go into effect only if majorities of both the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate approve it next year. Given the results of the midterm elections, only a final deal that can earn Democratic support will get through Congress.
 
If trade officials work with congressional Democrats, unions and others on the improvements needed to stop NAFTA’s ongoing job outsourcing and environmental damage and raise wages, a final deal could achieve broad support next year. Of course, who knows what lunatic things unrelated to trade that Donald Trump might do in the meantime to derail that prospect.
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How the Midterm Election Affects the Fate of NAFTA Renegotiations

Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

A lot of corporate lobbyists and congressional Republicans were downright scornful of U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer’s efforts to engage on NAFTA renegotiation with the congressional Democrats and unions that have opposed past trade deals. Now his approach appears prescient: After this election, only trade deals that can earn Democratic support will get through Congress.

Regardless of the change in control of the House, there is a path to creating a final NAFTA package that could achieve broad support.

In response to publication of the NAFTA 2.0 text, congressional Democrats that have opposed past pacts did not launch a campaign against it, but rather identified where progress was made and where more work is essential, including the labor standards enforcement that is necessary to counter NAFTA’s job outsourcing incentives and downward pressure on wages. This election has increased the number of House members whose support of any trade deal will be premised on such improvements.

If trade officials are willing to work with congressional Democrats, unions and other groups on the improvements needed to stop NAFTA’s ongoing job outsourcing and raise wages, there clearly is a policy path to a renegotiated NAFTA that could gain wide support next year. Of course, who knows what lunatic things unrelated to trade that Donald Trump might do in the meantime to derail that prospect?

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Third-Quarter Data Shows Record U.S. Trade Deficits During Trump Presidency

Contrary to Trump’s Campaign Pledges to Speedily Reduce the Deficit, Nine-Month Data Show Largest Deficit Ever Recorded With China and Largest With NAFTA Nations in a Decade

Government data released today reveals the highest U.S. goods trade deficit in a decade for the first three-quarters of 2018, contradicting President Donald Trump’s midterm campaign trail triumphalism on trade. During Trump’s presidency, the U.S. trade deficit with China has risen to the highest ever recorded, while the deficits with the world and with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) nations have steadily grown, reaching nine-month levels in 2018 higher than any year since before the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

“Instead of the speedy reduction in the trade deficit that Trump promised as a focal point of his campaign, during his presidency, the U.S. trade deficit with the world, China and NAFTA countries has steadily grown,” said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. “This alarming data spotlights that the Trump administration has chosen not to employ all of the tools at its disposal to bring down the trade deficit.”

Today’s U.S. Census Bureau release of the nine-month 2018 trade data reveals a global deficit and a China deficit that is higher than the nine-month level of Trump’s first year, which was higher than the nine months of President Barack Obama’s last year (all figures adjusted for inflation). The U.S. also is on track to end 2018 with the highest goods trade deficit with NAFTA partners since 2008. This is being driven by increasing imports from Canada and Mexico since 2016, but especially from Mexico this year.

As our Trump trade deficit tracker shows, the nine-month 2018 data indicate:

  • The U.S. trade deficit with China sets another all-time record. The goods trade deficit with China over the first nine months of 2018 was the highest deficit ever recorded for the first three quarters of a year – a 13 percent increase over 2016. Comparing the first nine months of Trump’s first year to his second year, the China goods deficit increased 8 percent, from $280 billion in 2017 to $301 billion in 2018. This compares to $268 billion for the first three quarters of 2016, Obama’s last year in office.
  • After increasing steadily during the Trump presidency, with a total increase of 23 percent over 2016, the U.S. goods trade deficit with NAFTA partners during the first three quarters of 2018 was the highest in a decade. The U.S. trade deficit with NAFTA partners during the first nine months of the year increased 11 percent, from $144 billion in 2017 to $160 billion in 2018 after falling to $130 billion in 2016, the last year of Obama’s term. The 2008 nine-month deficit, before the effect of the crisis was felt, reached a record $188 billion before falling to $101 billion in 2009 over the same nine-month period.
  • The overall U.S. goods trade deficit with the world over the first nine months of 2018 was the highest in the decade since before the financial crisis and up 13 percent over 2016. The U.S. trade deficit with the world over the first nine months of 2018 increased 7 percent, from $599 billion in 2017 to $643 billion in 2018, up from $570 billion in 2016, the last year of Obama’s term. The 2008 nine-month deficit, before the effect of the financial crisis was felt, had reached a record $744 billion before falling to $420 billion over the same period in 2009.

The growth of the NAFTA trade deficit has been overshadowed by focus on U.S.-China trade conflicts. But it is notable that the growth of the U.S.-Mexico deficit is accelerating, with 11 percent growth from the first nine months of 2017 to the same period in 2018 compared to 6 percent growth over that period from 2016 to 2017. The U.S. deficit with Canada is still growing, but the rate has not accelerated.

This data likely will color the debate next year as a renegotiated NAFTA heads toward congressional consideration. Public Citizen’s analysis of the NAFTA 2.0 text revealed some improvements progressives have long demanded, damaging terms long opposed and important unfinished business. The analysis showed that fixing NAFTA’s trade-deficit-raising terms that incentivize U.S. firms to outsource jobs to Mexico to pay workers poverty wages, dump toxins and bring their products back here for sale remains a work-in-progress.

The latest trade data spotlights actions the Trump administration has chosen not to take to bring down the U.S. trade deficit.

The data arrives on the heels of Trump’s Treasury Department failing to label any country a currency manipulator. An analysis released recently by Public Citizen shows how the Treasury Department’s decision to rely on reporting criteria created by the previous administration has ensured no action on the issue, despite then-candidate Trump pledging to crack down on countries that gain trade advantages by distorting currency values.

As well, Trump has not exercised the authority he has to reverse waivers of “Buy America” procurement policies that outsource U.S. tax revenues to purchase imports for government use. He also has not followed through on his campaign pledges to penalize imports from firms that consistently outsource jobs or limit government contracts to firms that outsource jobs.

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Public Citizen Analysis: How the New NAFTA Text Measures Against Key Changes We Have Demanded to Stop NAFTA’s Ongoing Damage

Note from Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

Here is our initial 14-page analysis of the NAFTA 2.0 text, following up on the statement from Sunday night. We have reviewed how the text measures up to the changes to NAFTA that Public Citizen and many other progressive organizations have long demanded. After some digging, which has been exhausting giving the 900 pages of text and annexes, we have boiled down whole chapters into bulleted highlights and lowlights and assessed whether demands are met or there are mixed outcomes or it’s too soon to know or there’s been a fail. 

Overall, the NAFTA 2.0 text reveals a work in progress with some improvements for which we have long advocated, some new terms that we oppose and more work required to stop NAFTA’s ongoing job outsourcing, downward pressure on wages and environmental damage.

The new text isn’t a transformational replacement of the entire corporate-rigged U.S. trade agreement model that NAFTA launched in the 1990s. But at the same time, in key respects, this deal is quite different from all past U.S. free trade agreements. The revised deal could reduce NAFTA’s ongoing job outsourcing, downward pressure on our wages and environmental damage if more is done to ensure the new labor standards are subject to swift and certain enforcement, and some other key improvements are made. There’s a ways to go between this text and congressional consideration of a final NAFTA renegotiation package in 2019.

Important progress has been made with the removal of corporate investor protections that make it cheaper and less risky to outsource jobs and a major reining-in of NAFTA’s outrageous Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) tribunals under which corporations have grabbed hundreds of millions from taxpayers after attacks on environmental and health policies.

Termination of ISDS between the U.S. and Canada would eliminate 92 percent of U.S. ISDS liability under NAFTA and the lion’s share of total U.S. ISDS exposure overall. This, combined with the major roll back of corporate rights and ISDS coverage between the U.S. and Mexico would prevent many new ISDS attacks on domestic environmental and health policies after more than $390 million has been paid to corporation by taxpayers to date. That even this corporate-compliant administration whacked ISDS means future presidents cannot backslide and also sends a powerful signal to the many nations worldwide also seeking to escape the ISDS regime. 

A lot more work remains to be done: Unless strong labor standards and environmental standards are made subject to swift and certain enforcement, U.S. firms will continue to outsource jobs to pay Mexican workers poverty wages, dump toxins and bring their products back here for sale.

Despite Donald Trump’s “Buy American/Hire American” rhetoric, the new deal maintains NAFTA’s waiver of Buy American rules that require the U.S. government to procure U.S.-made goods, so unless that gets fixed more U.S. tax dollars and more U.S. jobs will be outsourced.

The new deal grants pharmaceutical corporations new monopoly rights so they can keep medicine prices high by avoiding generic competition. This could undermine the changes we need to make medicine more affordable here and increase prices in Mexico and Canada, limiting access to lifesaving medicines.

Areas of progress include a first-time-ever innovation of conditioning trade benefits for a percentage of autos and auto parts on the workers producing them being paid $16 per hour or more. Terms that forced countries to continue to export natural resources that they seek to conserve are eliminated. Longstanding safety and environmental problems relating to Mexican-domiciled trucks’ access to U.S. roads are addressed. Rules of origin that allowed goods with significant Chinese and others non-North American value were tightened.   

Americans have suffered under NAFTA’s corporate-rigged rules for decades. Nearly one million U.S. jobs have been government-certified as lost to NAFTA, with NAFTA helping corporations outsource more jobs to Mexico every week. The downward pressure on U.S. workers’ wages caused by NAFTA outsourcing has only intensified as Mexican wages declined in real terms since NAFTA, with Mexican manufacturing wages now 40 percent below those in coastal China.

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NAFTA Notice: A Final Deal Must Be Judged on Whether It Will Stop NAFTA’s Serious Ongoing Damage

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Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

Note: The Trump administration gave notice to the U.S. Congress on Friday, Aug. 31 of its intent to sign a renegotiated North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Aug. 31 is the last day to give notice for a deal to be signed by outgoing Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. The U.S. reached agreement with Mexico on new terms, but talks with Canada are ongoing. The text of any deal would be made public only after 30 days’ notice. While much attention has been given to whether various deadlines can be met and the political and legal implications of various scenarios, the fundamental question is whether the content of a new agreement can halt NAFTA’s ongoing damage:

“We understand that progress has been made on some essential NAFTA changes we have long sought, like razing NAFTA’s investor tribunals where multinational corporations have grabbed $392 million in compensation from North American taxpayers after attacking environmental and health policies. But swift and certain enforcement of what we understand are improved labor standards is lacking and must still be added or U.S. corporations will keep outsourcing jobs to Mexico to pay workers a pittance, dump toxins and import products back to the U.S. for sale here.

Given the encouraging news about some of the key NAFTA changes we have long sought, we are closely monitoring the ongoing process with respect to improvements in labor enforcement that are necessary to counter NAFTA job outsourcing. We also closely monitoring the ongoing negotiations with Canada where several important consumer protection issues are at stake, including extended monopoly rights for pharmaceutical corporation that would increase medicine prices. Ultimately, we must see the final text to know whether our demands have been met.

Any final deal must be judged on whether it will stop NAFTA’s serious ongoing damage, given the pact now helps corporations outsource more jobs to Mexico every week (Almost one million American jobs have been government-certified as lost to NAFTA) and launch new NAFTA investor attacks on health and environmental laws after already $392 million has been grabbed from taxpayers. 

As we have made clear since Day One of renegotiations, the only agreement that can achieve broad support must end NAFTA’s job outsourcing incentives and Investor State Dispute Settlements tribunals – where corporations can attack our laws – and add strong environmental and labor terms with swift and certain enforcement to raise wages.

It may seem improbable that this administration could be making changes progressives have long sought, but public anger over outsourcing has made it impossible for business-as-usual trade agreements to get through Congress. The big questions are whether Trump will deliver a final deal strong enough to meet his election promises to return manufacturing jobs and cut the large NAFTA trade deficit and if so, whether Republicans in Congress would buck the corporate lobby and support a deal that would end NAFTA’s job outsourcing incentives and ISDS tribunals where corporations can attack our laws and add strong environmental and labor terms with swift and certain enforcement to raise wages.”

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U.S. Trade Deficit for First Half of 2018 Likely to Be Largest Recorded in Years, With China Deficit on Track to Be Highest First-Half Ever Recorded

January-June 2018 Data Out This Friday Likely to Show a Trump Trade Deficit Higher Than First Halves of 2017 or 2016

Contrary to Donald Trump’s claim last week that he has reduced the trade deficit by $52 billion, the United States is on track to post a record high goods trade deficit for the first half of 2018. When the U.S. Census Bureau releases the six-month data this Friday, the global deficit and China deficit are likely to be higher than in the first half of Trump’s first year in office, which was higher than the first half of President Barack Obama’s last year. The six-month 2018 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) deficit also is likely to be higher than the first half of Obama’s last year.

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U.S. Trade Deficit with Selected Partners, Sum of First Five Months (Source: U.S. Census Bureau)

Trump’s $52 billion trade deficit reduction claim seems to be premised on a misleading comparison between an annualized change in the goods and services trade balance between the first quarter of 2018 (a $902 billion deficit) and the second quarter of 2018 (a $850 billion deficit.) But the U.S. goods trade deficit in the first quarter of 2018 was the largest first-quarter deficit since before the financial crisis, meaning a decline from that in the next quarter says very little about the overall trend. This comparison, like changes in month-to-month deficit figures that often are reported in the press, obscure actual trends. The monthly data are volatile, especially now, as U.S. exporters race to beat retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods. Reviewing the same five-month goods trade balances shows that U.S. deficits with the world and with China were higher over the first five months of 2018 compared to the first five months of 2017, which in turn were higher than the first five months of 2016, even after adjusting for inflation.  (All figures in this memo are inflation-adjusted, so they represent the actual growth in the deficit expressed in constant dollars.)

What to Look for When Census Releases the Six-Month 2018 Trade Data on Friday

  • The goods trade deficit with China over the first half of 2018 is on track to be the highest first-half ever recorded. Comparing the first five months of Trump’s first year in office to his second, the China goods trade deficit increased 8 percent from $141 billion in 2017 to $152 billion in 2018. This compares to $136 billion for the first five months of 2016, Obama’s last year. As was widely reported, U.S. exports were inflated during the first half of 2018 by shipments racing to get ahead of the imposition of tariffs, but imports also grew substantially.
  • The goods trade deficit with the world over the first half of 2018 is likely to reach a level closer to the record deficits before the 2008-09 financial crisis. The U.S. trade deficit with the world over the first five months increased 5 percent from $320 billion in 2017 to $336 billion in 2018 after already hitting $296 billion in 2016, the last year of Obama’s term. The 2008 first five-month deficit, before the effect of the crisis was felt, reached a record $385 billion before falling to $206 billion in 2009 for the same period. 

  • The six-month 2018 NAFTA goods trade deficit may also increase in Trump’s second year, as it did in his first relative to Obama’s last year in office. The NAFTA deficit for the first five months of 2018 increased from $70 billion in 2016 to $82 billion in 2017 to $84 billion in 2018. Because re-exports now represent 20 percent of U.S. goods exports to NAFTA nations, for the NAFTA figures we use domestic export data. This excludes goods not actually produced in the exporting country. In 2016, 44 percent or nearly $100 billion of U.S. re-exports went to NAFTA partners – $53.5 billion to Mexico and $45.7 billion to Canada. No other country received more than 6 percent of U.S. re-exports. Not removing re-export artificially inflate export

Why Month-to-Month Trends Miss the Main Story

Many trade watchers focus on the change in month-to-month numbers, especially now as they study whether newly imposed tariffs are altering trade flows. But monthly trade figures are volatile, and the “seasonal adjustment” done by Census does not control for factors such as U.S. exporters trying to beat the imposition of various countervailing tariffs. Thus, the main storyline when the May trade figures were released was that the monthly deficit with the world was the lowest since October 2016. But missing in this assessment was that U.S. trade deficits with the world and with China were higher during the first five months of 2018 compared to the same period in 2017, which were in turn higher than the first five months of 2016, even after adjusting for inflation. A more complete picture of U.S. trade balance trends is achieved by comparing the year-to-date totals through the same point of previous years. This removes the need for seasonal adjustment, given the data cover the same months each year. (We focus on goods balances rather than total goods and services in this memo because services data broken down by trading partner lags the goods data by months. The services data by partner for the first half of 2018 will not be available until September 2018.)

NAFTA Balances and the Skew from Re-Exports: Yes, We Have A Deficit With Canada

Accurately accounting for NAFTA trade balances is complicated. Since NAFTA went into effect, the share of U.S. exports to Mexico and Canada that are re-exports of goods made in other countries has jumped from 5 percent in 1993 pre-NAFTA to 20 percent in 2017. (Re-exports are goods imported, for instance, from China into the United States and then exported to Canada without change. In 2016, one-third of U.S. re-exports to Canada were produced in China.) Counting re-export of foreign-made goods in U.S. export data inaccurately inflate export numbers. But to get an accurate balance, the import side of the equation also must be considered. The United Nations’ trade database, called Comtrade, provides official government data on domestic exports (i.e., not including re-exports). Consider the controversial question of whether the United States has a trade deficit with Canada. The Comtrade data show $221 billion in U.S. domestic exports to Canada and $266 billion in Canadian domestic exports to the United States in 2016, the most recent year that can be compared to available services data. That yields a $45 billion U.S. goods trade deficit with Canada. After subtracting the $24 billion U.S. services trade surplus with Canada documented by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the United States still had a $21 billion goods and services trade deficit with Canada in 2016. When this issue came to the forefront earlier this year, analysts who did not subtract re-exports instead calculated a $7 billion U.S. surplus with Canada for 2016.

A Deeper Dig into the Data: About Those Soy Exports

Several deeper cuts of the data are worth considering. The first relates to what the United States is exporting, which to the world in 2017 was $138 billion of agricultural goods and $1.1 trillion of manufactured goods. There has been breathless coverage of how China’s retaliatory tariffs have impacted U.S. soybean exports, which are noted to be the second largest U.S. export to China after civilian aircraft, engines and parts. What this reveals is the lack of U.S. value-added exports to China after that nation’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). After soybeans, the top 15 U.S. export products to China include commodities like crude oil (No. 4), copper scrap ( No. 7), propane (No. 8), aluminum scrap (No. 11), wood pulp (No. 12), cotton (No. 14) and paper waste (No. 15). The giant trade deficit with China is the result of exporting only $120 billion worth of goods in total. However, a large portion are low value-added commodities. Of the top 15 U.S. export products to China, $24 billion represent such goods, and only $31 billion, or 56 percent, represent high value-added product categories like cars and electronics. Meanwhile, 84 percent of Chinese imports into the United States are in these high- value categories. The United States runs over a $100 billion deficit with China in electrical machinery alone.

The second deep dive relates to the impact on wages from the composition of the goods we import and export. One way to view this is by checking the subset of the data on our manufacturing trade balance. Even the most orthodox economists admit that trade changes the composition of jobs – and thus the wages – available for U.S. workers. As the grandfather of modern trade economics, Nobel-Prize winning economist Paul Samuelson found in one of the last papers he published before his death, offshoring of higher-paid jobs to countries like China and India can cause U.S. workers to lose more in wages than they gain from access to cheaper imported goods. The downward pressure on wages is still the predominant feature of the U.S. labor market and trade is one of the significant factors fueling it and one of the only ones that can be altered via policy changes. The Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) revealed that when comparing the lower prices of cheaper imported goods to the income American workers lost from low-wage competition under current trade policy, by 2001 the trade-related wage losses were larger than gains from access to cheaper goods for the majority of U.S. workers. CEPR found that those without college degrees (58 percent of the workforce) had likely lost an amount equal to 12.2 percent of their wages under NAFTA-style trade, even after accounting for the benefits of cheaper imports. That meant a net loss of more than $3,965 per year for the average worker. Despite this, defenders of the trade status quo dismiss the relevance of trade deficits, especially given strong economic growth figures in an economy running near full employment. Yet, while headline economic indicators are strong, damage that is occurring may remain invisible. When the tide goes out on a hot economy, the damage in lower wages and the disappearance of middle-class jobs for the majority of Americans without college degrees may be seen and felt acutely, just as it was after the 2008-09 financial crisis.

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Unpacking Disingenuous GOP Complaints About Presidential Trade Authority

At midnight on June 30, Fast Track, which delegates Congress’ constitutional trade authority to the president, extended for another three years.

The congressional Democrats, who fought this broad give-away of control over trade agreements even when it was President Barack Obama’s request in 2015, could not even obtain a vote because the procedure is so rigged it automatically extends unless a “non-extension resolution” is passed. But that vote can only occur if the congressional GOP leadership allows it.

And the congressional GOP, most of whom supported the extreme Fast Track procedure but now are cynically howling about undue presidential authority over trade, chose not to take action.

Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress is supposed to write the laws and set trade policy, while the executive branch represents the United States in negotiations with foreign governments. When it came to trade agreements, this arrangement required cooperation between the branches.

For 200 years, these key checks and balances helped ensure that no one branch of government had too much power over trade policy. But, starting with Nixon, presidents have tried to seize those congressional powers using Fast Track.

Fast Track, which supporters renamed Trade Promotion Authority as the procedure became increasingly controversial, empowers the executive branch to unilaterally select partner countries for “trade” pacts, decide the agreements’ contents, and then negotiate, sign and enter into the agreements — all before Congress has a vote on the matter. Normal congressional committee processes are forbidden, meaning that the executive branch is empowered to write lengthy legislation on its own with no review or amendments. And, then the president is guaranteed a vote on the done deal within a set amount of time with no amendments allowed and debate limited.

President Obama — despite his campaign promise to reject Fast Track — requested the authority for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). A years-long battle ensued, with opposition coming from a majority of the U.S. public, most House Democrats and a sizeable bloc of Republicans, organized labor, environmental groups, public health organizations, family farmers, and many more. Despite the unprecedented strength and diversity of this coalition focused on a trade issue, Fast Track authority was passed by a one-vote margin in June 2015.

This delegation of Fast Track authority was for a three-year period with an automatic renewal for another three years after that. The only way to stop the automatic renewal of Fast Track would have been with a congressional resolution of disapproval.

The AFL-CIO sent a letter to Congress opposing Fast Track renewal in its current form because of its opacity and inadequate labor standards. But the broad coalition in Congress and outside that almost stopped Fast Track in 2015 did not organize a push to end the procedure because the disapproval mechanism is designed to only function if the congressional leadership allows it.

And, it was a telling spectacle to watch Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) and other GOP senators going ballistic over President Donald Trump’s authority to do anything to stop trade cheating while revealing their disinterest in getting rid of the Fast Track legislative luge run. 

Fast Track has been the necessary swamp oil to grease the skids to pass pacts like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and other job-killing deals packed with special corporate protections and rights. The corporate lobby opposes the president having trade authority to combat trade cheating that costs American jobs, but loves Fast-Tracked trade deals that make it easier to outsource additional jobs.

The GOP inaction on Fast Track disapproval made 100 percent clear what is really going on: Team Trade Status Quo is keen to eliminate presidential authority on trade matters that break with their pro-job-outsourcing trade agenda while remaining committed to the current iteration of Fast Track with a view to trying to use it to get more-of-the-same trade deals.

That dynamic makes the current NAFTA renegotiation a moment of truth. The U.S. Trade Representative, Robert Lighthizer, is using this delegation of Fast Track to negotiate a NAFTA replacement that actually has a chance of making things better for working people rather than expanding greater corporate control over our lives.

The renegotiated NAFTA just might eliminate the job outsourcing incentives at NAFTA’s heart, including the system that empowers multinational corporations to attack our laws for taxpayer money before a panel of three corporate lawyers. And the NAFTA replacement may even add labor and environmental standards that could actually help raise wages and improve conditions for people throughout North America.

In the face of this potential game-changer of a trade agreement, congressional Republicans’ inconsistency on Fast Track belies the truth, that for them criticism of presidential trade authority was never about constitutional checks and balances – it was all about making sure their corporate cronies can do whatever they want.

However, the revised NAFTA deal is not done yet. And the GOP’s decision not to act against Fast Track extension suggests that they still think they can get the terrible, TPP-style NAFTA deal that they want.

The diverse coalition that fought Fast Track and that defeated the TPP must remain vigilant and show that a revolutionary new model for NAFTA that puts working people first is the only type of deal that will pass in Congress.

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For G-7, Trump’s racism and misogyny are ok, but his trade policies are intolerable

Trump-G7-2017
U.S. President Donald Trump greets Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau during the 2017 G-7 Summit in Italy. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)

U.S. President Donald Trump seems as welcome at the G-7 picnic as a rabid skunk.

Most G-7 leaders have worked to build warm relationships with Trump, despite his xenophobia, racism, misogyny, climate denialism, warmongering and corrupt business self-dealing. But apparently, taking on the trade status quo was a bridge too far.

That is a bitter irony, given that the trade and financial policies that the G-7 has relentlessly promoted created the political context that helped to make Trump president. Decades of U.S. presidents from both parties and their G-7 counterparts have pushed international economic policies that have created expansive new rights and powers for multinational corporations and hurt working people.

Pushing corporate-rigged trade agreements, blessing financial deregulation and loosening trillions in speculative investment flows were the economic priorities.

Even as millions of manufacturing jobs were lost, absent was coordinated G-7 action to counter China’s currency manipulation or a unified approach to end Chinese subsidies and other unfair trade practices that, among other problems, fueled the global steel and aluminum oversupply glut.

And as working-class wages declined and income inequality and financial instability grew, the majority harmed by the G-7 version of globalization were told their fate was inevitable.

In the United States, that message was conveyed by Democratic and Republican presidents alike even as the economic and social fallout became increasing difficult to deny. About 4.5 million net American manufacturing jobs have been lost since the 1994 start of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 2000 trade deal with China related to its admission to the World Trade Organization. Sixty-thousand manufacturing facilities shuttered. And real wages flattened, given that the replacement of the higher-wage manufacturing jobs with lower-wage service sector jobs pushed down wages economy-wide even if one did not lose their job to trade.

Enter Trump, who, whatever else his trade policies may or may not do, ended the bipartisan presidential practice of not seeing or talking about the many Americans who have been harmed by our trade status quo.

Therefore perhaps Trump’s truly unforgiveable sin, finally meriting open ire from G-7 partners, is to demonstrate that the trade status quo is, in fact, not pre-ordained, but rather is a set of policies he is shredding.

Trump may well not achieve the better trade outcomes he promised.

That would require him to stay focused on changing China’s cornucopia of unfair trade practices rather than settling for the usual Chinese promises to buy more U.S. exports. And, unless he can implement a replacement deal that eliminates NAFTA’s investor-state outsourcing incentives and adds strong labor and environmental terms with swift and certain enforcement to raise wages, companies will keep moving jobs to Mexico to pay workers a pittance and dump toxins and import those products back for sale here.

And, the U.S. corporate lobby is in overdrive working against any attempt to change the trade policies to preserve the status quo. Doing so is apparently a higher priority for them than preserving the Republican congressional majority. The Koch Brothers just announced a campaign designed to line up congressional Republicans against Trump’s trade agenda before the midterm elections, even as polls show GOP and Independent voters support that agenda.

Plus, Trumpian chaos has led to Trump caving on well-thought-out policies, such as the China trade enforcement action aimed at dismantling the technology theft essential to the China 2025 agenda to dominate industries of the future. That approach was revived, for now.

But whether or not Trump’s trade policies succeed, the other G-7 leaders should reflect on the painful lesson of Trump’s rise and that of other authoritarian politicians who wrap themselves in economic populism: Political leaders who fail to offer a new approach on trade and the related economic policies that provide greater economic security for all only serve to alienate more and more people who are left behind, creating fertile political ground for more Trumps.

Trump’s pledges to upend the trade status quo, end job outsourcing and create manufacturing jobs attracted hard-hit working-class votes in the key Midwestern swing states that put him in the White House. And President Barack Obama’s relentless efforts right through the 2016 campaign to pass the business-as-usual Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and Secretary Hilary Clinton’s ambiguous views on the TPP and connection to President Bill Clinton’s NAFTA, dampened working-class enthusiasm for the Democratic ticket.

If Trump’s foreseeably cringe-worthy exploits at the G-7 don’t drive home this point, perhaps yesterday’s election of Doug Ford — considered the Donald Trump of Canada and brother of the infamous right-wing, populist, crack-smoking Ontario Mayor Robert Ford — as Ontario’s new Premier will.

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TPP-11 Countries Sign a Deal — While We Dodged a Bullet on ISDS Expansion Here, Our International Allies Face a Major Fight

Thanks to years of organizing, we in the United States saved ourselves from the corporate-dominated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) by ensuring that the controversial deal was universally reviled across party lines and could never gain a majority in Congress.

But it is deeply unfortunate for our international partners that this week the remaining 11 TPP countries — including Canada and Mexico — signed the deeply flawed TPP model for their countries in a cynically renamed “Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership.” We know from our years-long, internationally-coordinated TPP campaign that our sisters and brothers in those nations fought against the corporate-rigged TPP model as hard as we did. We stand in solidarity with them as they continue to mobilize to block the ratification and implementation of this TPP-11 deal in their countries.

While some of the most egregious provisions pushed by Big Pharma that would have further threatened access to life-saving medicines were fortunately set aside (for now) in the revised TPP-11 deal, most of the TPP’s dangerous rules remain intact. It is shocking, for instance, that Canada, Mexico and others agreed to maintain the infamous investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system (with only some minor tweaks), that empowers multinational corporations to attack public interest laws before panels of three corporate lawyers.

We dodged a bullet here in the United States — the TPP would have doubled U.S. exposure to investor-state attacks against U.S. policies by newly empowering more than 1,000 additional corporations in TPP countries, which own more than 9,200 additional subsidiaries in the United States, to launch investor-state cases against the U.S. government.

But, it is beyond perplexing that Canada and Mexico would agree to expand their liability to these ISDS attacks on their laws in the TPP-11. In the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) renegotiations, the United States has proposed to radically roll back ISDS, which should be good news for Canada and Mexico, since Canadian and Mexican taxpayers have paid $392 million to mostly U.S. corporations who won ISDS attacks against their public interest laws using NAFTA.

The corporate lobby, which has been doing all it can to block the positive NAFTA proposal to roll back ISDS, is undoubtedly rejoicing that the TPP-11 countries have signaled their willingness to accept expansion of the controversial ISDS system.

But the diverse consensus to end ISDS in NAFTA and elsewhere spans the political spectrum, with stark criticism coming from voices as disparate as U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John RobertsReagan-era associate deputy attorney general Bruce Fein, the pro-free-trade libertarian Cato Institutethink tank, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.)Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitzunions and environmental groups.

We will continue to push to remove ISDS from NAFTA and support our allies in Canada, Mexico and in the other TPP-11 nations as they fight ISDS expansion.

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In Memory of Zahara Heckscher

Zahara_HeckscherAll of us at Public Citizen lift up in loving memory our dear friend and peaceful warrior Zahara Heckscher, who passed away on February 24 at the age of 53, after her years-long battle with breast cancer. 

Among her many talents as a writer, poet, teacher and facilitator, Zahara was a fierce, creative and committed activist. As she valiantly battled advanced breast cancer, she became determined to fight for all patients to have access to the cutting-edge cancer medicines that extended her life. 

When she learned that prescription drug companies were using the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations to lock in extended monopolies that threatened access to affordable medicines, Zahara became a passionate trade justice advocate on behalf of cancer patients around the world. 

She galvanized testimony from people living with cancer and HIV/AIDS from the United States and other TPP countries to protest what she dubbed the “TPP death sentence clause” — a provision that would require governments to grant monopoly periods for biologic medicines used to treat cancer and other serious illnesses and thus deny patients access to more affordable generic and biosimilar medicines.  

The battle over biologics and access to cancer treatment was responsible for dragging out TPP talks for years. In October 2015, she carried those patients’ stories with her to the final round of TPP negotiations in Atlanta to demand that the TPP negotiators drop the “death sentence clause”. She was arrested as she attempted to enter the negotiations, holding an IV-pole, calling on the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to drop its insistence on demanding the extended monopoly period for biologic medicines. 

The video of her arrest was shared widely on social media, and her subsequent media interviews on Democracy Now, The Big Picture and others contributed to the national conversation about the dangers of the TPP for health. Due in part to the advocacy of public health advocates like Zahara, the pharmaceutical industry and USTR failed to convince the other TPP nations to accept the full twelve-year monopoly they had been demanding, but the final TPP did include a five-year period.

Zahara insisted that cancer patients cannot wait even one additional year for access to medicines that can keep them alive, so she turned her efforts to stopping Congress from ratifying the TPP.

On World Cancer Day in February 2016, she and fellow cancer survivor Hannah were arrested blocking the entrance to PhRMA, the pharmaceutical industry’s lobby that had pushed the TPP death sentence clause, to warn the public and Congress about TPP’s dangers for access to cancer medicines.  Together, Zahara and Hannah then co-founded Cancer Families for Affordable Medicines, creating public education and advocacy materials for cancer patients and their loved ones to support access to medicines by convincing their members of Congress to vote no on the TPP. 

As the pressure on Congress to pass the TPP mounted in the summer of 2016, Zahara took her message directly to Capitol Hill, getting arrested a third time at the office of Congressman Polis, and traveling to speak in-district to undecided members of Congress to demonstrate what was at stake in the TPP for cancer patients and their loved ones. Despite the fact that TPP passage was a top priority of the White House, Republican congressional leadership and Chamber of Commerce, the district-by-district activism by people like Zahara ensured that the TPP could not achieve majority support in Congress.

In the last year, Zahara’s waning physical strength did not stop her from continuing her trade justice activism. Concerned by reports that the Trump administration was pushing for the same “death sentence clause” in its renegotiations of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), just last month, Zahara made an educational video to urge people to take action to ensure that NAFTA renegotiations not further undermine access to essential medicines.

Until the very end, Zahara used every tool at her disposal — from her razor-sharp intellect to her poetic spirit to even the cancer itself — to bless the world and to change it for the better. Her strategic and creative trade justice activism was just one small piece of her multi-faceted legacy. She was an inspiration. We will miss her dearly.

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New Trade Deficit Tracker

Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch launches new Trade Deficit Tracker. Contrary to candidate Donald Trump’s pledge to speedily reduce the U.S. trade deficit, in Trump’s first year in office the goods trade deficit is larger than any time since 2008 and up 5 percent overall even in inflation-controlled terms from last year, with a significant jump in the China trade deficit and a 8 percent increase in the North American Free Trade Agreement deficit. Trump has not exercised his available executive authority to fulfill campaign pledges to limit imports, including those from firms that outsource jobs; label China a currency manipulator; revoke trade agreement waivers on “Buy America” procurement policies that outsource U.S. tax dollars to purchase imports for government use; or limit government contracts to firms that outsource jobs.

The overall 2017 U.S. goods trade deficit in inflation-controlled terms was $796 billion in 2017, up 5.4 percent or $40.9 billion from 2016, which was led by a U.S.-China goods deficit of $375 billion in 2017, up 5.5 percent and $19.5 billion from 2016. The 2017 U.S-NAFTA goods trade deficit was up 7.8 percent or $13.8 billion from 2016.

To document the significant increase in U.S. trade deficits under the Trump administration, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch has launched a new tracker. The tracker visualizes and tracks significant developments related to U.S. trade deficits with NAFTA partners (Canada and Mexico), and China respectively. Click here or on the image below to visit the tracker.

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www.citizen.org/our-work/globalization-and-trade/trumps-trade-deficit

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NAFTA Plan Does Not Describe Promised Transformation of NAFTA to Prioritize Working People

Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

 Note: Today, the Trump administration published a document on its NAFTA renegotiation objectives. Under the 2015 Fast Track law, the administration must publish “a detailed and comprehensive summary” of its specific negotiating objectives 30 days before formally beginning trade talks.

“This document does not describe the promised transformation of NAFTA to prioritize working people that some voters were expecting based on President Trump’s campaign pledges.

More than 910,000 specific American jobs have been certified as lost to NAFTA under just one narrow program, but this document does not make clear whether NAFTA’s job offshoring incentives or its ban on Buy American procurement policy will be eliminated or labor or environmental standards better than the widely rejected one in the TPP will be added.

The document is quite vague so while negotiations can start in 30 days, it’s unclear what will be demanded on key issues, whether improvements for working people could be in the offing or whether the worst aspects of the TPP will be added making NAFTA yet more damaging for working people. The administration should follow the European Union’s practice and make public its actual proposals being shared with Mexico and Canada prior to talks starting.

The Trump administration has a very narrow pathway to both achieving the president’s campaign pledges on NAFTA and passing a new NAFTA deal. Achieving Trump’s campaign-promised NAFTA deficit-lowering and U.S. job creation goals will require changes to NAFTA that GOP congressional leaders and the corporate lobby oppose and about which this document remains vague. Even if a bloc of GOP rank and file members may support elimination of NAFTA’s investor offshoring incentives and Buy American ban, which are necessary to achieve Trump’s goals, a sizeable bloc of Democratic votes will be needed to pass a new NAFTA of that sort. But GOP congressional leaders and the corporate lobby are demanding TPP elements be added to NAFTA and that will push away Democrats. Some aspects of that TPP agenda can be seen in today’s document because much of the text repeats the negotiating objectives of the 2015 Fast Track bill, which GOP leaders and the corporate lobby loved and most congressional Democrats, a sizeable bloc of GOP congressional members and labor and civil society groups opposed.”

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Ecuador Says No to ISDS, Exits BITs*

After years of sustained activism in Latin America and across the globe, the President of Ecuador recently terminated its remaining 16 treaties that empower multinational corporations to challenge its laws before panels of three corporate lawyers and demand unlimited sums of taxpayer money.

By terminating treaties that include the corporate-rigged investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system, Ecuador is the latest country to prioritize its people over corporate rights.

Ecuador’s decision to terminate its ISDS pacts was spurred by firsthand experience with some egregious cases, particularly with Big Oil. For example, Chevron is looking to avoid paying for its massive pollution in the Ecuadorian Amazon. And, Occidental Petroleum received a $1.4 billion award against Ecuador despite having obviously violated its contract with the government.

In response to citizens’ uproar against ISDS throughout Latin America, in 2013, the Ecuadorian government established an audit commission of government officials, academics, lawyers and civil society groups to analyze the costs and benefits of the country’s existing treaties and make recommendations.

On May 8, the government made public the Audit Commission’s 688-page report, which recommended that the government should terminate its remaining treaties and develop an alternative investment treaty model that removes ISDS and rebalances the rights of citizens over corporations.

The Audit Commission reported that the treaties had failed to deliver on promised foreign investment and had, in fact, undermined the development objectives laid out in Ecuador’s constitution. The report found that Ecuador had been forced to pay nearly $1.5 billion to multinational corporations (equivalent to 62 percent of its annual health spending), and that, under currently pending cases, the government runs the risk of having to pay out $13.4 billion (more than half the government’s entire annual budget for 2017).

Ecuador’s President Raphael Correa heeded the advice in the Audit Commission’s report and on May 16, 2017, issued executive decrees that terminated the existing treaties, including its treaty with the United States.

Ecuador joins countries — such as South Africa, Indonesia, Bolivia and India — that have terminated their investment treaties. Meanwhile, Mercosur and the South African Development Community have recently explicitly excluded ISDS from their respective investment protocols.

And Ecuador’s move away from ISDS-enforced treaties mirrors the growing movements in Europe and the United States to stop the expansion of corporate power through ISDS. Bipartisan opposition to ISDS in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was a significant reason that the deal could never achieve majority support in the U.S. Congress. The wave of opposition to ISDS in Europe also helped to stall the U.S.-EU negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

Worldwide, the tide is turning against the notion that multinational corporations and investors should be granted extraordinary rights and the ability to enforce them against governments in a corporate-rigged, extrajudicial system. Ecuador’s announcement shows that the diverse movement of civil society, legal scholars and government officials concerned about ISDS are making progress in rolling back the regime.

In the United States, the upcoming renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an obvious opportunity to demand that ISDS be eliminated from any NAFTA replacement.

As pressure grows worldwide for governments to withdraw from the ISDS system, the Trump administration has 60 days before it must reveal its position. (Under Fast Track, the administration must publicly post a detailed description of its negotiating plans 60 days after the initial notice.)

Given that ISDS was a key contributor to the U.S. Congress’ opposition to the TPP, it is not surprising that the administration’s NAFTA renegotiation notice was greeted by demands from Congress and civil society that ISDS elimination must be a top priority.  

*Updated 5/22/17 .

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Representative Who “Deeply Regrets” NAFTA Vote Warns Congress Not to Flip-Flop on Fast Track

Today the House of Representatives narrowly passed a procedural rule, inserted into an unrelated legislative package last night, that gives defenders of the unpopular status quo trade model six weeks to try to revive the Fast Track package that was put on life support last Friday. They will not succeed so long as they continue to face the wall of dogged, diverse grassroots pressure that delivered Friday’s landmark fair trade victory.  

Even so, the Obama administration and congressional proponents of more-of-the-same trade deals will try to badger the many members of Congress who voted down the Fast Track package into switching their votes. They will likely reiterate the tired litany of false promises that members of Congress and the U.S. public have heard time and again when being sold unpopular trade pacts.

In a poignant speech before today’s vote, Rep. Alcee Hastings (D-Fla.) warned against trusting such promises. In 1993, Rep. Hastings cast a controversial vote for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – the deal that spawned the status quo trade model that Fast Track would expand.  Today, Hastings stated:

In the 20 plus years that I’ve served in this body, I can think of only three votes which I deeply regret making and one of those was in support of NAFTA. In the years since, I’ve seen, after NAFTA, a decrease in American jobs, a rollback of critical environmental protections, here and in Mexico where I was promised that the environmental circumstances in the maquiladoras would be cleared up – and they were not – and a stagnation of wages that has prevented the financial upward mobility of working class and middle class Americans and has ground poor Americans into poverty beyond belief.

Rep. Hastings made clear that he has learned from NAFTA’s broken promises and urged his colleagues to stand firm by continuing to oppose Fast Track’s expansion of the trade status quo:

If we’re going to create trade policy that is worthy of future generations, then we must ensure that policy strengthens—not weakens—labor rights. It must strengthen—not weaken—environmental protections. It must ensure other countries responsibility to adhere to basic human rights. It must expand and strengthen our middle class, not squeeze hardworking Americans in favor of corporate interests. The legislation included in this rule today is part of a trade package that does nothing to bolster these important priorities.  

If past is precedent, the White House and congressional leadership will also try to make special deals with members of Congress who voted against the Fast Track package on Friday, offering promises of political cover or special goodies – from bridges to import safeguards – if they would be willing to face the wrath of their constituents and flip-flop on Fast Track.  But a review of the last two decades of trade-vote dealmaking reveals that such promises made to extract unpopular trade votes have also been consistently broken, leaving members of Congress exposed to voters’ anger over their decision to defy the opinion and interests of the majority.

Here again, Rep. Hastings’ experience offers a cautionary tale.  In deciding how to vote on NAFTA, Florida representatives like Hastings were concerned that the deal could lead to an influx of underpriced tomatoes from Mexico, displacing Florida’s tomato farmers and the state’s many tomato-related jobs. To extract their votes, the Clinton administration promised Florida representatives that the U.S. government would take measures to safeguard Florida tomato growers if NAFTA led to a surge in tomato imports.

The Clinton administration never fulfilled this promise. Before NAFTA, Florida had a $700 million tomato industry with 250 growers.  Within two years of NAFTA, tomato imports from Mexico soared, Florida’s tomato revenues dropped to $400 million and the state’s tomato industry shrank to just 100 growers.  No meaningful import safeguards were enacted by the Clinton administration, the George W. Bush administration or the Obama administration. Today, imports of tomatoes from Mexico are up 247 percent since NAFTA’s implementation.  Florida’s tomato growers have now filed a lawsuit to obtain the safeguards that they, and Florida’s representatives, were promised 22 years ago.

Rep. Hastings learned the hard way that promises used to extract “yes” votes on unpopular trade deals rarely materialize. His colleagues have the opportunity to learn the easy way – by heeding Rep. Hastings’ warning and maintaining opposition to Fast Track. 

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New Public Citizen Report Documents Systematic Bipartisan Betrayals on ‘Deals’ Made by Presidents, Congressional Leaders in Exchange for Trade Votes

Broken Promises, Lost Elections: Goodies Promised in Exchange for Trade Votes Don’t Materialize, Don’t Shield Representatives From Voters’ Wrath

As the Obama administration and GOP congressional leaders resort to promising special favors in attempt to entice members of Congress to buck majority opinion and support Fast Track, a report released today by Public Citizen reveals that such promises to extract controversial trade votes consistently have been broken, exposing representatives to angry constituents and electoral losses.

Facing bipartisan congressional opposition to Fast Track trade authority and polls showing majority U.S. public opposition, the Obama administration has moved beyond trying to sell Fast Track on its merits and is now offering rides on Air Force One, promises of infrastructure legislation and pledges to help representatives survive the political backlash of a “yes” vote on Fast Track. GOP congressional leaders are promising post-hoc policy fixes to trade laws and more. A comprehensive review of the past two decades of such trade vote deal-making shows that promises of policy changes, goodies for the district and political cover for unpopular trade votes rarely materialize, contributing to electoral upsets for representatives of both parties who trade their votes.

“Members of Congress should know better than to trust an exiting president’s promises of political cover or to rely on vote-yes-now-goodies-later deals for voting ‘yes’ on such a controversial, career-defining issue as Fast Track,” said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. “Our research of scores of deals over the past 20 years shows no matter who the president or congressional leadership is, almost all of the promises made in the heat of a trade vote go unfulfilled, and representatives who vote ‘yes’ are repeatedly left in political peril.”

Already the first promise of the 2015 Fast Track battle has been broken. U.S. Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) and colleagues cast deciding Senate votes after obtaining commitments that Congress would have votes to reauthorize the Export-Import Bank before its June 30, 2015, sunset. Now GOP leaders have made clear this will not occur. Whether Ex-Im will ever be reauthorized is in doubt.

Members of Congress repeatedly have endured such trade vote-swapping deals gone wrong as pledged import safeguards have not materialized, promised funds for community development or worker assistance have proven illusory, and dreams of new infrastructure projects have remained dreams. Among current members of Congress featured in the report who experienced deals for trade votes gone bad are:

  • U.S. Rep. Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.) and the Empty Sock: Aderholt still awaits changes to the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) to protect his district’s now-devastated sock manufacturers.  President George W. Bush promised this in 2005 to obtain Aderholt’s “yes” vote for CAFTA. 
  • U.S. Rep. Sam Farr (D-Calif.) Flower Deal Wilts: Farr voted for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) after the Clinton administration promised to safeguard the California cut flower sector from import surges. After four years of ballooning flower imports from Mexico displaced California producers, Farr voted against giving President Clinton Fast Track in 1998.
  • U.S. Rep. Alcee Hastings (D-Fla.) Tomato Wipeout: Hastings and other Florida representatives voted for NAFTA on the basis of the Clinton administration’s promises to protect Florida’s tomato growers from destabilizing surges in tomato imports from Mexico. But the Clinton administration did not honor its pledge when, within two years of NAFTA, tomato imports multiplied, Florida’s tomato revenues dropped more than 40 percent, and the number of Florida tomato growers fell 60 percent.

“Even in the rare case where a promise to ‘fix’ a controversial trade deal has been upheld, the acclaimed tweak has failed to offset or outlast the damage wrought on local communities,” said Ben Beachy, research director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. “Voters do not tend to remember boasts of finite safeguards or worker assistance funds, while mass layoffs, farm foreclosures and news reports on inequality provide fresh, ongoing reminders of how their member of Congress voted on Fast Track and Fast Tracked deals.”

For some members of Congress, the decision to cast controversial trade votes in exchange for empty promises of political cover has exposed them to such constituent ire as to lead to electoral defeat:

  • Former U.S. Rep. Robin Hayes (R-N.C.) provided the final votes to pass Fast Track in 2002 and CAFTA in 2005, after telling his constituents he would oppose both. He flip-flopped on the basis of promises that failed to prevent thousands of trade-related job losses in his district, many of them at textile factories. In the 2008 election, a former textile worker, Larry Kissel, decisively beat Hayes after hammering him for his trade vote swaps.
  • Former U.S. Rep. Matthew Martinez (D-Calif.) stated support for Fast Track in 1997 as an apparent quid-pro-quo for President Clinton’s promise to approve a highway extension project in his district. Martinez never got the highway, but he did lose his job. In 2000, Martinez, an 18-year incumbent, lost 29 to 62 percent to a primary challenge by Hilda Solis, who ran against his support for Fast Track.

“This report provides a somber warning to members of Congress who may be approached by the Obama administration or GOP congressional leader to vote for Fast Track in exchange for promised new programs or policies to ameliorate feared damage or in exchange for unrelated goodies for the district,” said Wallach. “The trade votes and the damage wrought by bad trade agreements last forever, with voter ire only escalating over time, while our research shows that few deals made for trade votes are met and the few that are often fail to remedy the feared problems.”

Today’s report includes an annex of 92 promises made for trade vote support. Only 17 percent of these promises were kept, even though many were memorialized in the text of trade agreements’ implementing legislation. The overall finding of the report is that if appropriated funds are not locked in an account and if the policy change or amendment to a trade pact is not made before the trade vote, funding and follow-through is not likely to be forthcoming after the vote. Promises to seek future renegotiations of trade agreement provisions or to take action in future negotiations were broken most of the time. Of the past 64 policy promises designed to put a gloss on a contested agreement and give political cover to members of Congress, just seven were kept and 57 broken. Public Citizen also documented 28 pork barrel deals made in exchange for “yes” votes on trade agreements, of which nine were kept and 19 broken. 

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50 Reasons We Cannot Afford the TPP

How would your state be impacted by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – a controversial “free trade” agreement (FTA) being negotiated behind closed doors with 11 Pacific Rim countries? 

Click here for a state-by-state guide to the specific outcomes of the status quo “trade” model that the TPP would expand.  Get the latest government data on how many jobs have been lost in your state to unfair trade, how much inequality has risen, how many family farms have disappeared, and how large your state’s trade deficit with FTA countries has grown. 

The TPP would extend the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) model that has contributed to massive U.S. trade deficits and job loss, downward pressure on middle class wages, unprecedented levels of inequality, lagging exports, new floods of agricultural imports, and the loss of family farms.

These impacts have been felt across all 50 U.S. states.  Here is a sampling of the outcomes:

  • North Carolina: North Carolina has lost more than 369,000 manufacturing jobs – nearly half – since NAFTA and NAFTA expansion pacts have taken effect.  More than 212,000 specific North Carolina jobs have been certified under just one narrow Department of Labor program as lost to offshoring or imports since NAFTA.
  • Delaware: Delaware’s total goods exports to all U.S. FTA partners have actually fallen 27 percent while its exports to non-FTA nations have grown 34 percent in the last five years. 
  • California: In the last five years, California’s $403 million NAFTA agricultural trade surplus became a $187 million trade deficit – a more than $590 million drop. In contrast, California’s agricultural trade surplus with the rest of the world increased by $3 billion, or 79 percent, during the same time period.  The disparity owes to the fact that California’s exports of agricultural products to NAFTA partners Mexico and Canada grew just 27 percent, or $693 million, in the last five years, while its agricultural exports to the rest of the world grew 70 percent, or $4.3 billion. Meanwhile, California’s agricultural imports from NAFTA partners during this period surged $1.3 billion – more than the increase in agricultural imports from all other countries combined.
  • Michigan: Michigan’s trade deficit with all U.S. FTA partners is nearly five times larger than its deficit with the rest of the world. Michigan’s FTA deficit has grown more than three times as much as its non-FTA deficit in the last five years. Today, Michigan’s trade deficit with FTA partners comprises 83 percent of the state’s total trade deficit.
  • Louisiana: Before the Korea FTA – the U.S. template for the TPP – the United States had balanced trade with Korea in the top 10 products that Louisiana exports to Korea – including everything from metal to agricultural products. Under two years of the FTA, that balance became a $9 billion annual trade deficit. 
  • New York: The TPP and the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) would empower 3,067 foreign corporations doing business in New York to bypass domestic courts, go before extrajudicial tribunals, and challenge New York and U.S. health, environmental and other public interest policies that they claim undermine new foreign investor rights not available to domestic firms under U.S. law.
  • Texas: U.S. farmers were promised that the Korea FTA would boost U.S. agricultural exports to Korea. But U.S. exports to Korea fell in eight of Texas’ top 10 agricultural export products, from cotton to wheat to meat in the first two years of the Korea FTA.  Meanwhile, U.S. exports to Korea of beef, pork and poultry – all top agricultural exports for Texas – declined 18, 15, and 42 percent, respectively (measuring by volume).
  • Nevada: The richest 10 percent of Nevadans are now capturing more than half of all income in the state – a degree of inequality not seen in the 100 years for which records exist.  Study after study has produced an academic consensus that status quo trade has contributed to today’s unprecedented rise in income inequality.  
  • Minnesota: Small-scale U.S. family farms have been hardest hit by rising agricultural imports and declining agricultural trade balances under FTAs.  Since NAFTA took effect, 15,500 of Minnesota’s smaller-scale farms (24 percent) have disappeared.
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Exports Lag 20%, Trade Deficits Surge 427% under "Free Trade" Deals

A recent parade of reports from corporate lobbies and think tanks has played a familiar but discordant refrain, alleging that more of the same "free trade" agreements (FTAs) would boost U.S. exports and reduce the U.S. trade deficits that displace U.S. jobs.  It sounds nice.  But this tired promise is simply not supported by the data.  

According to the official government trade data from the U.S. International Trade Commission, the aggregate U.S. goods trade deficit with FTA partners is more than five times as high as before the deals went into effect, while the aggregate trade deficit with non-FTA countries has actually fallen. The key differences are soaring imports into the United States from FTA partners and lower growth in U.S. exports to those nations than to non-FTA nations.

Why do we keep hearing arguments that more of the same will produce different results?  Well, if you (or your corporate backers) wanted to Fast Track through Congress the controversial Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would expand the status quo FTA model, you might also find it convenient to parrot the standard FTA sales pitch of higher exports and lower trade deficits.  In doing so, you would need to ignore these facts:

  • Growth of U.S. goods exports to FTA partners has been 20% lower than U.S. export growth to the rest of the world over the last decade (annual average growth of 5.3 percent to non-FTA nations vs. 4.3 percent to FTA nations from 2004 to 2014). 
  • The aggregate U.S. goods trade deficit with FTA partners has increased by about $144 billion, or 427 percent, since the FTAs were implemented. In contrast, the aggregate trade deficit with all non-FTA countries has decreased by about $95 billion, or 11 percent, since 2006 (the median entry date of existing FTAs). See the chart below. Using the Obama administration’s net exports-to-jobs ratio, the FTA trade deficit surge implies the loss of about 780,000 U.S. jobs.
  • The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contributed the most to the widening FTA deficit – under NAFTA, the U.S. trade deficit with Canada has ballooned and a U.S. trade surplus with Mexico has turned into a nearly $100 billion deficit.
  • More recent deals have produced similar results. Since the 2011 passage of the Korea FTA, the U.S. template for the TPP, the U.S. trade deficit with Korea has already surged 72 percent.

FTA deficits

“Higher Standards” Have Failed to Alter FTA Legacy of Ballooning Trade Deficits

Some proponents of status quo trade have claimed that post-NAFTA FTAs have included higher standards and thus have yielded trade balance improvements. But the Korea FTA included the higher labor and environmental standards of the May 10, 2007 deal, and still the U.S. trade deficit with Korea has grown over 70 percent in the three years since the deal’s passage. Meanwhile, most post-NAFTA FTAs that have resulted in (small) trade balance improvements did not contain the “May 10” standards. The evidence shows no correlation between an FTA’s inclusion of “May 10” standards and its trade balance impact. Reducing the massive U.S. trade deficit will require a more fundamental rethink of the core status quo trade pact model extending from NAFTA through the Korea FTA, not more of the same.

Corporate FTA Boosters Omit Imports, Use Errant Methods to Claim Higher Exports under FTAs

Members of Congress will invariably be shown data by defenders of our status quo trade policy that appear to indicate that FTAs have generated an export boom. Indeed, to promote congressional support for new NAFTA-style FTAs, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) have funded an entire body of research designed to create the appearance that the existing pacts have both boosted exports and reversed trade deficits with FTA partner countries. This work relies on several methodological tricks that fail basic standards of accuracy:

  • Ignoring imports: U.S. Chamber of Commerce studies regularly omit mention of soaring imports under FTAs, instead focusing only on exports. But any study claiming to evaluate the net impact of trade deals must deal with both sides of the trade equation. In the same way that exports are associated with job opportunities, imports are associated with lost job opportunities when they outstrip exports, as dramatically seen under FTAs.
  • Counting “foreign exports”: NAM has errantly claimed that the United States has a manufacturing surplus with FTA nations by counting foreign-made goods as “U.S. exports.” NAM’s data include “foreign exports” – goods made elsewhere that pass through the United States without alteration before being re-exported abroad. Foreign exports support zero U.S. production jobs and their inclusion distorts FTAs’ impacts on workers.
  • Omitting major FTAs: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has repeatedly claimed that U.S. export growth is higher to FTA nations that to non-FTA nations by simply omitting FTAs that do not support their claim. One U.S. Chamber of Commerce study omitted all FTAs implemented before 2003 to estimate export growth. This excluded major FTAs like NAFTA that comprised more than 83 percent of all U.S. FTA exports. Given NAFTA’s leading role in the 427 percent aggregate FTA deficit surge, its omission vastly skews the findings.
  • Failing to correct for inflation: U.S. Chamber of Commerce studies that have claimed high FTA export growth have not adjusted the data for inflation, thus errantly counting price increases as export gains.
  • Comparing apples and oranges: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has claimed higher U.S. exports under FTAs by using two completely different methods to calculate the growth of U.S. exports to FTA partners (an unweighted average) versus non-FTA partners (a weighted average). This inconsistency creates the false impression of higher export growth to FTA partners by giving equal weight to FTA countries that are vastly different in importance to U.S. exports (e.g. Canada, where U.S. exports exceed $260 billion, and Bahrain, where they do not reach $1 billion), despite accounting for such critical differences for non-FTA countries.
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2014 Trade Data Deal Further Blows to the Push for Fast Track

2014 Trade Data Reveal Surging U.S. Trade Deficits Under Korea FTA and NAFTA, and a Dramatic Failure to Meet Obama’s Export-Doubling Goal

Today’s release of the corrected 2014 annual trade data from the U.S. International Trade Commission reveal that President Barack Obama’s goal of doubling exports has failed dramatically, with a growing trade deficit with Korea under the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and a burgeoning non-fossil fuel trade deficit with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners. Even as overall U.S. exports increased slightly due to growing U.S. fuel exports, manufacturing exports stagnated, according to projections. The data show that continuing with more-of-the-same trade policies would kill more middle-class jobs, dampen wages and increase income inequality – outcomes contrary to Obama’s “middle-class economics” agenda. The abysmal trade data are likely to reinforce congressional opposition to Obama’s bid to expand the status quo trade model by Fast Tracking the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 

  • Obama’s Five-Year Export-Doubling Plan Failed, in Part Thanks to His 2011 Korea FTA: The context for Obama’s 2015 State of the Union ask for Fast Track for the TPP is the abysmal failure
    of his 2010 State of the Union trade initiative – a plan to double U.S. exports in five years. The 2014exportgoal2014 data show U.S. goods exports over those five years have increased by just 36 percent, falling more than $660 billion short. U.S. goods exports grew by less than 1 percent in 2014 – the same average rate of the prior two years. (The first two years of stronger export growth represented recovery from the worldwide crash in trade flows after the global financial crisis.) At the paltry 2012-2014 annual export growth rate, which is a fraction of the 4 percent average annual export growth seen in the decade before the Obama administration, Obama’s export-doubling goal would not be reached until 2057 – 43 years behind schedule.
  • U.S. Exports Declined Under the Korea FTA, While Imports and the U.S. Trade Deficit with Korea Soared: Today’s data release also reveals a 14 percent increase in the U.S. goods trade deficit with Korea in 2014, marking the third consecutive year of substantial growth in the U.S. 2014koreatrade deficit with Korea since the 2011 passage of the Korea FTA, which U.S. negotiators used as the template for the TPP. The 2014 U.S. goods trade deficit with Korea topped $26 billion, a 72 percent increase over the trade deficit in 2011 before the FTA took effect. U.S. exports remain lower than the level before the FTA went into effect, as imports have increased 17 percent. Had U.S. exports to Korea continued to grow at the rate seen in the decade before the FTA’s implementation, exports would be about 18 percent, or $7 billion, higher in 2014 than they actually were. The resulting trade deficit increase represents more than 70,000 lost American jobs, according to the ratio the Obama administration used to project gains from the deal. Ironically, 70,000 is the number of jobs the Obama administration promised would be gained from the Korea FTA.
  • Non-Fuel NAFTA Trade Deficit Grows: The 2014 trade data are also projected to show a more than 12 percent, or $10 billion, increase in the non-fossil fuel U.S. goods trade deficit with NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico. The overall U.S. goods trade deficit with NAFTA partners, which also increased in 2014, has ballooned $155 billion, or 565 percent, under 21 years of the pact, reaching $182 billion in 2014.
  • Contrary to the Administration’s TPP Sales Pitch That More FTAs Would Boost U.S. Exports, U.S. Exports to FTA Partners Have Grown More Slowly Than U.S. Exports to the Rest of the World Over the Past Decade. Taking into account the data for 2014, average annual U.S. export growth to all non-FTA partners in the past 10 years outpaced that to FTA partners by 24 percent.
  • The United States Has a Large Trade Deficit with FTA Partners: Overall, the aggregate U.S. trade deficit with all U.S. FTA partners topped $177 billion in 2014, marking a more than $143 billion, or 427 percent, increase in the aggregate U.S. FTA trade deficit since the pacts were implemented. In contrast, the aggregate deficit with all non-FTA countries has decreased by more than $95 billion, or 11 percent, since 2006 (the median entry date of existing FTAs). Despite this, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Michael Froman testified to Congress last month that we have a trade surplus with the group of FTA nations.

Heads Up for Distorted Data…

Given that the record of lagging U.S. exports and surging trade deficits under U.S. FTAs jeopardizes Obama’s prospects for obtaining Fast Track, the administration may try to obscure the results with distorted data. The USTR has taken to lumping foreign-made products in with U.S.-produced exports, which artificially inflates U.S. export figures and deflates U.S. trade deficits with FTA partners.

“Foreign exports,” also known as “re-exports,” are goods made abroad, imported into the United States, and then re-exported without undergoing any alteration in the United States. Foreign exports support zero U.S. production jobs. Each month, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) reports trade data with foreign exports removed, providing the official government data on made-in-America exports. But the USTR likely will choose to use the uncorrected raw data, as it has in the past, that the U.S. Census Bureau released last Thursday, which counts foreign-made goods as U.S. exports. Our figures are based on the corrected data.

By using the distorted data, the USTR may errantly claim an aggregate trade surplus with all U.S. FTA partners, though the actual 2014 U.S. goods trade balance with FTA partners is a more than $177 billion trade deficit. By counting foreign exports as “U.S. exports,” the USTR can artificially eliminate more than two-thirds of this FTA deficit, shrinking it to less than $57 billion. The USTR may misleadingly claim an FTA trade surplus by then adding services trade surpluses with FTA partners, which pale in comparison to the massive FTA trade deficit in goods when properly counting only American-made exports.

The USTR also may repeat its bogus claim that the United States has a trade surplus with its NAFTA partners by errantly including foreign exports as “U.S. exports,” removing fossil fuels and adding services trade data. But even after removing fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) and adding services 2014naftare-exporttrade surpluses, the United States still had a projected NAFTA trade deficit of $50 billion in 2014. Indeed, the fossil fuels share of the NAFTA trade deficit declined in 2014, and U.S. exports of services to NAFTA partners fell, according to projections. The USTR can make its errant claim of a “NAFTA surplus” only by including foreign exports, which artificially reduces the NAFTA goods trade deficit to less than half of its actual size.

The USTR also may boast about an increase in U.S. exports to Korea in 2014, while ignoring the much larger increase in imports from Korea. While U.S. goods exports to Korea in 2014 increased by $2.3 billion, imports from Korea have risen by $5.6 billion, spelling a $3.3 billion increase in the U.S. goods trade deficit with Korea in the third calendar year of the Korea FTA.

Moreover, U.S. exports to Korea have declined since the FTA went into effect and did not return to the pre-FTA level in 2014. Monthly imports from Korea repeatedly broke records in 2014, such as in October when imports from Korea topped $6.3 billion – the highest level on record.

Expect the administration to repeat the same data trick it employed last year with respect to U.S. auto sector exports to Korea. Exports to Korea of U.S.-produced Fords, Chryslers and General Motors vehicles increased by fewer than 3,100 vehicles per year in the first two years of the Korea FTA. But given that exports of “Detroit 3” vehicles before the FTA were also tiny – fewer than 8,200 vehicles per year – the USTR expressed the small increase as a significant percentage gain in a press release. The USTR did not mention that more than 184,000 additional Korean-produced Hyundais and Kias were imported and sold in the United States in each of the Korea FTA’s first two years, in comparison to the two years before the FTA, when Hyundai and Kia imports already topped 1 million vehicles per year.

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10 Tall Tales on Trade: Fact-Checking Obama’s Top Trade Official

Yesterday was a difficult day for U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Michael Froman.  He had to go before Congress and explain how the administration’s plan to expand a trade model that has offshored U.S. manufacturing jobs and exacerbated middle class wage stagnation fits with President Obama’s stated “middle class economics” agenda.

Inconveniently for Mr. Froman, it does not.

That did not stop Froman from trying to paint the last two decades of Fast-Tracked, pro-offshoring trade deals – and the administration’s plan for more of the same – as a gift to the middle class. 

The facts he cited to support this depiction actually sounded great.  They just didn’t have the added advantage of being true. 

Here’s a rundown of the top 10 fibs and half-truths that Froman uttered before the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee yesterday in his sales pitch for the administration’s bid to expand the NAFTA “trade” pact model by Fast-Tracking through Congress the controversial Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

1. Fast Track Puts Congress in the Driver’s Seat (of a Runaway Car, without Brakes or a Steering Wheel)

Froman: “[Fast Track] puts Congress in the driver’s seat to define U.S. negotiating objectives and priorities for trade agreements.”

Okay, let’s go with this analogy.  If reviving Fast Track puts Congress in the driver’s seat, it also removes the brakes and steering wheel.  Reviving Fast Track would empower the administration to negotiate and sign a sweeping “trade” pact like the TPP – implicating everything from the cost of medicines to the safety of food to the reform of Wall Street – before Congress had any enforceable say over the deal’s contents, even if they contradicted Congress’ stated negotiating objectives.  Goodbye steering wheel.  Congress’ role would be relegated to an expedited, no-amendments, limited-debate vote on the already-signed deal.  Goodbye brakes. 

Also, if we’re talking about Fast Tracking the TPP, the car is already going 60mph.  As a couple of members of Congress pointed out to Froman, the administration has been negotiating the TPP for more than five years, and Froman himself stated that TPP negotiations are in their endgame.  Even if Froman’s assertion were true that Fast Track allows Congress to define priorities for trade agreements (rather than ensuring that such priorities are not enforceable), it’s a little late for members of Congress to be naming priorities for a deal that has been under negotiation since 2009 and that Froman hopes to close in the coming months.

2. A Trade Surplus with Our FTA Partners (Does Not Appear in Official Government Data)

Froman: “You take all of our FTA partners as a whole, [and] we have a trade surplus. And that trade surplus has grown.”  Froman also claimed that the United States has a trade surplus in manufactured goods with its FTA partners.  And he tried to use red herrings to explain away the surging U.S. trade deficit with Korea under the Korea FTA.

These claims defy official U.S. government data.  Data from the U.S. International Trade Commission show that the United States has a $180 billion U.S. goods trade deficit with all free trade agreement (FTA) partners (in 2013, the latest year on record).  In manufactured goods, the United States has a $51 billion manufacturing trade deficit with all FTA partners.  Froman claimed otherwise, in part, by counting billions of dollars’ worth of "foreign exports" – goods produced abroad that simply pass through the United States without alteration before being “re-exported.”  These goods, by definition, do not support U.S. production jobs.

Contributing to our FTA deficit is the 50 percent surge in the U.S. goods trade deficit with Korea in just the first two years of the Korea FTA, which literally was used as the U.S. template for the TPP. This deficit increase, owing to a drop in exports and rise in imports, spells the loss of more than 50,000 American jobs in the FTA's first two years, according to the ratio used by the administration to claim the pact would create jobs. Froman tried to explain away the ballooning U.S. trade deficit under the Korea FTA as due to decreases in corn and fossil fuel exports.  But even if discounting both corn and fossil fuels, U.S. annual exports to Korea still fell under the FTA, and the annual trade deficit with Korea still soared.  Product-specific anomalies cannot explain away the broad-based downfall of U.S. exports to Korea under the FTA, which afflicted nine of the top 15 U.S. sectors that export to Korea. The disappointing results also cannot be blamed on low growth in Korea since the FTA.  Though Korea's growth rates in the last several years have not been spectacular, the economy has still grown since the FTA (3 percent in 2013), as has consumption (2.2 percent, adjusted for inflation, in 2013). Koreans are buying more goods, just not U.S. goods. 

 

3.  We Wish to Ensure Access to Affordable Medicines in the TPP (but Big Pharma Won’t Let Us)

Froman: “In negotiations, like TPP, we are working to ensure access to affordable life-saving medicines, including in the developing world, and create incentives for the development of new treatment and cures that benefit the world and which create the pipeline for generic drugs.”

These words play politics with people’s lives. They cloak the tragic reality that if the TPP would take effect as USTR has proposed, with leaks showing even greater monopoly protections for pharmaceutical corporations than in prior pacts, people would needlessly die for lack of access to affordable medicines. A new study finds, for example, that the TPP would dramatically reduce the share of Vietnam’s HIV patients who have access to life-saving antiretroviral medicines.  The study reveals that while 68 percent of Vietnam’s eligible HIV patients currently receive treatment, U.S.-proposed monopoly protections for pharmaceutical corporations in the TPP would allow only 30 percent of Vietnam’s HIV patients to access antiretrovirals.  As a result, an estimated 45,000 people with HIV in Vietnam who currently receive antiretroviral treatment would no longer be able to afford the life-saving drugs.

Froman also indicated in the Senate hearing that USTR is pushing to include a special monopoly protection for pharmaceutical firms that contradicts the Obama administration’s own stated objectives for reducing the cost of medicines in the United States. President Obama’s budget proposes to reduce a special monopoly protection for pharmaceutical firms with regard to biologic medicines – drugs used to combat cancer and other diseases that cost approximately 22 times more than conventional medicines.  To lower the exorbitant prices and the resulting burden on programs like Medicare and Medicaid, the Obama administration’s 2015 budget would reduce the period of Big Pharma's monopoly protection for biologics from 12 to seven years. The administration estimates this would save taxpayers more than $4.2 billion over the next decade just for federal programs. However, Froman suggested yesterday that USTR continues to push for the 12 years of corporate protection in the TPP, which would lock into place pharmaceutical firms’ lengthy monopolies here at home while effectively scrapping the administration’s own proposal to save billions in unnecessary healthcare costs.

4. Most Exporters are Small Businesses (that Have Endured Slow and Falling Exports under FTAs)

Froman: “15,600 firms export from Pennsylvania. Almost 90 percent of them are small and medium sized businesses. And the question is whether with these trade agreements we can create more opportunities for these kinds of businesses.”

Implying that exporting is mainly the domain of small businesses because they make up most exporting firms is like implying that the NBA is a league of short people because most NBA players are shorter than 7 feet tall.  The reason small and medium enterprises (defined as 500 employees or less) comprise most U.S. exporting firms is simply because they constitute 99.7 percent of U.S. firms overall (in the same way that those of us below 7 feet constitute more than 99 percent of the U.S. population).  The more relevant question is what share of small and medium firms actually depend on exports for their success. Only 3 percent of U.S. small and medium enterprises export any good to any country. In contrast, 38 percent of large U.S. firms are exporters.  Even if FTAs actually succeeded in boosting exports (which they don’t, per the government data noted below), exporting is primarily the domain of large corporations, not small businesses.

As for whether “with these trade agreements we can create more opportunities” for small firms, the record of past FTAs suggests not. Under the Korea FTA, U.S. small businesses have seen their exports to Korea decline even more sharply than large firms (a 14 percent vs. 3 percent downfall in the first year of the FTA). And small firms’ exports to Mexico and Canada under NAFTA have grown more slowly than their exports to the rest of the world. Small businesses’ exports to all non-NAFTA countries grew over 50 percent more than their exports to Canada and Mexico (74 percent vs. 47 percent) during a 1996-2012 window of data availability. The sluggish export growth owes in part to the fact that small businesses’ exports grew less than half as much as large firms’ exports to NAFTA partners (47 percent vs. 97 percent from 1996-2012).

5. We Try to Be Transparent (with the Corporate Advisors Who Can Access Secret Texts)

Froman: “And to ensure these agreements are balanced, we seek a diversity of voices in America’s trade policy. The Administration has taken unprecedented steps to increase transparency… We have held public hearings soliciting the public’s input on the negotiations and suspended negotiating rounds to host first-of-a-kind stakeholder events so that the public can provide our negotiators with direct feedback on the negotiations.”

“A diversity of voices” is an odd way to describe the more than 500 official trade advisors with privileged access to secretive U.S. trade texts and U.S. trade negotiators.  About nine out of ten of these advisors explicitly represent industry interests. Just 10 of the more than 500 advisors (less than 2 percent) represent environmental, consumer, development, food safety, financial regulation, Internet freedom, or public health organizations.  It’s little wonder that so many of these groups, excluded from setting the content of the TPP, have denounced leaked TPP texts as presenting threats to the public interest.  And as for the claim of “unprecedented steps to increase transparency,” the reality is closer to the opposite. When the Bush administration negotiated the last similarly sweeping trade pact – the Free Trade Area of the Americas – USTR published the negotiating text online for anyone to see amid negotiations. In a step backwards from the degree of transparency exhibited by the Bush administration, the Obama administration has refused repeated calls from members of Congress and civil society organizations to release TPP texts. This secrecy limits the utility of the public hearings and stakeholder events that Froman touts, as it is difficult to opine on a text you are prohibited from seeing.

6. Supporting Manufacturing and Higher Wages (Is a Goal in Spite of Our Trade Policies)

Froman: “In 2015, the Obama Administration will continue to pursue trade policies aimed at supporting the growth of manufacturing and associated high-quality jobs here at home and maintaining American manufacturers’ competitive edge.”

The only objectionable word in this sentence is “continue.” Since NAFTA, we have endured a net loss of nearly 5 million manufacturing jobs – one out of every four – and more than 57,000 manufacturing facilities. While not all of those losses are due to NAFTA, the deal’s inclusion of special protections for firms that relocate abroad certainly contributed to the hemorrhaging of U.S. manufacturing. The U.S. manufactured goods trade balance with Canada and Mexico in NAFTA’s first 20 years changed from a $5 billion surplus in 1993 to a $64.9 billion deficit in 2013. The U.S. Department of Labor has certified (under one narrow program) more than 845,000 specific U.S. workers – many of them in manufacturing – as enduring “trade-related” job losses since NAFTA due to the offshoring of their factories to Mexico or Canada, or import competition from those countries. And under just two years of the Korea FTA, U.S. manufacturing exports to Korea have fallen. Overall, the United States has a $51 billion trade deficit in manufactured goods with its 20 FTA partners. Reviving manufacturing and reviving Fast Track for the NAFTA-expanding TPP are incompatible.

Froman: “At a time when too many workers haven't seen their paychecks grow in much too long, these jobs typically pay up to 18% more on average than non-export related jobs.” 

Froman neglects to mention a key reason that too many workers haven’t seen their paychecks grow: NAFTA-style deals have not only incentivized the offshoring of well-paying U.S. manufacturing jobs, but forced these workers to compete for lower-paid service sector jobs, which has contributed to downward pressure on wages even in non-offshoreable sectors.  According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, about three out of every five displaced manufacturing workers who were rehired in 2014 experienced a wage reduction. About one out of every three displaced manufacturing workers took a pay cut of greater than 20 percent. As increasing numbers of American workers, displaced from better-paying jobs by current trade policies, have joined the glut of workers competing for non-offshoreable jobs in retail, hospitality and healthcare, real wages have actually been declining in these growing sectors. A litany of studies has produced an academic consensus that such trade dynamics have contributed to the historic increase in U.S. income inequality – the only debate is the degree to which trade is to blame. The TPP would not only replicate, but actually expand, NAFTA’s extraordinary privileges for firms that relocate abroad and eliminate many of the usual risks that make firms think twice about moving to low-wage countries like Vietnam – a TPP negotiating partner where minimum wages average less than 60 cents an hour, making the country a low-cost offshoring alternative to even China.

7. The TPP Supports an Internet that Is Open (to Lawsuits for Common Online Activity)

Froman: "We will continue to support a free and open Internet that encourages the flow of information across the digital world."

Repetition of this platitude has failed to assuage the concerns of Internet freedom groups that point out that leaked TPP texts do not support Froman’s assurances. In a July 2014 letter, an array of Internet service providers, tech companies, and Internet freedom groups wrote to Froman about leaked TPP copyright terms, some of which resemble provisions in the defeated Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), which could “significantly constrain legitimate online activity and innovation.”  Noting the deal’s terms on Internet service provider liability, the groups stated, “We are worried about language that would force service providers throughout the region to monitor and policy their users’ actions on the internet, pass on automated takedown notices, block websites and disconnect Internet users.”

8. Our Exports Have Grown (More Quickly to Non-FTA Countries)

Froman: “Our total exports have grown by nearly 50 percent and contributed nearly one-third of our economic growth since the second quarter of 2009. In 2013, the most recent year on record, American exports reached a record high of $2.3 trillion...” “By opening rapidly expanding markets with millions of new middle-class consumers in parts of the globe like the Asia-Pacific, our trade agreements will help our businesses and workers access overseas markets...”

U.S. goods exports grew by a grand total of 0 percent in 2013.   The year before that, they grew by 2 percent.  As a result, the administration utterly failed to reach President Obama’s stated goal to double U.S. exports from 2009 to 2014. Most of the export growth Froman cites – which is less than half of the administration’s stated objective – came early in Obama’s tenure as a predictable rebound from the global recession that followed the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  At the abysmal export growth rate seen since then, we will not reach Obama’s stated goal to double 2009’s exports until 2054, 40 years behind schedule.  

Froman ironically uses this export growth drop-off to argue for more-of-the-same trade policy (e.g. the TPP).  The data simply does not support the oft-parroted pitch that we need TPP-style FTAs to boost exports.  In the first two years of the Korea FTA, U.S. exports to Korea have fallen 5 percent.  Overall, growth of U.S. exports to countries that are not FTA partners has exceeded U.S. export growth to countries that are FTA partners by 30 percent over the last decade.  That’s not a solid basis from which to argue, in the name of exports, for yet another FTA. 

And if we’re seeking to export to those countries that are growing the fastest, then the TPP is the wrong trade pact.  Of the TPP countries with which we do not already have an FTA, all but one are actually growing more slowly than the per capita growth rate of the East Asian and Pacific region overall.     

9. Increases in Food Exports (Have Been Swamped by a Surge in Food Imports)

Froman: “In 2013, U.S. farmers and ranchers exported a record $148.7 billion of food and agricultural goods to consumers around the world.”

Yes, U.S. food exports have increased, but not nearly as much as food imports. In 2013, the total volume of U.S. food exports stood just 0.5 percent higher than in 1995, while imports of food into the United States had more than doubled (growing 115 percent since 1995). Existing FTAs have contributed to the imbalanced food trade. The average annual U.S. agricultural deficit with Canada and Mexico under NAFTA’s first two decades reached $975 million, almost three times the pre-NAFTA level. And under the first two years of the Korea FTA, U.S. agricultural exports to Korea plummeted 34 percent. Smaller-scale U.S. family farms have been hardest hit. About 170,000 small U.S. family farms have gone under since NAFTA and NAFTA expansion pacts have taken effect, a 21 percent decrease in the total number.

10. The TPP Takes Heed of NAFTA’s Mistakes (and Builds on Them)

Froman: “I think the President has made clear that as we pursue a new trade policy, we need to learn from the experiences of the past and that’s certainly what we’re doing through TPP and the rest of our agenda. For example, when he was running for President, he said we ought to renegotiate NAFTA. What that meant was to make labor and environment not side issues that weren’t enforceable, but to bring labor and environment in the core of the agreement and make them enforceable just like any other provision of the trade agreement consistent with what Congress and the previous administration worked out in the so-called May 10th agreement.”

When candidate Obama said in 2008 that he would renegotiate NAFTA – a pact that had become broadly unpopular for incentivizing the offshoring of U.S. manufacturing jobs – most people probably didn’t imagine that he meant expanding those offshoring incentives further. But the TPP would extend further NAFTA’s extraordinary privileges for firms that relocate abroad to low-wage countries (like TPP negotiating partner Vietnam).  Most people also probably would not expect “learning from the experiences of the past” to lead to an expansion of the monopoly protections that NAFTA gave to pharmaceutical corporations, thereby reducing the availability of generics and increasing the cost of medicines. But Froman himself stated yesterday that such corporate protections – antithetical to textbook notions of “free trade” – are part of the TPP’s NAFTA-plus provisions.

And though Froman touts the May 10 deal as an improvement over NAFTA for labor rights, a recent government report has shown the May 10 provisions to be ineffective at curbing labor abuses in FTA partner countries. A November 2014 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office found broad labor rights violations across all five surveyed FTA partner countries, regardless of whether or not the FTA included the labor provisions of the vaunted May 10 deal, including unionist murders in Colombia and impunity for union-busting in Peru.  Several of the TPP negotiating partners are notorious labor rights abusers – four of them were cited in a recent Department of Labor report for using child and/or forced labor. Vietnam, meanwhile, outright bans independent unions. Why would incorporation of the same terms that have failed to curb labor abuses in existing FTAs be expected to end the systematic labor rights abuses of TPP partners? 

And despite the May 10 deal’s environmental provisions, the TPP’s extraordinary investment provisions would empower thousands of foreign firms to bypass domestic courts, go before extrajudicial tribunals, and challenge new domestic environmental protections as "frustrating their expectations." Corporations have already used such foreign investor privileges under existing U.S. FTAs to attack a moratorium on fracking, renewable energy programs, and requirements to clean up oil pollution and industrial toxins.  Tribunals comprised of three private attorneys have already ordered taxpayers to pay hundreds of millions to foreign firms for such safeguards, arguing that they violate sweeping FTA-granted investor privileges that the TPP would expand.  Provisions, such as those in the May 10 deal, that call for countries to enforce their environmental laws sound hollow under a TPP that would simultaneously empower corporations to “sue” countries for said enforcement. 

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Obama vs. Obama: The State of the Union's Self-Defeating Trade Pitch

In his State of the Union address tonight, President Obama called for job creation, reduced income inequality, more affordable healthcare and better regulation of Wall Street. 

He also called for Fast Tracking the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – a controversial “trade” deal that would undermine all of the above.

Here's a side-by-side analysis of how Obama's push to Fast Track the TPP contradicts his own State of the Union agenda:

Obama’s Agenda

The TPP’s Counter-Agenda

Income Inequality: “Will we accept an economy where only a few of us do spectacularly well? Or will we commit ourselves to an economy that generates rising incomes and chances for everyone who makes the effort?”

An “economy where only a few of us do spectacularly well” is actually the projected outcome of the TPP. A recent study finds that the TPP would spell a pay cut for all but the richest 10 percent of U.S. workers by exacerbating U.S. income inequality, just as past trade deals have done

Manufacturing revival: “More than half of manufacturing executives have said they’re actively looking at bringing jobs back from China. Let’s give them one more reason to get it done.”

The TPP would give manufacturing firms a reason to offshore jobs to Vietnam, not bring them back from China. The TPP would expand NAFTA’s special protections for firms that offshore American manufacturing, including to Vietnam, where minimum wages are a fraction of those paid in China. Since NAFTA, we have endured a net loss of more than 57,000 U.S. manufacturing facilities and nearly 5 million manufacturing jobs.

American jobs: “So no one knows for certain which industries will generate the jobs of the future. But we do know we want them here in America.”

 

TPP rules would gut the popular Buy American preferences that require government-purchased goods to be made here in America, preventing us from recycling our tax dollars back into our economy to create U.S. jobs.

Exports: “Today, our businesses export more than ever, and exporters tend to pay their workers higher wages.”

Those who wish for more exports should wish for a different trade agenda. U.S. exports to countries that are part of TPP-like deals have actually grown slower than exports to the rest of the world, according to government data. Under the Korea deal that literally served as the template for the TPP, U.S. exports have actually fallen.

Small businesses: “21st century businesses, including small businesses, need to sell more American products overseas.”

Small businesses have endured declining exports and export shares under pacts serving as the model for the TPP. Small businesses suffered a steeper downfall in exports than large firms under the Korea trade pact, and small businesses’ export share has declined under NAFTA.

Economic growth: “Maintaining the conditions for growth and competitiveness. This is where America needs to go.”

An official U.S. government study finds that the economic growth we could expect from the TPP is precisely zero, while economists like Paul Krugman have scoffed at the deal’s economic significance.

Middle class wages: “Of course, nothing helps families make ends meet like higher wages.”

The TPP would put downward pressure on middle class wages, just as NAFTA has, by offshoring the jobs of decently-paid American manufacturing workers and forcing them to compete for lower-paying, non-offshoreable jobs.

Legacy of past trade deals: “Look, I’m the first one to admit that past trade deals haven’t always lived up to the hype, and that’s why we’ve gone after countries that break the rules at our expense.”

Past trade deals have resulted in massive trade deficits and job loss not because the pacts’ rules have been broken, but because of the rules themselves. The TPP would double down on NAFTA’s rules – the opposite of Obama’s promise to renegotiate the unpopular pact – by expanding NAFTA’s offshoring incentives, limits on food safety standards, restrictions on financial regulation and other threats to American workers and consumers.

Affordable medicines: “…middle-class economics means helping working families feel more secure in a world of constant change. That means helping folks afford …health care…”

The TPP would directly contradict Obama’s efforts to reduce U.S. healthcare costs by expanding monopoly patent protections that jack up medicine prices and by imposing restrictions on the U.S. government’s ability to negotiate or mandate lower drug prices for taxpayer-funded programs like Medicare and Medicaid.

Wall Street regulation: “We believed that sensible regulations could prevent another crisis…Today, we have new tools to stop taxpayer-funded bailouts, and a new consumer watchdog to protect us from predatory lending and abusive credit card practices…We can’t put the security of families at risk by…unraveling the new rules on Wall Street…”

Senator Warren has warned that the TPP could help banks unravel the new rules on Wall Street by prohibiting bans on risky financial products and “too big to fail” safeguards while empowering foreign banks to “sue” the U.S. government over new financial regulations.

Internet freedom: “I intend to protect a free and open internet…”

The TPP includes rules that implicate net neutrality and that would require Internet service providers to police our Internet activity – rules similar to those in the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) that was rejected as a threat to Internet freedom.

National interests: “But as we speak, China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region. That would put our workers and businesses at a disadvantage. Why would we let that happen?”

With the TPP, multinational corporations want to write the rules that would put our workers at a disadvantage and undermine our national interests. TPP rules, written behind closed doors under the advisement of hundreds of official corporate advisers, would provide benefits for firms that offshore American jobs, help pharmaceutical corporations expand monopoly patent protections that drive up medicine prices, give banks new tools to roll back Wall Street regulations, and empower foreign firms to “sue” the U.S. government over health and environmental policies. Why would we let that happen? 

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Obama’s Legacy: Middle-Class Jobs, Affordable Medicine and Financial Stability, or Fast-Tracked Trade Agreements – But Not Both

New Report ‘Prosperity Undermined’ Fact Checks Administration, Corporate Lobbyists and GOP Leadership With 20 Years of Data on Jobs, Economy

Fast Tracked trade deals have exacerbated the income inequality crisis, pushed good American jobs overseas, driven down U.S. wages, exploded the trade deficit and diminished small businesses’ share of U.S. exports, a new report from Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch shows. The report, “Prosperity Undermined,”compiles and analyzes 20 years of trade and economic data to show that the arguments again being made in favor of providing the Obama administration with Fast Track trade authority have repeatedly proved false.

President Barack Obama is expected to push Fast Track for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The pact, initiated by George W. Bush, literally replicates most of the job-offshoring incentives and wage-crunching terms found in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and would roll back Obama administration achievements on health, financial regulation and more. 

“It’s not surprising that Democrats and Republicans alike are speaking out against Fast Track because it cuts Congress out of shaping trade pacts that most Americans believe cost jobs while empowering the president to sign and enter into secret deals before Congress approves them,” said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. “In their speeches and commentary, the administration, corporate interests and GOP leadership disregard the real, detrimental impacts that previous fast tracked trade deals – which serve as the model for the Trans-Pacific Partnership – have had on America’s middle class over the past 20 years.”

With unprecedented unity among Democratic members of Congress, there will be a handful of Democratic House votes in favor of Fast Track. Last year, seven of 201 House Democrats  supported Fast Track legislation. Meanwhile, a sizable bloc of GOP House members oppose Fast Track, which would grant the president extensive new executive powers and delegate away core congressional constitutional authorities.

The new report shows a 20-year record of massive U.S. trade deficits, American job losses and wage suppression. More specifically, data show that:

  • Trade Deficits Have Exploded: U.S. trade deficits have grown more than 440 percent with Fast Tracked U.S. FTA countries since the pacts were implemented, but declined 16 percent with non-FTA countries during the relevant period. Since Fast Track was used to enact NAFTA and the World Trade Organization, the U.S. goods trade deficit has more than quadrupled, from $216 billion to $870 billion. Small businesses’ share of U.S. exports has declined, while U.S. export growth to countries that are not FTA partners has exceeded U.S. export growth to FTA partners by 30 percent over the past decade.  ‘
  • Good American Jobs Were Destroyed: Nearly 5 million U.S. manufacturing jobs – one in four – were lost since the Fast Tracking of NAFTA and various NAFTA-expansion deals. Since NAFTA, more than 845,000 U.S. workers have been certified under just one narrow U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) program for Americans who have lost their jobs due to imports from Canada and Mexico and offshored factories to those countries.
  • U.S. Wages Have Stagnated, Inequality Soared: Three of every five manufacturing workers who lose jobs to trade and find reemployment take pay cuts, with one in three losing greater than 20 percent, according to DOL data. Overall, U.S. wages have barely increased in real terms since 1974 – the year that Fast Track was first enacted – while American worker productivity has doubled. Since Fast Track’s enactment, the share of national income captured by the richest 10 percent of Americans has shot up 51 percent, while that captured by the richest 1 percent has skyrocketed 146 percent. Study after study has revealed an academic consensus that status quo trade has contributed to today’s unprecedented rise in income inequality.
  • Food Exports Flat, Imports Soared: Under NAFTA and the WTO, U.S. food exports have stagnated while food imports have doubled. The average annual U.S. agricultural deficit with Canada and Mexico under NAFTA’s first two decades reached $975 million, almost three times the pre-NAFTA level. Approximately 170,000 small U.S. family farms have gone under since NAFTA and WTO took effect.
  • Damaging Results of Obama’s “New and Improved” Korea Trade Deal: Since the Obama administration used Fast Track to push a trade agreement with Korea, the U.S. trade deficit with Korea has grown 50 percent – which equates to 50,000 more American jobs lost. The U.S. had a $3 billion monthly trade deficit with Korea in October 2014 – the highest monthly U.S. goods trade deficit with the country on record. After the Korea FTA went into effect, U.S. small businesses’ exports to Korea declined more sharply than large firms’ exports, falling 14 percent.

“Big dollars for big corporations and special interests calling the shots – that’s what the American people hear when only the country’s top corporate lobbyists are shaping America’s trade agreements,” said Wallach. “With such high stakes, we cannot let the Fast Track process lock Congress and the public out of negotiations that will have lasting impacts on the livelihoods, rights and freedoms of American families, workers and businesses.”

Read the report.          

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At Export Council, Obama Expected to Urge Corporate Interests to Help Him Obtain New Fast Track Powers to Expand the Status Quo U.S. Free Trade Pact Model That Congressional Democrats, Obama’s Base Oppose

At today’s meeting of the President’s Export Council, President Barack Obama is expected to urge yet another audience dominated by the corporate interests that opposed his election to help him obtain broad new Fast Track trade powers. Obama’s Fast Track request faces opposition by most Democratic members of Congress and base organizations as well as a bloc of conservative Republicans.

Obama also is likely to tout the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a pact that would expand the status quo U.S. trade agreement model that has led to staggering U.S. trade deficits, job loss and downward pressure on wages. When Obama picked up TPP negotiations from former President George W. Bush in 2009, consumer and environmental organizations, unions and congressional Democrats urged him to use the process to implement his 2008 election campaign promises to replace the old U.S. trade model based on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Instead, the administration has sided with the corporate interests that represent the majority of the approximately 600 official U.S. trade advisors and has replicated many of NAFTA’s most damaging provisions in the TPP.

“With the TPP, Obama is doubling down on the old, failed NAFTA trade pact status quo and even expanding on some of the NAFTA provisions that promoted American job offshoring, flooded us with unsafe imported food and increased medicine prices,” said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. “Given the TPP terms that would newly empower thousands of foreign firms to attack American health and environmental laws in foreign tribunals, incentivize even more U.S. job offshoring and ban the use of Buy American and Buy Local preferences, most Americans would be better off with no deal than what is in store with the TPP.”

Obama’s efforts to obtain Fast Track in the 113th Congress were rebuffed, as almost all House Democrats and a bloc of House GOP members indicated opposition.

Obama’s efforts to push more-of-the-same trade policies have been sidelined by the dismal outcomes of his 2011 U.S.-Korea FTA: The trade deficit with Korea in the first two years of the pact. In fact, the record shows that U.S. export growth with U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partners lags behind the rate of export growth with non-FTA nations. In addition, the aggregate U.S. trade deficit with the group of 20 countries with which the U.S. has FTAs has increased more than fivefold since the FTAs took effect, due in part to a massive NAFTA trade deficit.

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Defending Foreign Corporations' Privileges Is Hard, Especially When Looking At The Facts

Forbes just published this response from Lori Wallach and Ben Beachy (GTW director and research director) to a counterfactual Forbes opinion piece by John Brinkley in support of investor-state dispute settlement.  

Forbes-logoDefending Foreign Corporations' Privileges Is Hard, Especially When Looking At The Facts

By Lori Wallach & Ben Beachy

 

Even those who support the controversial idea of a parallel legal system for foreign corporations, known as investor-state dispute settlement or ISDS, likely cringed at John Brinkley’s recent attempt to defend that system. (“Trade Dispute Settlement: Much Ado About Nothing,” October 16.)

In trying to justify trade agreement provisions that provide special rights and privileges to foreign firms to the disadvantage of their domestic competitors, Brinkley wrote 24 sentences with factual assertions. Seventeen of them were factually wrong.

To his credit, it is no easy task to defend a system that empowers foreign corporations to bypass domestic courts and laws to demand taxpayer compensation for domestic policies that apply equally to their local competitors, but that they claim frustrate special privileges granted to them as foreign investors. The cases are heard by extrajudicial tribunals not bound by precedent. Decisions are not subject to substantive appeal.

Brinkley’s mission was particularly difficult given how unpopular the ISDS system has become. Indeed, one reason that the CATO Institute has come out against ISDS is the realistic concern that its inclusion in the proposed trans-Pacific and transatlantic free trade pacts could derail those negotiations.

ISDS is risky to include in a transatlantic deal

In Europe, the incoming European Commission President and the Economic Minister of Germany have both indicated that they oppose including ISDS in the U.S.-EU deal. Whether one focuses on the threat to solvency or fair competition, it’s especially risky to include ISDS in a transatlantic deal. Doing so would newly empower more than 70,000 U.S. and EU subsidiaries of cross-registered firms to demand compensation based on special foreign investor privileges—an unprecedented increase in liability for both the United States and the EU.

Around the world, governments from Australia to South Africa have started to rebuke ISDS as studies have shown countries have failed to attract more FDI by enacting ISDS agreements, while governments—and their treasuries—have come under increasing ISDS attacks by foreign firms.

Only 50 cases were launched in the first three decades of ISDS pacts. But in each of the past three years more than 50 cases have been filed annually. The current stock of 568 ISDS cases includes demands for compensation over land use policies, tobacco controls, energy and financial regulations, pollution cleanup requirements, patent standards and other policies that apply equally to domestic firms, and that often have been approved by domestic high courts.

This trend and its threat to the rule of law have led esteemed jurists from free-trade-minded nations such as Singapore, New Zealand and Australia to join the U.S. National Conference of State Legislatures (which represents our states’ majority GOP-controlled legislatures) in opposing ISDS.

Reviewing the facts

In his quixotic effort to defend the ISDS system, Brinkley made a real mess of the facts. There’s not space to go through all 17 factual errors, but it’s important to correct his biggest blunders.

For instance, Brinkley argued, “What matters is not whether [the foreign corporations] can sue, but whether they can win.” He then proceeded to misstate the win record.

In fact, the United Nations figures on ISDS case outcomes, which Brinkley cited, show that foreign corporations have gained favorable rulings or settlements in 57 percent of the ISDS cases launched to date.

Foreign corporations have “won” against Canada’s ban on hazardous waste exports, the Czech Republic’s decision to not bail out a bank, a Mexican municipality’s decision to not allow the expansion of a contaminated toxic waste facility, and a Canadian requirement for any and all firms obtaining oil concessions to contribute to research and development in the affected province.

Foreign firms and the success of their ISDS cases

Foreign firms have also proven successful in using the threat of an ISDS case to extract favorable settlements, which often oblige governments to pay large sums to the foreign firms. A government paid $900 million to a firm in one recent ISDS settlement.

ISDS settlements have also led governments to alter policies challenged by foreign corporations. An ISDS case that a U.S. chemical company launched against Canada’s ban on a toxic gasoline additive – one currently also banned in the United States – resulted in Canada overturning the ban. In another ISDS settlement, the German city of Hamburg was obliged to roll back environmental requirements on a Swedish corporation’s coal-fired power plant.

Without explanation, Brinkley chose simply to ignore all of the ISDS cases that were settled in favor of the foreign firm, distorting his “scoreboard” of ISDS case outcomes. And he did not mention that even when governments “win,” they are still on the hook for high legal costs and tribunal fees associated with defending these cases – an average of $8 million per case.

Investor-state disputes vs. state-state disputes

Brinkley’s accounting became even more confused when he conflated investor-state disputes withstate-state disputes – and similarly made a mish-mash of our critique. Brinkley appears not to realize the difference between the ISDS system, in which any covered foreign corporation claiming to have an investment in a country can drag a government to an extrajudicial tribunal to challenge its policies, and trade agreement dispute settlement in which cases may only be brought by government signatories to pacts.

He stated, for example, that “the aggrieved foreign investor can turn to a dispute settlement body at the…WTO [World Trade Organization].” False. The WTO only allows governments – not foreign corporations – to bring cases against governments.

Brinkley then picked one state-state dispute that the United States lost at the WTO and wondered why the UN did not include it in its list of investor-state cases against the United States. He added the lost WTO state-state case to his tally of investor-statechallenges that the United States has faced to date, and summarized his hodgepodge U.S. win-loss record as, “we’ll say 13-1.”

Brinkley seems unaware that in fact the United States has lost 61 out of 67state-state cases brought against it at the WTO – a 91 percent loss rate.

As for investor-state cases brought against the United States, few such cases exist thanks to the reality that 52 of the 54 countries with which the United States has an ISDS-enforced pact are not major FDI exporters. Brinkley appears strangely unconcerned that the U.S. government plans to dramatically expand its investor-state liability under the U.S.-EU deal, which would open the door to foreign investor claims from 11 of the world’s 20 largest FDI exporters.

The Loewen fluke

Brinkley also cited an ISDS case that Loewen, a Canadian funeral home conglomerate, launched against the U.S. government over Mississippi’s jury trial system and the standard common-law requirement to post bond before pursuing an appeal. (Loewen had lost a state court case battle against a rival funeral home operator.)

Brinkley argued that because the tribunal dismissed Loewen’s ISDS claim, there is no cause for concern. But the tribunal actually supported a number of Loewen’s claims on the merits. It only dismissed the case without imposing a penalty on the U.S. government thanks to a remarkable fluke: Loewen’s lawyers reincorporated the firm as a U.S. company, thus destroying its ability to obtain compensation as a “foreign” investor.

Such luck should not be expected to continue, particularly if, under the U.S.-EU deal, foreign investor privileges are granted to thousands of European firms operating here.

Before we subject our national treasury, our domestic firms or our laws to an unprecedented expansion of ISDS liability, we should take a cold, hard look at the legacy to date of this extraordinary system. It would help to start with actual facts.

Ms. Wallach and Mr. Beachy are the director and research director, respectively, of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch.

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Pharmaceutical CEO: This Controversial Deal Will Be Great for Us…And You (Trust Us)

In an op-ed appearing in Forbes on Tuesday, the CEO of Eli Lilly, a U.S. pharmaceutical corporation, paints a glowing picture of how the proposed Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) would benefit consumers on both sides of the Atlantic – but it’s pure fantasy.

It is not surprising that Eli Lilly is cheerleading this controversial deal. This is the same pharmaceutical firm that is using the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – TAFTA’s predecessor – to challenge Canada’s legal standards for granting patents and demand $500 million in taxpayer compensation.

John Lechleiter, Lilly’s CEO, shrouds his arguments under the guise of “free trade,” while in reality Lilly’s TAFTA proposals are a plea for increased government protection for his company and expansion of the monopolistic business model upon which the multinational pharmaceutical industry relies.

This post will take on Mr. Lechleiter’s claims, one by one.

Continue reading "Pharmaceutical CEO: This Controversial Deal Will Be Great for Us…And You (Trust Us)" »

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Let’s Just Pretend We Didn’t Offshore Manufacturing

Is an iPhone made in China and exported to Europe a U.S. export?

Is an Apple executive a manufacturing worker?

Yes, and yes.  At least those could become the answers if a new proposal afoot among some in the administration is allowed to take effect.  Federal agencies grouped under the bland-sounding Economic Classification Policy Committee (ECPC) are proposing to radically redefine U.S. manufacturing and trade statistics. 

Under the proposal, U.S. firms that have offshored their production abroad – like Apple – would become “factoryless goods” manufacturers.  The foreign factories that actually manufacture the goods – like the notorious iPhone-producing Foxconn factories in China – would no longer be manufacturers, but “service” providers for the rebranded “manufacturing” firms like Apple.

It appears the administration has been reading Orwell

But the problem with this proposed redefinition is not merely that it offends common sense.  The “factoryless goods” proposal would deceptively deflate the size of reported, but not actual, U.S. manufacturing trade deficits, while artificially inflating the number of U.S. manufacturing jobs overnight.

While some details of the proposal remain open-ended, one thing is clear: this maneuver would obscure the erosion of U.S. manufacturing.  It would disguise the mass-offshoring of U.S. middle-class factory jobs incentivized by NAFTA-style trade deals.  It would undermine efforts to change the unfair trade and other policies that have led to such decline.  

To boost U.S. manufacturing jobs and production, we need to switch our policies, not our numbers.

The ECPC is accepting comments on their “factoryless goods” proposal until July 21.  If you’d care to offer your thoughts, click here.
  

The 3 Big Distortions of the "Factoryless Goods" Proposal
  

1.  The proposal would result in a fabricated reduction of the U.S. manufacturing trade deficit by rebranding imports of U.S. manufactured goods as “services” imports, according to recent explanations offered by officials of ECPC member agencies.  The redefinition would not affect all U.S. trade statistics, but it would distort some of the most widely-reported numbers (those calculated on a balance of payments basis), misleading the public and policymakers alike.

Take, for example, a scenario in which Apple ships iPhone parts to China to be assembled in a Foxconn factory and then sent back to the United States to be sold here.  Currently, the value of the imported iPhone minus the lesser value of the exported parts counts as a net U.S. import of a manufactured good.  This reflects the fact that Apple offshored its iPhone manufacturing to China.

But under the ECPC proposal, Foxconn, now called a “manufacturing services provider,” would not be described as having manufactured the iPhones but as having provided services to Apple.  As a result, the net U.S. import of manufactured goods resulting from Apple’s decision to offshore would be reduced. In its place would be an import of Foxconn’s factory “services.”
  

2.  The proposal would treat some goods exported by foreign factories as U.S. manufactured exports.  Take a scenario in which Apple ships iPhone parts to China that are assembled by Foxconn and then shipped to the European Union (EU).  Currently, Apple’s export of parts to China counts as the only U.S. export in this scenario. 

But the ECPC proposal, according to officials of ECPC member agencies, would instead count China’s export of the fully-assembled iPhones to the EU, less the cost of any imported parts, as a “U.S. manufactured goods export.”

The absurd logic of this rebranding is that while China manufactured and exported the iPhones, they count as U.S. manufactured exports because they were under the control of a U.S. brand.  This Orwellian proposal would spell an artificial increase in U.S. manufactured exports (on a balance of payments basis), further belying the real U.S. manufacturing trade deficit.
  

 3.  The proposal would spur a disingenuous, overnight increase in the number of U.S. “manufacturing” jobs as white-collar employees in firms like Apple – now rebranded as “factoryless goods producers” – would suddenly be counted as “manufacturing” workers. 

This change would also create a false increase in manufacturing wages, as many of the newly-counted “manufacturing” jobs would be designers, programmers and brand managers at “factoryless goods producers” like Apple. 

Reported U.S. manufacturing output would also abruptly and errantly jump, as revenues from firms like Apple would be lumped in with the output of actual manufacturers. 
  

This proposal defies common sense.  It would dramatically distort U.S. trade, labor and gross domestic product statistics.  Goods manufactured abroad and imported into the United States are not something other than manufactured goods imports.  Goods exported from foreign factories do not become “U.S. exports” when they are produced for U.S. brands.  And jobs in which workers spend zero time actually manufacturing anything are not “manufacturing jobs.”  

The offshoring of U.S. manufacturing under years of unfair trade policies cannot be undone with a data trick.  The hoped-for “renaissance” of U.S. manufacturing will come through new policymaking informed by accurate data, not politically convenient distortions.  

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Corporate Group Launches “Fact-Based” Trade Series, Avoids Facts

When launching a new series of materials touted as “fact-based analysis,” it is unwise to begin with a distortion of the facts.  But that’s the inauspicious move taken today by the Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT), a corporate alliance that has launched a new “Trade Notes” series with some confused data on the record of U.S. trade under “free trade” agreements (FTAs).  

Official government data show that U.S. trade deficits have ballooned with FTA partners while actually diminishing with the rest of the world.  As we reported recently, the aggregate U.S. trade deficit with FTA partners has increased by more than $147 billion, or 443%, since the FTAs were implemented.  In contrast, the aggregate deficit with all non-FTA countries (even including China) has decreased by more than $130 billion, or 16%, since 2006 (the median entry date of existing FTAs). 

Two factors explain this proclivity toward trade deficits with FTA partner countries.  First, imports from those countries have spiked – an unsurprising result of a trade model that has incentivized offshoring and pitted U.S. workers against their lower-wage counterparts abroad.  Second, and perhaps more surprising, is that U.S. export growth to FTA partner countries, despite all promises to the contrary, has been slower than to non-FTA countries. Indeed, growth of U.S. exports to countries that are not FTA partners has exceeded U.S. export growth to countries that are FTA partners by 30 percent over the last decade.

But that isn’t the takeaway from ECAT’s Trade Notes debut today.  In response to “some commentators [who] have argued that trade agreements drive growth in U.S. trade deficits,” ECAT asserts, “recent data suggest that trade agreements, on the whole, actually help to improve U.S. trade balances with FTA partner countries.” 

How can ECAT make this claim?  First, they take oil and gas out of the trade data. Echoing the refrain of many FTA proponents that burgeoning FTA deficits are just about oil imports, ECAT displays a chart that appears to show aggregate non-oil trade deficits with FTA partners diminishing and then turning into surpluses over the last decade.

But the official government data beg to differ.  Even if we remove oil and gas, the non-oil U.S. goods trade balance last year with all U.S. FTA partners was a $100 billion deficit, not a surplus. And while ECAT claims that the non-oil trade balance with FTA countries has been improving, the non-oil U.S. trade deficit with these 20 countries was larger last year than in any of the last six years. 

What, then, explains the gulf between the data and ECAT’s claim of a growing non-oil surplus with FTA countries?  The primary explanation is that ECAT – like the U.S. Trade Representative and fellow corporate conglomerates such as the Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, Business Roundtable, etc. – has decided to count foreign-made exports as U.S. exports.  As we’ve explained time and again, determining FTAs’ impacts on U.S. jobs requires counting only U.S.-made exports.  Instead, ECAT also counts “re-exports” – goods made abroad that are shipped through the United States en route to a final destination.  As re-exports to FTA partner countries have been steadily increasing, counting them in trade data – as ECAT does – has had an increasingly distortionary effect on the true record of FTAs (e.g. you can make the NAFTA deficit look half as big simply by counting foreign-made re-exports as U.S. exports). 

In announcing today’s new Trade Note series, ECAT President Calman Cohen stated, “ECAT member companies recognize the importance of maintaining a fact-based dialogue on the contribution of trade and investment to our national economic interest.  ECAT seeks to make a constructive contribution to that dialogue through its new Trade Notes series.”

We’re all for contributions to fact-based dialogue.  Let’s hope we start seeing some from ECAT.  

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U.S. Trade Deficits Have Grown More Than 440% with FTA Countries, but Declined 16% with Non-FTA Countries

The aggregate U.S. goods trade deficit with Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partners is more than five times as high as before the deals went into effect, while the aggregate deficit with non-FTA countries has actually fallen. The key differences are soaring imports into the United States from FTA partners and lower growth in U.S. exports to those nations than to non-FTA nations. Incredibly, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce website states, “For those worried about the U.S. trade deficit, trade agreements are clearly the solution – not the problem.” Their pitch ignores the import surges contributing to growing deficits and job loss, while their export “data” is inflated, using tricks described below.

The aggregate U.S. trade deficit with FTA partners has increased by more than $147 billion (inflation-adjusted) since the FTAs were implemented. In contrast, the aggregate deficit with all non-FTA countries has decreased by more than $130 billion since 2006 (the median entry date of existing FTAs). Two reasons: a sharp increase in imports from FTA partners and significantly lower export growth to FTA partners than to non-FTA nations over the last decade. Using the Obama administration’s net exports-to-jobs ratiothe FTA trade deficit surge implies the loss of about 800,000 U.S. jobs. Trade with Canada and Mexico (our first and third largest trade partners, respectively) contributed the most to the widening FTA deficit. Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the U.S. deficit with Canada ballooned and the small U.S. surplus with Mexico turned into a nearly $100 billion deficit. The trend persists under new FTAs – two years into the Korea FTA, the U.S. trade deficit with Korea has jumped more than 51 percent. Reducing the massive trade deficit requires a new trade agreement model, not more of the same.

U.S. Export Growth Falters under FTAs

Growth of U.S. exports to countries that are not FTA partners has exceeded U.S. export growth to countries that are FTA partners by 30 percent over the last decade. Between 2003 and 2013, U.S. goods exports to FTA partner countries grew by an annual average rate of only 4.9 percent. Goods exports to non-FTA partner countries, by contrast, grew by 6.3 percent per year on average. Since 2006, when the number of FTA partner countries nearly doubled with the implementation of the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the FTA export growth “penalty” has only increased. Since then, average U.S. export growth to non-FTA partner countries has topped average export growth to FTA partners by 47 percent.

Corporate FTA Boosters Use Errant Methods to Claim Higher Exports under FTAs

Members of Congress will invariably be shown data by defenders of our status quo trade policy that appear to indicate that FTAs have generated an export boom. Indeed, to promote congressional support for new NAFTA-style FTAs, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) have funded an entire body of research designed to create the appearance that the existing pacts have both boosted exports and reversed trade deficits with FTA partner countries. This work relies on several methodological tricks that fail basic standards of accuracy:

  • Ignoring imports: U.S. Chamber of Commerce studies regularly omit mention of soaring imports under FTAs, instead focusing only on exports. But any study claiming to evaluate the net impact of trade deals must deal with both sides of the trade equation. In the same way that exports are associated with job opportunities, imports are associated with lost job opportunities when they outstrip exports, as dramatically seen under FTAs.
  • Counting “re-exports:” NAM has misleadingly claimed that the United States has a manufacturing surplus with FTA nations by counting as U.S. exports goods that actually are made overseas – not by U.S. workers. NAM’s data include “re-exports” – goods made elsewhere that are shipped through the United States en route to a final destination. Determining FTAs’ impact on U.S. jobs requires counting only U.S.-made exports.
  • Omitting major FTAs: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has repeatedly claimed that U.S. export growth is higher to FTA nations that to non-FTA nations by simply omitting FTAs that do not support their claim. One U.S. Chamber of Commerce study omitted all FTAs implemented before 2003 to estimate export growth. This excluded major FTAs like NAFTA that comprised more than 83 percent of all U.S. FTA exports. Given NAFTA’s leading role in the 443 percent aggregate FTA deficit surge, its omission vastly skews the findings.
  • Failing to correct for inflation: U.S. Chamber of Commerce studies that have claimed high FTA export growth have not adjusted the data for inflation, thus errantly counting price increases as export gains.
  • Comparing apples and oranges: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has claimed higher U.S. exports under FTAs by using two completely different methods to calculate the growth of U.S. exports to FTA partners (an unweighted average) versus non-FTA partners (a weighted average). This inconsistency creates the false impression of higher export growth to FTA partners by giving equal weight to FTA countries that are vastly different in importance to U.S. exports (e.g. Canada, where U.S. exports exceed $251 billion, and Bahrain, where they do not reach $1 billion), despite accounting for such critical differences for non-FTA countries.

Chart: U.S. Trade Deficit Rises by $147 Billion with FTA Partners, Falls by $131 Billion with Rest of the World

FTA v non-FTA 3

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The 2014 Trade Agenda: What Hole? Keep Digging.

The President’s 2014 Trade Policy Agenda, released today by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), violates the first law of holes: when you are in one, stop digging. Instead, it sticks to the first rule of PR, when the data is against you (e.g. when export growth under last year's trade agenda amounted to zero percent), distract. 

In the face of large U.S. trade deficits with Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partners, the report declines to count imports and counts exports when convenient. It tries to camouflage the damaging track record of past deals (“forget about the hole”) to sell to the U.S. Congress and public yet another round of FTAs (“just keep digging”). 

The report states that the administration is “working with Congress” to gain Fast Track authority to enact two sweeping and controversial new FTAs – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA). It neglects to mention that, having seen the hole created by past Fast Tracked FTAs, members of Congress have stated in overwhelming, bipartisan fashion that they have no interest in handing the administration another shovel labeled “Fast Track.”

Much of the 2014 agenda is a copy and paste of the 2013 agenda, reiterating USTR’s stock set of talking points, such as the tired, counterfactual promise that a more-of-the-same trade policy will boost exports. In 2013, this is how USTR put it: “The Obama Administration’s trade policy helps U.S. exporters gain access to billions of customers beyond our borders to support economic growth in the United States and in markets worldwide.” This year they invert the sentence: “We seek to…strengthen our economy by…negotiating high standard agreements that help U.S. exporters gain access to billions of customers beyond our borders.”

But repetition does not make the argument any truer. Under the array of FTAs that have served as a template for the Obama administration’s trade policy agenda, U.S. exports grew by a grand total of 0% last year. The year before that, they grew by 2%.  At the abysmal export growth rate seen in the last two years, we will not reach Obama’s stated goal to double 2009’s exports until 2054, 40 years behind schedule. (The authors of this year’s Trade Policy Agenda opt not to highlight the ill-fated goal.)  

Also omitted is the inconvenient fact that the overall growth of U.S. exports to countries that are not FTA partners has exceeded U.S. export growth to countries that are FTA partners by 30 percent over the last decade.  

Even more glaring is the report's lack of any mention of how exports to Korea have fared under the Korea FTA, which has its second anniversary in less than two weeks, despite detailing export performance to other countries. Under the Korea FTA, which served as the administration’s opening offer for the TPP negotiations, U.S. goods exports to Korea have fallen below the average monthly level seen before the FTA for 20 out of 21 months. Rather than deal with this reality, the report tries to hide it.

The data simply do not support the oft-parroted pitch that more-of-the-same FTAs are the ticket to boosting exports. 

But data is not the report’s strong suit. In defending existing deals like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Korea FTA so as to advocate for expanding on their model via the TPP and TAFTA, the report simply ignores the deals' track records. For example, on manufacturing, the report states: “to support the growth of advanced manufacturing and associated high-quality jobs here at home, in 2014 the Obama Administration will continue to pursue trade policies aimed at keeping American manufacturers competitive with their global peers.”

But official government data show that our manufacturing trade deficits have increased dramatically under the very trade policies that the administration vows to “continue to pursue.” Last year, we had a $52.4 billion manufacturing trade deficit with our 20 FTA partners. In 1993, before NAFTA was implemented and before 18 of these 20 countries had an FTA with the United States, we had a $30.1 billion manufacturing trade surplus with these same trade partners.  In the intervening 20 years, during which the United States implemented FTAs with all of these countries, the U.S. manufacturing trade balance with these trade partners fell by $82.6 billion. According to the administration’s own figures, that amounts to a loss of more than 446,000 U.S. jobs in manufacturing alone.

When directly addressing NAFTA, the report chooses to ignore one half of the trade flow equation and focus only on exports. It fails to mention that imports from Mexico and Canada under NAFTA have swamped exports, causing the NAFTA trade deficit to soar 556 percent, reaching $177 billion last year.

And while the report claims that “the agricultural sector has been a bright spot for exports,” that has not been the case under recent FTAs. The average annual U.S. agricultural deficit with Mexico and Canada in NAFTA’s first two decades reached $975 million last year, almost three times the pre-NAFTA level. Over the last decade, U.S. food exports to Mexico and Canada actually fell slightly while U.S. food imports from Mexico and Canada more than doubled.

Food exports have fared even worse under the Korea FTA – in the first year of the deal, U.S. beef, pork, and poultry exports to Korea fell by 8 percent, 24 percent, and 41 percent respectively. 

While ignoring the sluggish exports and deep deficits occurring under existing FTAs (“what hole?”), the 2014 Trade Policy Agenda advocates for the TPP by claiming it would deliver where its predecessors have failed. The report states, “TPP will expand U.S. trade with dynamic economies throughout the rapidly growing Asia-Pacific region.” 

Even if one ignores the disappointing export legacy of the deals serving as the TPP’s template, this sales pitch comes across as hollow. The United States already has FTAs with six of the 11 TPP negotiating countries, for which increased market access is largely not up for negotiation. Of the remaining five TPP countries, Japan is the only major economy, and its growth rate last year was a tepid one percent – hardly the sought-after “dynamism.” The remaining four countries include Vietnam (with an annual per capita income of $1,550), Malaysia (with an annual per capita income of $9,820), New Zealand (with a population the size of metro D.C.), and Brunei (with a population the size of Huntsville, Alabama). Are these the markets on which the administration’s history-defying promise of TPP-led export growth hinge? 

Members of Congress aren’t buying it. Most House Democrats and a sizeable bloc of House Republicans have said no to Fast Tracking the TPP. House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid have also voiced their opposition. So has 62% of the U.S. voting public. Their message to the administration is simple: we’re in a hole. Stop asking for shovels. Find a ladder. 

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New York Times: Obama's TPP-Promoting Mexico Visit Is "Politically Fraught"

A New York Times story today on Obama's trip to Mexico tomorrow underscores a point we made last week: Obama's visit with the leaders of Mexico and Canada shines a spotlight on NAFTA's 20-year legacy of damage, casting a long shadow on Obama's unpopular attempt to Fast Track through Congress the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping pact built on the NAFTA model.  The Times reports:

The whirlwind visit...will offer Mr. Obama a chance to reassure his counterparts about his capacity to deliver at a time when he faces significant hurdles at home. Senator Harry Reid of Nevada and Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, the Democratic leaders in Congress, oppose legislation giving him authority similar to that of his predecessors to negotiate trade deals.

That ill-favored legislation is an attempt to revive Fast Track, the Nixon-era maneuver that empowered the executive branch to unilaterally negotiate and sign sweeping "trade" deals, locking in the contents before Congress got an expedited, no-amendments, limited-debate vote.  In addition to Pelosi and Reid, most House Democrats, a bloc of House Republicans, and about two out of three U.S. voters oppose the administration's current push to renew Fast Track so as to skid the controversial TPP through Congress. 

Among the reasons for the broad opposition to a Fast-Tracked TPP is the 20-year legacy of NAFTA.  For many people throughout North America, NAFTA's damage has been tangible: job losses, wage stagnation, displaced livelihoods, unsafe food, and exposure to toxins.  The Times cited our comprehensive report, released last week, that details the empirical record of NAFTA's damaging first twenty years: 

But even two decades after Nafta, debate still rages about its merits or drawbacks. Ms. Wallach’s group released a report last week compiling government data to argue that not only did Nafta’s promised benefits not materialize, but that many of the results were the opposite of what was promised, citing lost jobs, slower manufacturing and large trade deficits.

It is the lived experience of NAFTA, not an abstract ideology, that has prompted 53 percent of the U.S. public to say that we should “do whatever is necessary” to “renegotiate” or “leave” NAFTA.  Seeing such opposition, Obama promised to renegotiate NAFTA as a presidential candidate in 2008.  His current push to Fast Track the TPP represents a stunning flip-flop that threatens to replicate the very NAFTA-style damage that Obama criticized on the campaign trail.  Incredibly, Obama administration officials are now trying to sell the TPP as honoring Obama's renegotiation promise -- an Orwellian move that our own Lori Wallach has been quick to counter.  The Times reports: 

Michael B. Froman, the president’s trade representative, tried to reassure Democrats on Tuesday that the administration would be sensitive to their concerns about workplace and environmental standards in putting together the new trade pact, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP. He noted that as a candidate, Mr. Obama promised to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement, known as Nafta.

“And that’s exactly what we’re doing in TPP, upgrading our trading relationships not only with Mexico and Canada but with nine other countries as well,” Mr. Froman said in a speech at the Center for American Progress, a liberal research group in Washington.

That assertion drew scorn from critics. “I don’t think that expanding on the Nafta model and extending it to nine more nations was what the unions, environmental groups or Democratic Party activists had in mind when Obama said he would renegotiate Nafta,” said Lori Wallach, a trade expert at Public Citizen, a liberal advocacy group.

The administration's TPP sales pitch is unlikely to convince the broad majority of the U.S. public that wants to renegotiate NAFTA and halt a NAFTA-expanding TPP.  If NAFTA's two-decade legacy of tumult and hardship makes it politically impossible to Fast Track through Congress the TPP, it would constitute a unique benefit of an otherwise damaging deal.

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Obama Mexico Visit Spotlights 20-Year Legacy of Job Loss from NAFTA, the Pact on Which Obama’s TPP Is Modeled

New Public Citizen Report Catalogs the Negative NAFTA Outcomes That Are Fueling Opposition to Obama Push to Fast Track TPP

The 20-year record of job loss and trade deficits from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is haunting President Barack Obama’s efforts to obtain special trade authority to fast track the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), said Public Citizen as it released a new report that comprehensively documents NAFTA’s outcomes. Next week’s presidential trip to Mexico for a long-scheduled “Three Amigos” U.S.-Mexico-Canada summit will raise public attention to NAFTA, on which the TPP is modeled, which is not good news for Obama’s push for the TPP and Fast Track.

Numerous polls show that opposition to NAFTA is among few issues that unite Americans across partisan and regional divides. Public ire about NAFTA’s legacy of job loss and policymakers’ concerns about two decades of huge NAFTA trade deficits have plagued the administration’s efforts to obtain Fast Track trade authority for the TPP. The TPP would expand the NAFTA model to more nations, including ultra-low-wage Vietnam. In the U.S. House of Representatives, most Democrats and a bloc of GOP have indicated opposition to Fast Track, as has Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.).

Public Citizen’s new report, "NAFTA’s 20-Year Legacy and the Fate of the Trans-Pacific Partnership", compiles government data on NAFTA outcomes to detail the empirical record underlying the public and policymaker sentiment. It also shows that warnings issued by NAFTA boosters that a failure to pass NAFTA would result in foreign policy crises – rising Mexican migration and a neighboring nation devolving into a troubled narco-state – actually came to fruition in part because of NAFTA provisions that destroyed millions of rural Mexican livelihoods.

“Outside of corporate boardrooms and D.C. think tanks, Americans view NAFTA as a symbol of job loss and a cancer on the middle class,” said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. “If you are a president battling to overcome bipartisan congressional skepticism about giving you special trade authority to fast track a massive 12-nation NAFTA expansion, it is really not helpful to be visiting Mexico for a summit of NAFTA-nation leaders.”

The Public Citizen report shows that not only did projections and promises made by NAFTA proponents not materialize, but many results are exactly the opposite. Such outcomes include a staggering $177 billion U.S. trade deficit with NAFTA partners Mexico and Canada, one million net U.S. jobs lost in NAFTA’s first decade alone, slower U.S. manufacturing and services export growth to Mexico and Canada, a doubling of immigration from Mexico, larger agricultural trade deficits with Mexico and Canada, and more than $360 million paid to corporations after “investor-state” tribunal attacks on, and rollbacks of, domestic public interest policies.

“The data have disproved the promises of more jobs and better wages, so bizarrely now NAFTA defenders argue the pact was a success because it expanded the volume of U.S. trade with the two countries without mentioning that this resulted in a 556 percent increase in our trade deficit with those countries, with a flood of new NAFTA imports wiping out hundreds of thousands of American jobs,” said Wallach.

The study tracks specific promises made by U.S. corporations like Chrysler, GE and Caterpillar to create specific numbers of American jobs if NAFTA was approved, and reveals government data showing that instead, they fired U.S. workers and moved operations to Mexico.

“The White House and the corporate lobby sold NAFTA with promises of export growth and job creation, but the actual data show the projections were at best wrong,” said Wallach. “The gulf between the gains promised for NAFTA and the damage that ensued means that the public and policymakers are not buying the same sales pitch now being made for theTPP and Fast Track.”

The report also documents how post-NAFTA trade and investment trends have contributed to middle-class pay cuts, which in turn contributed to growing income inequality; how since NAFTA, U.S. trade deficit growth with Mexico and Canada has been 50 percent higher than with countries not party to a U.S. Free Trade Agreement, and how U.S. manufacturing and services exports to Canada and Mexico have grown at less than half the pre-NAFTA rate.

Among the study’s findings:

  • Rather than creating in any year the 200,000 net jobs per year promised by former President Bill Clinton on the basis of Peterson Institute for International Economics projections, job loss from NAFTA began rapidly:
    • American manufacturing jobs were lost as U.S. firms used NAFTA’s foreign investor privileges to relocate production to Mexico, and as a new flood of NAFTA imports swamped gains in exports, creating a massive new trade deficit that equated to an estimated net loss of one million U.S. jobs by 2004. A small pre-NAFTA U.S. trade surplus of $2.5 billion with Mexico turned into a huge new deficit, and a pre-NAFTA $29.6 billion deficit with Canada exploded. The 2013 NAFTA deficit was $177 billion, representing a more than six-fold increase in the NAFTA deficit.
    • More than 845,000 specific U.S. workers, most in the manufacturing sector, have been certified for Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) since NAFTA because they lost their jobs due to offshoring to, or imports from, Canada and Mexico.The TAA program is narrow, covering only a subset of jobs lost at manufacturing facilities, and is difficult to qualify for. Thus, the TAA numbers significantly undercount NAFTA job loss. A TAA database searchable by congressional district, sector and more is available here.
    • According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, two out of every three displaced manufacturing workers who were rehired in 2012 experienced a wage reduction, most of them taking a pay cut of greater than 20 percent.  
    • As increasing numbers of workers displaced from manufacturing jobs have joined those competing for non-offshorable, low-skill jobs in sectors such as hospitality and food service, real wages have also fallen in these sectors under NAFTA. The resulting downward pressure on middle-class wages has fueled recent growth in income inequality.
  • Scores of environmental and health laws have been challenged in foreign tribunals through NAFTA’s controversial investor-state dispute resolution system. More than $360 million in compensation to investors has been extracted from NAFTA governments via “investor-state” tribunal challenges against toxics bans, land-use rules, water and forestry policies, and more. More than $12.4 billion is pending in such NAFTA claims, including challenges of medicine patent policies, a fracking moratorium and a renewable energy program.
  • The average annual U.S. agricultural trade deficit with Mexico and Canada in NAFTA’s first two decades reached $975 million, almost three times the pre-NAFTA level. U.S. beef imports from Mexico and Canada, for example, have risen 133 percent. Over the past decade,  total U.S. food exports to Mexico and Canada have actually fallen slightly while U.S. food imports from Mexico and Canada have more than doubled. This stands in stark contrast to projections that NAFTA would allow U.S. farmers to export their way to newfound wealth and farm income stability. Despite a 239 percent rise in food imports from Canada and Mexico under NAFTA, the average nominal U.S. price of food in the United States has jumped 67 percent since NAFTA.
  • The reductions in consumer goods prices that have materialized have not been sufficient to offset the losses to wages under NAFTA; U.S. workers without college degrees (63 percent of the workforce) likely have lost a net amount equal to 12.2 percent of their wages even after accounting for gains from cheaper goods.This net loss means a loss of more than $3,300 per year for a worker earning the median annual wage of $27,500.
  • The export of subsidized U.S. corn did increase under NAFTA’s first decade, destroying the livelihoods of more than one million Mexican campesino farmers and about 1.4 million additional Mexican workers whose livelihoods depended on agriculture. The desperate migration of those displaced from Mexico’s rural economy pushed down wages in Mexico’s border maquiladora factory zone and contributed to a doubling of Mexican immigration to the United States following NAFTA’s implementation.
  • Facing displacement, rising prices and stagnant wages, more than half the Mexican population, and more than 60 percent of the rural population, still falls below the poverty line, despite the promises that NAFTA would bring broad prosperity to Mexicans. Real wages in Mexico have fallen significantly below pre-NAFTA levels as price increases for basic consumer goods have exceeded wage increases. A minimum wage earner in Mexico today can buy 38 percent fewer consumer goods than on the day that NAFTA took effect. Despite promises that NAFTA would benefit Mexican consumers by granting access to cheaper imported products, the cost of basic consumer goods in Mexico has risen to seven times the pre-NAFTA level, while the minimum wage stands at only four times the pre-NAFTA level. Though the price paid to Mexican farmers for corn plummeted after NAFTA, the deregulated retail price of tortillas – Mexico’s staple food – shot up 279 percent in the pact’s first 10 years.

“Given NAFTA’s damaging outcomes, few of the corporations or think tanks that sold it as a boon for all of us in the 1990s like to talk about it, but the reality is that their promises failed, the opposite occurred and millions of people were severely harmed and now this legacy is derailing President Obama’s misguided push to expand NAFTA through the TPP,” said Wallach.

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2013 Trade Data: USITC Corrections of Last Week’s Census Data Show Why Obama’s TPP, Fast Track Quest Is in Trouble

This weekend’s U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) release of corrected 2013 year-end trade data goes a long way in explaining broad congressional and public opposition to the Obama administration’s trade agenda, which is premised on expanding to additional nations a model of trade pacts that the data show are failing most Americans. The data (graphs below) show:

A stunning decline in U.S. exports to Korea, a rise in imports from Korea, and a widening of the U.S. trade deficit under the Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

  • In 20 out of 21 months since the Korea FTA took effect, U.S. goods exports to Korea have fallen below the average monthly level in the year before the deal.
  • U.S. average monthly exports to Korea since the FTA are 12 percent lower than the pre-FTA monthly average, while monthly imports from Korea are up 3 percent.
  • The monthly trade deficit with Korea has ballooned 49 percent compared to the pre-FTA level. These losses amount to tens of thousands of lost U.S. jobs.

Zero growth in U.S. goods exports relative to 2012, placing the United States decades behind in Obama’s stated goal to double exports in five years.

  • Total U.S. goods exports in 2013 actually dropped slightly from 2012 after adjusting for inflation, revealing a negative 0.1 percent growth rate.
  • The data show there is no chance to meet President Obama’s stated goal to double 2009’s exports by the end of this year. At the paltry 1 percent annual export growth rate seen over the past two years, the export-doubling goal would not be reached until 2054, 40 years behind schedule.

A staggering U.S. trade deficit with Canada and Mexico after 20 years of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

  • The 2013 U.S. goods trade deficit with Mexico and Canada was $177 billion - a nearly seven-fold increase above the pre-NAFTA level, when the United States enjoyed a small trade surplus with Mexico and a modest deficit with Canada.
  • Even worse for U.S. workers, the non-oil NAFTA deficit has multiplied more than 13-fold, costing hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs. Indeed, the share of the combined U.S. trade deficit with Mexico and Canada that is comprised of oil has declined since NAFTA.

Today’s USITC data correct last week’s Census Bureau trade data to remove re-exports – goods made elsewhere that pass through U.S. ports en route to final destinations. The corrected data only heaps further doubt on Obama’s prospects for getting Fast Track trade authority, now publicly opposed by most House Democrats, a sizeable bloc of House Republicans, and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. Obama has asked for Fast Track to push through Congress the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a controversial deal modeled on the Korea FTA and NAFTA.

Statement of Lori Wallach, Director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch

“Many in Congress and the public oppose NAFTA-on-steroids “trade” agreements like the TPP and Fast Track authority to expedite them because past trade deals have proved to be so damaging. Just like today for TPP, in the past we were sold on glorious projections of these deals’ benefits but the actual data show an ever-larger drop in U.S. exports to Korea since that pact and a growing trade deficit, a massive NAFTA trade deficit and overall zero growth for U.S. goods exports relative to last year despite implementation of more-of-the-same trade deals. The White House and the corporate lobby are trying to sell Congress the TPP and Fast Track with the same old promises about export growth and job creation, but today’s data show that under Obama’s only past major trade deal with Korea on which TPP is modeled, U.S. exports dropped dramatically, imports soared and the U.S. lost more jobs to a trade agreement.”

Korea 2013.

Obama Exports 2013.

NAFTA 2013

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